THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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THE BRISTOL MODERN CHURCHMEN'S CONFERENCE

THE thirty-second Annual Conference of Modern Churchmen was held at Bristol, September 6th—9th, 1949. The Conference was well attended and the discussions were lively and well-informed. The Bishop of Truro, Professor Simon of Strasbourg, the Dean of St. Paul's, the Vice-Chancellor of Bristol University and, last but not least, Dr. Stanley Cook (whose recent death we greatly regret) graced our proceedings by their presence.

The social life of the Conference was of the happiest kind. Amid the beautiful surroundings of Will's Hall we felt ourselves to be dwelling in a modern *Abbaye de Thélème* in which the sweets of reason were freely mingled with other sweets of life.

This number of the *Modern Churchman* contains the Presidential address by Sir Henry Self, the Conference sermon by Bishop Wilson, Dean of Manchester, and eight Conference papers as follows:

The Non-Rational Element in Religion by Prof. Grensted.
Reason and Rationalism by H. C. Snape, M.A.
Modern Interpretations of History and their Challenge by Dr. S. F. G. Brandon.
The Flight from Reason in the Interpretation of the Bible by L. B. Cross, M.A.
Reason and Aesthetics by Dr. Geddes Macgregor.
Beyond Reason—The Occult and the Psychic by J. D. Pearce-Higgins, M.A.
Reason and Authority by Dr. St. John Ervine.
Return to Reason and to God by D. E. H. Whiteley, M.A.*

* We regret being unable to publish, on account of its length, the valuable paper by Professor H. D. Lewis on *Reason and Morals,* but it will appear in the *Cambridge Journal* (January, 1950).

The Flight from Reason, the selected theme of the Conference, was discussed mainly as it manifests itself in the spheres of contemporary Christian Faith and Practice.

We are aware, of course, that there are a number of Christian Fundamentalists who regard Reason as the enemy of the Christian Religion and seem to be quite unaware that religious irrationalism is the most powerful factor in producing scepticism and superstition. A religion whose supreme ideal is to worship God in spirit and in truth and to love one's neighbour as oneself has no truer friend than reason. It may be retorted that even if this claim be granted in the case of Natural Religion it certainly cannot be admitted in the case of Revealed Religion.

Bishop Butler, in his *Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature*, contradicts this anti-rational claim. He there maintains that 'Reason is the candle of the Lord within us' and that by which we must judge even of Revelation itself. To claim less for reason was in his eyes to 'villify reason.' This is the basic conclusion of the reformed Church of England on the authority of Reason in relation to Religion.

But, it may be objected, how can you justify these claims for the authority of Reason in Religion when you study the doctrinal formularies of the Church of England? In the Thirty-nine Articles no such claim is made for Reason in Religion. It is not the authority of Reason, but the authority of the Scripture and the Holy Spirit which are cited as the supreme authority to which the Church must yield obedience (cf. Articles VI, XIX, XX, XXI).

The absence of the appeal to the authority of Reason in our Thirty-nine Articles is because this was not a disputed issue between Rome and the English Reformers. The point at issue in the Thirty-nine Articles was the authority of Scripture as against the authority of the Papacy, Canon Law and Ecclesiastical Tradition. In this controversy the Reformers stood absolutely for the authority of Scripture interpreted in the light of the Holy Spirit's guidance, but this guidance must operate through Reason, and to this the individual or the community of individuals must yield obedience, as the judicious Hooker wrote in his *Ecclesiastical Polity*: 'Companies of learned men, be they never so great and never so learned, must yield unto Reason.'

It is true that the Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed say nothing about the authority of Reason, but this is because they are professions of Christian Faith, and in the New Testament Christian Faith is never opposed to Reason, but to sight. We

heard Professor Burkitt affirm on one occasion that what he particularly valued in the *Quiqunque Vult* was the great importance which it attached to right thinking in Religion:

> 'Whosoever would be saved he must thus *think* . . .'

It is not without significance that at the consummation of our worship in the Holy Communion, after our Acts of Confession, Commemoration, Communion, Thanksgiving, each worshipper offers himself to God as 'a reasonable sacrifice.' The term reasonable here is no doubt an echo of St. Paul's phrase in *Romans* xii, 'your reasonable service'; but this emphasis on reason goes back to Jesus Christ, who Himself, according to that great scholar, R. H. Charles, added 'with all thy mind' to the First and Great Commandment.

A rigid rationalism, unimaginative and unspiritual, comes short of the ideal of the Christian Religion; but a religion which is irrational is a far greater danger both to Christian worship and to Christian morals. Hastings Rashdall on an unforgettable occasion said:

> 'If I did not hold the Christian Religion to be rational, I could not be a Christian.'

This we believe to be the conviction of the great majority of Englishmen, at home and abroad, and this is why 'The Flight from Reason' in ecclesiastical circles is so dangerous in this age of scientific education.

In 1911, in the first issue of the *Modern Churchman*, we wrote under the heading 'Ourselves and our Aims' as follows:

> 'If things continue to go on as at present, before another generation or two is past we shall have, as in some Continental countries to-day, Clericalism and Secularism ready to spring at each other's throats, and Englishmen of good will and good sense placed in the preposterous position of having either to sacrifice their reason to their religion or their religion to their reason.
>
> 'It needs no prophetic eye to see that this is the position into which we are drifting — one far removed from the aim of a great National Church, which would unite and build up all classes of the nation, by inculcating an ideal of life at once reasonable and religious. . . .
>
> 'If these ideals are neglected the Church will rapidly become an obscure and ineffective sect tending with unavailing care the failing lights on her altars as she beholds the great tide of progressive national life sweep past her deserted temples.' (*Modern Churchman*, Vol. I, p. 10.)

It is nearly forty years since these words were written, but unhappily the danger of the crisis against which we forewarned our readers has not been averted. An enlightened, educational, religious policy may yet save our National Church, but the times are waxing late.

That the Christian Religion will ultimately triumph in human civilization we have no doubt, but whether the Church of England can possibly do so unless it reforms itself in accordance with the demands of modern knowledge and modern thought seems improbable to judge by its decline in influence during the last forty years.

However, whilst there is life there is hope, and we publish in this issue of the *Modern Churchman* a statement by the Bishop of Birmingham to his Diocesan Conference in which some will detect the turn of the tide. We ourselves look to our younger clergy, influentially represented at the Bristol Conference, to implement and carry forward in divers manners that 'ecclesiastical polity,' loyal both to the Gospel of the Kingdom of God and to the principles of the Church of England, which alone can unite, uplift and inspire our national life, spiritually, morally and rationally.

THE FLIGHT FROM REASON

By Sir Henry Self

I. Introduction

THE theme for this year's conference is 'The Flight from Reason.' The series of papers programmed for later delivery will develop the problem through its various aspects whether religious, philosophical, ethical, or mystical. I assume, therefore, that the purpose of the Presidential Address is to introduce the subject in broad terms and from a general standpoint. In any event, I would not presume to attempt the more expert assessments of the problem and await with interest the treatment which will be revealed over the next few days.

Nevertheless, I cannot but imagine that the theme will not be an advocacy of 'The Flight from Reason' but an attempt to ascertain why this trend should be urged in so many quarters to-day and to suggest how the end, which it presumably seeks to meet, can be catered for without disparagement of the faculty of Reason which is so essentially the basis of the approach of modern Churchmen to the problems of their age. I take it I will have your general agreement in maintaining that Reason, as generally understood, is basic to human interpretation of life. Equally you will be very ready to urge the case for other spheres of human enterprise which may promote a lively imagination and permit a colourful development of life in terms of emotional endeavour. Certainly, we would be foremost in stressing the validity and necessity of religious experience, faith and endeavour as the inner shrine of life. Yet all the time the intuitions such activities inspire must be justifiable in their essential principles by subjection to the legitimate scrutiny of that faculty of Reason which has hitherto been credibly supposed to be the basic warrantor of human beliefs and practices. This must follow if, to quote Mr. Hardwick in the June *Modern Churchman*, we agree that 'Reason, indeed, as St. Augustine insisted, is the instrument with which man interrogates and understands his experience' (p. 101).

The ultra-rational critic might protest that this is to inject Reason by some artificial device or by unconscious prejudice into the picture and then to use it as a basis for the construction of a grandiose system which might well be the legimate development of Reason itself but could not be legitimately sustained if Reason had been injected at the outset without justification. By way of illustration is could possibly be asserted that no one

is more rational in his processes than the lunatic and that his lunacy consists not in failure to be rational in his processes but in his adoption of initial premises which are invalid. Equally it would be urged that to inject Reason at the root of the argument to be developed is to adopt a false basis for the discussion and thus to invalidate the subsequent treatment.

There must immediately be a short and simple answer to such a captious objection. Human thought does not inject Reason into its activity; human thought derives from Reason. Without Reason it could never come into being or continue; without Reason there could be no exchange of thought between individuals, for indeed they would neither have the means of exchanging experiences nor yet the means in themselves to know that they were having experience. Life would be reduced below the level of self-awareness and for our purposes below any significance. In short this Conference could not be starting to-day if we did not find Reason as a basic stubborn fact underlying all human experience; as such, it should be accepted and used like any other matter of fundamental status in the human scheme of existence.

It may well be that the critic is right in supposing that acceptance of the fact of Reason leads to, and warrants, the development of a comprehensive structure which may take a philosophical and even a theological outline; the history of human thought suggests, indeed, that that is the conclusion to which the argument will inevitably tend. But so to argue is not to decry Reason or to entitle the critic to reject the developed argument as invalidated *ab initio*. It would be otherwise if Reason had been injected as it were from a mystical intuition without being found at the core of existence. In fact it is so found; without it, as I have urged, human existence could not continue. Therefore we should not fear to go forward and examine sympathetically the conclusions which might be warranted by the very fact of Reason lying at the core of human existence. It is the belief of Modern Churchmen that such a course will enable men once again to accept Christianity — but only when it has been shown to be rationally valid and re-expressed in terms consistent with modern thought.

But equally it would be contrary to Reason itself, i.e. as we so readily say 'unreasonable,' to suppose that Reason could claim an all-embracing dominion; indeed one might go further and enquire whether it could claim to be master in any dominion. We should not be entitled either at the outset or later in the argument to credit such a claim without the most searching

examination. It seems equally incompatible with human experience to suppose that Reason, whilst being a critical factor, is yet more than one factor among many. It may have to operate either in co-partnership or even in subordination to other faculties or to transcendent inspirations which may emerge at later phases of experience, whilst yet in their emergence indicating maybe that such an outcome has only become possible because of the prior operation of rational processes. Reason may thus be a handmaid and a means to higher faculties. True mystic communion is the core of life and emphasises the need not to restrain the Adventure of Faith springing from spiritual experience, itself tested by Reason.

The question is thus not merely how to discourage mystical authoritarianism from urging the so-called 'Flight from Reason' but even more how to encourage 'Flight' into the higher and the mystical regions provided always that such flight is sustained by wings which have reasonable guarantees of adequate structure and power. In the light of human experience, as also of the fact that the universe cannot be basically contradictory to itself as between the part and the whole, it is more than likely that we shall find that Reason must provide the wings upon which such sustained flight can be undertaken without disaster in the imaginative regions of mystic speculation, however gifted and sincere. In such event the cry would not be for 'The Flight from Reason' but for 'The Flight with Reason.'

These preliminary thoughts were in the first place inspired by reflection on a curious incident last year at a joint meeting sponsored by The Society for the Study of Religions. The Dean of St. Paul's and I spoke from a joint platform with a prominent philosopher. To my surprise, the philosopher's panacea for the present situation in religious affairs were

(*a*) The disestablishment of the Church of England;

(*b*) The promotion of the Flight from Reason.

I would personally deplore the former. To disestablish the Church would jeopardise grievously the spiritual heritage of this nation but that is not a matter upon which I should dwell tonight. The advocacy of the 'Flight from Reason' was, however, an astonishing contribution from such a source, implying as it seemed to do, the abnegation of thought and human rational faculties. The remedy seemed odd but, nevertheless, provoked me at least to wonder what the phrase really did imply.

My own reflection has led me to the conclusion that the use of the phrase by many people springs from the phase in middle age

when there is an increasing readiness to respond to mystical experience and a less optimistic belief in the adequacy of human reason to grapple with the problems of life. Alternatively it may be suggested by a parallel anxiety lest the wells of imaginative development should be dried up by arid intellectualism. Either of these anxieties are understandable, though experience suggests that the remedy would be worse than the disease if the phrase were taken and applied in its strict meaning.

One cannot but conclude, however, that the current urge for the tendency to use this phrase — albeit loosely — springs from the subconscious leaning, following all crises, towards mystical exaggerations and corresponding depreciations of the claims and scope of human thought, even at its best. The present post-war phase is no exception, as witness the following tendencies so manifest in recent years :

viz. (*a*) the proneness to emphasise scientific achievement and accept its claims at full face value, and so to surrender to a scientific agnosticism which is in itself so disturbing as to call for a compensatory over-emphasis on the emotional satisfaction forthcoming from music and allied forms of art;

(*b*) the keen activity and the emotional appeals of fundamentalist bodies on behalf of outmoded doctrines or authoritative systems;

(*c*) the indifference to world problems among esoteric 'rumps of the elect,' solely concerned with the salvation of the few who are called (in their private belief) to the blessedness of such select societies;

(*d*) the prevalence of group meetings based on so-called 'waiting' upon each other and on a supernatural experience, coupled with group confessions and like practices;

(*e*) the demand for abnegation of human Reason in a surrender to supernatural authority, preferably revealed through its self-appointed prophets;

(*f*) the current mass clamour for emotional expression. As Mr. J. M. Thompson puts it (*Modern Churchman*, June, 1949, p. 83) the question is 'how to preserve religion at all in a world whose theology has been absorbed into feeling, experiencing and living, and whose "sense of sin" has been largely replaced by "frustration."'

One discerns on all sides this post-war urge to find relief in emotional expression or mystic gropings clearly attributable to loss of confidence in the workings of human organization and its rational pursuits. This is only to be expected following upon the irrational onslaught of totalitarianism upon the structure of

society so laboriously built up. These misgivings undoubtedly spring from subconscious apprehension of the failure of civilization as a rational society as so acutely experienced in the shape of two world wars inside forty years.

All this presses for some attempt to assess the true balance of the situation. Has reason in fact a fundamental place in the scheme of things and human destiny? Is it in itself a valid test for human aspirations and their self-explanation? Alternatively, is it something which has illegitimately intruded itself and is therefore an aspect of life which must be conquered or superseded by rising into a region of mystic insight with which it has no association or indeed to which it may be a deterrent? The first approach to this assessment is perhaps to consider briefly what is the place in the physical universe of this Reason which is the fear of so many and the sacred trust of so many others. Does it, in truth, lie as a stubborn fact at the very core of existence? I am personally convinced that the answer to this question is the first and all important step in any endeavour to revitalise the religious life of humanity. Men must recapture their religious faith by fearlessly exposing it to rational processes allied to those by which science has made its advance. The result must be beneficial if Reason is basic to life and the universe; that must be my justification for intruding upon you the following argument to establish that Reason is in fact basic and ineluctable. That is not to say however that Reason itself is immutable; the argument will show that it must rise and develop till it becomes the vehicle of spiritual wisdom and understanding.

II. Reason and the Physical Universe

We have accepted the definition of Reason as 'the instrument with which man interrogates and understands his experience.' What better description could be given of the faculty through which the scientist interrogates and explains his experience and observations of the physical universe? The closer the questioning and the more exact the observations, the more explicitly does the purely scientific explanation transfer itself in the ultimate to that field *par excellence* of rational process, viz. Mathematics. This must mean that Reason lies at the core of the universe as revealed to and interpreted by the human mind. It is Reason which bridges the gulf between Mind and Matter.

This claim is best substantiated by a summary review of the successive grades of existence discerned by the human mind,

'The Void.' It seems *prima facie* 'reasonable' that, in the ultimate, the physical universe as we know it stems from what

can only be described as 'the void.' The Greeks, such as Plato, were fond of describing 'the void' as the ultimate *hyle* and much has been misconceived through the English counter-word 'Matter.' Aristotle regarded *hyle* as 'pure potentiality.' In modern physics 'the void' must be the ultimate, or as I would prefer to think, the cradle of the physical universe.

By contrast to the idea of 'the void' there is, of course, the possibility of the whole physical universe having originated from 'a point-event.' This would presumably see the universe as originated through an in-ruption from another order of being or existence resulting in an ever-extending manifestation of this in-ruption in the form of the expanding physical universe which we know to-day. This theory would link up with a parallel notion of atomic evolution pictured in modern concepts of atomic nuclei with their surrounding electronic shells. However that may be, there has to be some conception of a background to the universe which in itself provides the setting for its origin as well as its destiny. Is it possible, as hinted in some scientific thought, that the expansion of the universe we now see progressing must be coupled in conception with reverse processes in space-time by which the expansion is turned into a contraction and a passing-out of this order of existence, i.e. in the same way as there are in-ruptions there are passings-out in the reverse manner?

This basic theme is only relevant to-night as suggesting that the basis of all, conceived as some form of void, is ordered in some patterned manner with risings and fallings, crescendos and diminuendos — call it what you will — proceeding in regular form which itself is capable of mathematical determination, i.e. 'the void' and its characteristics are responsive to what we call 'Reason.' It surely cannot be disputed that Reason is at least the basis of mathematical determination.

Accepting the void, we pass then to the manifestation in it of the mysterious factors which we have to explain by such names as 'electricity' and 'magnetism.' The void somehow gives birth to the manifestation of electro-magnetic fields, so that electricity and magnetism themselves are the warp and woof upon which is displayed the tapestry of 'energy.' What energy may be we do not know any more than what may be the significance and nature of the electro-magnetic fields through which it is manifest. But at least there is beyond dispute a rational basis for its manifestation and operation, whence comes the fundamental necessity to express it primarily in mathematical equations Similarly it is Reason which has discerned the so-called

law of the conservation of energy, now giving place to the deeper conception of 'the law of the conservation of mass.'

This leads to the passing of energy to its manifestation as 'mass.' What can we call 'mass' in the light of modern physics but the manifestation of 'concentrated energy'? The ultimates of atomic physics face us with electrons, positrons, protons, neutrons, mesotrons, neutrinos and the like, all of which in their own way demonstrate the focusing of intense concentrations of energy maintained in position by the balanced equipoise of their violent affections or antipathies for each other, and so yielding the fundamental units of so-called matter, viz: atoms. Yet again we see that these atoms with their 'shells' of the ultimate particles of modern physics have a perfectly balanced geometric structure operating through techniques and under laws which can only be expressed mathematically. This fact incontrovertibly pins Reason at the very basis of matter.

The point is further driven home by the fact that, given an escape from the atom, the electrons move shrouded in waves of 'probability' and in ways best explored by mathematics. Similarly the various 'forms' of active radiation, or the pulses of radiant energy which we discern to be produced by the merging and disappearance of opposed particles of matter, manifest themselves in ways which again can only be expressed mathematically.

Yet mathematical study establishes the further fact that their movements and their activities are subject to what are called 'laws' of statistical probability. What are probabilities? They enter into the heart of physical nature just as much in higher existence, cf. the modern treatment of electrons in terms of wave mechanics.

The very conception of 'laws' of statistical probabilities implies a 'pattern' which itself connotes Reason. This is reinforced by Heisenberg's equations of uncertainty which indicate that the element of indeterminism is kept within overall bounds by the operation of the system on the wide scale. Here again is introduced the notion of rational control, without undue impairment of individual freedom, imposed within the bounds of collective society.

We pass forward to the higher significance of so-called inorganic chemistry which describes the behaviour of atoms in combination to form molecules, with molecules themselves combining in various substances. The whole sphere here has been completely transformed by the new electronic theories of Valency whereby inorganic chemistry is now reduced, or should one say developed, to the status of mathematical assessment. This serves

to develop the concept of Valency as the process binding together atoms and molecules with mathematical precision and structural pattern.

III. The Passage from Inorganic to Organic Life

The transition at this point is indicated by the picture of organic chemistry with its long open chains of atoms in the aliphatic field as contrasted with the combinations of closed rings of atoms in the aromatic field. Permutations and combinations arise beyond the limit of imagination and man has a vista open to lines of development in the field of organic chemistry which know practically no bounds. Also there is now the parallel development of radio-activity and atomic power and the translation of elements from one to the other, either by building up or by disruption accompanied by release of energy. This is also full of boundless possibilities, but all of these fields are expressed primarily in terms of geometric pictures or mathematical equations emphasising clearly the whole programme as grounded in Reason.

The argument next seeks to develop the picture through organic life.

(i) First, we find so-called organisms having unconscious individuality, coupled with special powers of instinct. What is instinct but concentrated, albeit unconscious Reason?

(ii) From such organisms we pass to the higher stage of soul life which is primarily unconscious in character and underlies ordinary life as the seat of emotional activity. Yet that emotional activity though unconscious in origin as yet, on examination clearly shows itself to be grounded in laws of psychic causation which regulate the emotions. Thus though different in character to Reason, the emotions yet operate in accordance with its process. Is not mathematics the purest expression of the measure of rhythm, timing and pattern running through all artistic expression appealing to the emotions?

(iii) From soul life the review passes to the empirical consciousness with its chains of psychic cause and effect and its continual attempt to reconcile the various phases of life by justification and rationalisation of the conative impulses, springing from the emotions.

(iv) From the empirical consciousness we next rise to the super-consciousness or the Christian 'Spirit.' Here we find Reason in its transcendental form as the Inspiration of human understanding and experience at their highest. Then they yield

and express what we term 'values' as the transcendent goal of life and its governing qualities. Values themselves are thus the inspired objectives of that which is the highest discernable in man, viz: his personality as the meeting place of Reason and Spirit, and infused by Love as the essence of spiritual life.

IV. The Background to the Universe

The foregoing is the approach to an examination of the status of Reason in the world, as reviewed from its basic origins upwards through Matter, Life and Mind to Spirit. The explanation points unhesitatingly to a transcendent background to the world which is screened from human sight and observation. Clearly any interpretation of this 'Beyond' must be greatly affected by the extent of belief in so-called 'Revelation.' Living activity on this side of the screen if inspired by transcendent agencies, presupposes both the existence of living activity on the other side and a kinship between the human agents 'here' and their inspirers 'yonder.' Moreover, the relationship would imply Reason as one of the faculties through which the relationship is maintained.

Reason has provided the basis for this hypothesis of a transcendent and living Background in our scrutiny of the Scheme of Existence from the 'Void' up to 'Spirit.' If 'Revelation' pervades all inspired forms of human activity and understanding (whether scientific, artistic, creative or mystic) and thus provides the transcendent counterpart to the immanent uprisings, we should expect a parallel test for the rational justification of our hypothesis in a review of the process 'downward' in contrast with that already conducted of the process 'upward.'

This 'downward' survey of the consequences of indwelling Spirit has been repeatedly essayed by Anglican Theologians, and particularly by Dean Inge and the late Archbishop Temple. Both explain the process as one of 'Indwelling' whereby the lower offers itself as the instrument and agent for the higher in the realisation of Value. At the same time, the agent is thereby recreated on a higher plane and guided on the path of destiny. Dean Inge has brought to the aid of Christian theology in this respect the powerful concepts of the Plotinian dialectic and manifested in truly prophetic terms the place of humanity in a spiritual community, inspired by what Plotinus called '*Nous in Eros*.' The parallel conception in Christian terms will be touched upon later.

Archbishop Temple argues

> 'The structure of Reality, as it presents itself to us, seems to be as follows: It consists of many grades, of which each presupposes those

> lower than itself, and of which each finds its own completion or perfect development only in so far as it is possessed or indwelt by that which is above it (*Christus Veritas*, p. 4). Each grade exists for the sake of what is made possible when the higher grade possesses it; and each higher grade requires the lower for the possibility of its own existence.' (*ibid.* p. 8.)

He categorises his review of the grades under the broad divisions of Matter, Life, Mind, Spirit and it seems clear that he regards the general statement as warranted both from the scientific, as well as the religious standpoint. In his Gifford lectures he asserts

> 'Broadly speaking, the modern scientific view affords an apprehension of the Universe as existing in a series of strata, of such sort that the lower is necessary to the actuality of the higher but only finds its own fulness of being when thus used by the higher as its means of self-actualisation.' (p. 474.)

Just as our review of the 'upward' process of existence has suggested that life is founded on Unconscious Reason, progressively passing to Conscious Reason, and then yielding itself to inspiration from transcendental Spirit — so the review of the 'downward' sequence suggests an ordered process of 'Indwelling' of each lower existence by the higher. The Indwelling is the source of inspiration to proposed activity and achievement of destiny. The process itself has been deduced without any reliance on possible Revelation, even though it must presuppose such a possibility at all times and throughout all grades and forms of existence. To those who are ready to credit the reasonableness of such revelation if only through such unquestionable forms as beauty and so-called 'spiritual values,' the downward process of Indwelling (by which the upward process is inspired) must spring from the transcendent Background to the world. In that event, the transcendent Background must be revealing itself in human lives at their highest and grading the revelation to the capacity and development, both of the race and the individual.

At this stage it is relevant to introduce the Christian argument. I have referred to the neo-Platonism of Plotinus, but this was later and fell far short of the inspired philosophy of religion which found its initial expression when the Christian Experience was allied with the Greek vehicles of thought by the writer of the Fourth Gospel and early Church Fathers.

Dr. Major has reminded me that the *logos theology* of the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel and of the Greek Fathers provides the basis of Christian philosophy. The Greek *Nous* signified mind manifested generally in the Universe and particularly in the creative process. As such it falls short of the Christian concept of Spirit as the transcendental inspiration of Reason at its

highest, as of other human activities. It would therefore be much better for our purpose to recall to modern thinkers the appropriateness of the term *Logos* as the key to the Christian philosophy based on the ever-continuing Revelation of God as the Focus of the Spiritual and transcendent Background which our argument postulates for the physical universe.

I am grateful to Dr. Major for this thought as also for the following summary of the *Logos* theology as expressive of the revealed yet rational basis for which we have been groping. Recalling Origen's doctrine of 'The Eternal Generation of the Word,' the incarnational stages have been broadly conceived as

(i) The Indwelling Reason (*logos endiathetos*) as the source of Creation.

(ii) The Word proceeding forth in the creative process (*logos prophorikos*).

(iii) The Rational Word (*logos spermatikos*, as taught by Justin Martyr), operative when rational beings appear in the creative process.

(iv) The Incarnate Word (*logos ensarkos*) revealed in Jesus Christ, the perfect *organon* of the Word *sub specie humanitatis*.

(v) The Spirit of Christ (*logos pneumatikos*) indwelling spiritual humanity.

I can conceive no more apt presentation of the Christian philosophy in brief and am particularly grateful to Dr. Major for being permitted to quote it. It is the perfect counterpart to the halting gropings of the approach of Reason from the human side, which I may perhaps express in the form of a few summary conclusions as to the status of Reason and of man in the scheme of the Universe, viz :

1. The argument determines Reason as basic to the universe and life.

2. It reveals Spirit as transcendent and the inspiration of Values — which are potentially the fabric of Personality.

3. The destiny of human individuals depends on the meeting and harmonization of Reason and Spirit without curtailment of emotional energy directed towards such sublimated Values.

4. Life thus turns on a blending of Truth (the vehicle of Reason), Beauty (the vehicle of Intuition), Goodness (the vehicle of Will), all subsumed within the embrace of Love as the supreme emotional quality inspiring relationships of Persons.

5. In brief, the human ego is at its best when actuated by Reason and inspired by Spirit to the achievement of its sublimated ideals; and then it achieves its destiny as the Crucible

wherein Experience is assimilated and forged into the refined fabric of living Personality which is the real 'inner man.'

That these thoughts are in no way opposed to the Christian tradition is indicated by the three following quotations:

> Clement of Alexandria said, 'The image of God is the divine and royal Logos, and the image of the image is the human reason.'
>
> Benjamin Whichcote wrote, 'Sir, I oppose not rational to spiritual, for spiritual is most rational.'
>
> Henry More said, 'Take away reason and all religions are alike true — as the light being removed, all things are of one colour.'

V. Conclusion

So we pass to our conclusion. Science demonstrates that Reason, as the bridge between Mind and Matter, is basic to the visible universe in which we live. The argument equally implies that Reason's transcendent counterpart Spirit is basic to the spiritual universe which we legitimately intuite as 'beyond' the screen of existence. Religion goes further and teaches that the 'Beyond,' so intuited, is also a spiritual community of persons focused on God as the source and goal of life, and that this 'Beyond' is revealed to all men unceasingly throughout the ages, according to the measure of the response and understanding forthcoming. In short, as Dean Matthews has so repeatedly emphasised, it is a 'Beyond that is akin' and a 'Beyond that is within.'

But if this be true of life at its highest and in its totality, then it must be equally true of 'Reason' as one vital strand of that life. Reason must be kin to and inspired by Spirit. Equally it must be subject to growth and development, and conditioned by its response to the inspiration of Spirit. In so progressing it finds increasingly that its essential function is not to crush or destroy, but to function as a guide and ally to those other faculties, and particularly the emotions, from which must spring the power to achieve the revealed ideals. These latter are the prime essentials to life in its upward progress, and Reason must therefore provide the wings for the 'Flight *not from* but *with* Reason.' This is to blend the philosophy of this world with the philosophy of the spiritual world to give a philosophy of both worlds, i.e. of the Universe in its fulness to which man is organic.

In essence the Universe (seen and unseen) is spiritual — and things 'Spiritual' must be spiritually discerned. But this discernment springs from the transcendent counterpart of Reason. We must trust Reason at its highest, use it as the test of our gropings and as the instrument for giving expression to our beliefs in terms adapted to our epoch. Archaic terminology and outmoded dogmas must go — so that spiritual life can come to self-

expression in modern terms. That is the essence of Modernism, but we realise that to-day the need is for constructive thought. The time for purely destructive criticism has gone and the Modern Churchman's Union stands ready and anxious to play its part in that reconstruction of religious belief which is possible at long last. In my judgment, the age-long antagonism between science and religion should be a thing of the past. In the light of modern knowledge, the two are and should be recognised as allies in a common cause, provided both are ready to surrender the shibboleths of tradition and allow Reason to challenge and reconcile their basic tenets. That is the crying need if our spiritual heritage is to survive.

THE NON-RATIONAL ELEMENT IN RELIGION

By Prof. L. W. Grensted, Oxford

ONE of the things most obviously true about religion is that it is not, in the main, a rational affair. It is also obviously true that when we try to think about religion we are likely to regret this, for to think about anything is to attempt to measure it by rational standards. And that carries with it the obvious side of reducing it to the scale of our measuring instruments, instruments which in the hands of the *soi-disant* rationalist have sometimes made religion look very small indeed. But that is not necessarily the fault of religion, but rather of the instruments and of those who use them. It may well be that reason, so recently, as Bergson pointed out, detached from material purposes, is as yet wholly inadequate to the task of measuring life-processes in their totality. Nevertheless it is the only power of reasoning that we possess, and it is a biological duty, if nothing more, that we should use it to the full.

It is natural enough that the fulfilment of this duty should produce in some people an exaggerated attention to theology, the science of religion, which may become obsessive, even to the exclusion of almost all that matters in religion itself. More often discouragement intervenes and theology becomes, as for its health it should always be, deeply suspect. Such discouragement, at its best, is not far removed from wisdom. At its worst it is a poor and empty thing, the symbol of life's frustration. Where, in this picture, the Modern Churchman has his place, I must not attempt to indicate.

I am going to assume that, from the point of view of the individual, religion is his total reaction to his total environment. I am going to make the further assumption, a metaphysical one, that it is the total environment which calls out this reaction in the individual. This is, indeed, the process by which the individual comes to be himself, and, stated in this way, is closely in line with modern biological hypotheses. For the importance of environment in determining the course of evolution is now a commonplace. Has not Dr. Julian Huxley even invoked this principle as determining the nature and content of ethics and indicating the direction in which the moral consciousness may be expected to develop? When we have once realized, with modern psychologists of every school except the Behaviourist, that within this total environment the personal elements are by far the most significant, we are not far from a theological doctrine of Creation, in a form which would have occasioned little surprise to Origen or John Scotus Erigena.

But the total reaction of a person, even if as yet very incompletely personal, to an environment in which personal elements take obvious precedence, clearly involves much more than reason. Values, purposes, emotions, appetition, and sentience itself, together with what we may not unfairly call the rights and dignities of the physical organism, are quite plainly involved as well, and this basic reality of the situation is not in any way altered if we add to our hypotheses the further metaphysical conception of God. That to adopt such a metaphysical conception is the only way of making sense of this total environment, with its strongly marked personal characteristics, I will not now stop to argue. I may assume, in a gathering of self-conscious and theologically-minded people, that we are here on common ground. What concerns us now is the way in which these non-rational energies will take effect in our religious life, partly as a concomitant of its rationality and partly, though we are loath to recognize the fact, as affecting that rationality itself. For our theological reasoning is by no means as pure and unadulterated a process as we should like to think.

We may note, before passing on, that these same considerations hold good of that total environment to which our individual being arises in response, the garment that God weaves as the mode of His self-manifestation to us. Revelation is not a matter of reason only, the bare illumination of our understanding. The Fourth Gospel may begin with the Divine Logos, the true light which lighteth every man, coming into the world. But it goes on to show the Way and the Truth of Life (as the Coptic translation

ıns) in terms of flesh and blood, warm with emotion and desire, nd the final formula of that disciple who interpreted the Fourth ospel to the next generation of Christians was not 'God is eason' but 'God is Love.'

Even so our task would be a comparatively simple one if we ould deal with these various elements, factors, or energies eparately and give reason a sphere of its own, in which rational oncepts could be handled rationally, without contamination from fe-processes of other kinds. This is, of course, just the philo-ophers' dream over again, the escaping vision of the Idea of the ood, of a metaphysic resting upon pure *a priori* concepts, of an bsolute in which all contradiction and all contingency is at once ubsumed and transcended. But the philosophers' dream remains nfulfilled and philosophy to-day is in a mood of pessimism as to ıe possibility of its fulfilment. It is unlikely that theology can e in any better case, especially as any theology worthy the name ıust necessarily be a particular theology, interpreting the signifi-ance of some particular set of facts, some happenings or experi-ıces in which men have seen, rightly or wrongly, a self-revelation f God. We must, in short, recognize that rational and non-ational are intimately interwoven, and, indeed, that it is upon the road basis of the non-rational that the rational has been able to stablish itself in its present position of precarious supremacy.

It is at this point that the work of modern psychologists has ome to be of outstanding importance, partly because they have nabled us to see the influence of non-rational factors much more learly, and partly because they have at least gone some part of he way in showing the intimate connection between our adult ationality and the processes of subconscious and unconscious ental activity characteristic of childhood, of dreaming, and of reative art. To this task almost all the many recent developments f psychology have made their contribution, and if in what follows call attention only to two or three of these it is with the know-edge that the survey could be made much more comprehensive. Freud and Jung and the *Gestalt* psychologists must serve our urn, but in confining myself to them I do not forget that Suttie, nd Prinzhorn, and Karen Horney, and many others have, each in heir way, added greatly to our knowledge and our understand-ng of the total pattern.

The disciples of Freud and of Jung do not hit it off together t all. The quarrel between the masters has been carried on with igour, and membership of the one school barely allows the recog-ition of the existence of the other. This hardening of rival ystems into exclusive orthodoxies has had serious results for the

systems themselves, since it has accentuated the tendency to transform descriptive hypotheses into entities. The Super-ego and the Id stand arrayed against Anima and Animus and all the protean host of Archetypes, while the Ego and Self, which ought to be unifying concepts, have quite different functions, most unsatisfactorily defined, in the two schemes. And if the Jungian pseudo-entities have greatly the advantage in number, those of Freud have very much the superiority in clarity. Let us then start with Freud, only noting before we do so that whether we use the notation of Freud or of Jung what these psychologists are actually describing is always the patterns of behaviour of a whole personality. The entity is not the partial manifestation, the super-ego or anima, but the person concerned. To remember this will save a great deal of confusion, and will enable us to be Freudians and Jungians both at once, neither orthodoxy being allowed the opportunity of becoming obsessive.

Freud, then, the pioneer in this field of analytic investigation, provides us with some of our simplest and most important hypotheses. The first is fundamental, and is the basis of his early work on dreams, which has had such far-reaching consequences. It may be summed up by saying that the primitive forms of rationality, forms which still underlie all rational processes, are not, in the ordinary sense of the word, rational. We do not solve the problems of life by reasoning but by presentation. Imagery is enormously more effective than logic, and our normal way of dealing with complex problems resembles a dramatic performance, in which we act the part appropriate to ourselves, much more than a balanced consideration of the issues involved. We see this very plainly in the symbolism of dreams, and when once we have recognized it there we realize that it is also characteristic of the mentality of the child. The wisdom of the child, which is closely akin to simplicity, has become almost proverbial. But reason lingers far behind wisdom, and when it appears is often, at first, a source of confusion rather than of ordered illumination. This movement of the mind (a term of very dubious meaning) through symbolism and dramatic presentation to action, is discovered, when once we have recognized it, to be almost as characteristic of the adult as of the child, and even the bizarre distortions of dreams are closely paralleled in waking life. There is every ground for believing this to be an entirely natural and right state of affairs, and, indeed, it represents far more truly than a purely rational approach the response of the total individual to the total situation.

This, of course, has obvious implications for the evaluation of ritual and the whole symbolic aspect of religion. Clearly, to judge

on purely rational grounds would be to miss its whole significance. An effective ritual is effective for various reasons, traditional, corporate, aesthetic and emotional, but most of all because it gives expression to aspects of our human nature by no means childish and concerned with those personal values which, in the last resort, take precedence even of truth itself.

For Freud these personal values take first place in his study of human development and behaviour. The importance of this has been obscured for many people by his insistence upon the sexual character of personal relations, an insistence in which, after all, there is nothing new if the term sex is given a wide enough meaning. On that side he has little to teach the artists, poets and dramatists. More serious is the almost mechanistic determinism which he postulates for mind as well as for the external emotions of physical science. But his determinism does not destroy the worth of his descriptive psychology, and his account of the patterns formed in the behaviour of the growing child through its successive relationships to mother, father, the family and the wider group, is of the first value. Two illustrations must suffice, drawn from the relation of the child to the mother and the father respectively.

It is obviously true that the first interests of the child are directed towards the mother and that the craving for the mother passes through all the phases of simple satisfaction of the instinctive life of appetite, called by Freud the Id, to the gradual recognition of the mother as a person. Therewith the child discovers itself to be a person too, defined by its distinctness from its mother, and also the real world, Freud's 'Reality-principle,' within which both mother and child must work out the possibilities of their relationship and of their own growth to individuality. Thus the mother plays two parts, as the child grows older. She is, ideally, the actual means by which the real world is reached, the mediator of the true individuality, the Ego, of the child and of the world in which the child must live. But she is also the object of desire, to which in moments of frustration the child looks back with longing. The mother's breast, the symbol of satisfaction, becomes also the symbol of security, in which the child — often long after he has ceased to be a child — may lose for a time or wholly the Ego with its dangerous freedom and be merged once more in the source from which it came. And all this is no mere pictorial symbolism, but an actual and effective pattern of behaviour, exemplified in a multitude of ways alike in neurosis and in ordinary life.

What then of Holy Mother Church? It is clearly no accident that the Church has, almost from the first, been linked with this

powerful but ambivalent mother symbolism. And at once it becomes clear that any doctrine of the Church must, if it is to be effective, take account of this powerful and primitive background to its rationality. Only so can we enter into the full significance of the twofold rôle in which the Church appears in history, at once the link between man and the real world, the strongest creative factor in man's progress, and the seductive refuge from the perils of living in that same real world, the Mother with whom we are safe, at the cost of being children still.

Consider again Freud's account of the child's relation to the father, the power so close and intimate and desirable, the source of the stable law and order of the home, who is also the controller of the child's liberties and the possessor of the mother whom the child so much desires. It is in the child's unconscious struggle to cope with this problem that Freud sees the source of conscience, the development of an authoritarianism within adjusting itself to the authoritarianism without, and establishing itself over against the insistent claims of the Id, the primitive, undying, instinctive self. So arises the Super-ego, rigorist, dominant, exacting, and all the more exacting as the Id presses its claim. 'The archangel would not stand so straight unless the dragon writhed.' In Freud's theory the Ego, the rational self, born in the clash between this introjected Super-ego and the Id, has no force of its own, but exists simply to harmonize these claims, persuading the Id to conform its demands to the reality-principle, and drawing upon the strength of the Super-ego to reinforce its persuasion. As an account of the actual pattern of human behaviour this picture is a convincing one, provided, as I have said, that we do not transform its hypotheses into entities, and provided that we do not restrict our conception of the Ego so arbitrarily.

Once more we are bound to recognize that the whole question of authority in the Church, so difficult and so involved in contradiction when treated on purely theological lines, is inextricably bound up with this ambivalence of authority in the individual. In the individual the development of the Super-ego is a natural and necessary stage, but it is not the highest stage, and those who remain in the bondage of its rigorism may indeed attain the dignity of being honoured as men of principle when they are in fact still children, so bound by the upsurging of the instinctive life that they dare not make any terms save those of sheer slavery between the Ego and the Super-ego. Their morality is not true morality but only an introjected legality. They have not achieved autonomy, the freedom of their own souls. But this is exactly the situation which is so often to be found in the Church, or indeed

in any religious tradition. The whole New Testament rings with the message of freedom, the freedom which is also the Kingdom of God, the freedom which includes but transcends the Law, the freedom which, as St. Paul says, recognizes and is not bound by desire. In this freedom the Super-ego and Id alike have found their fulfilment and their service. But it is only too clear that the authority of the Church is often no more than a displaced and projected Super-ego. The free 'I believe' of the Creeds becomes 'You must believe,' and the grimness with which theologians fight for the orthodoxy of others is the measure of their own failure to grow up. In matters of discipline the same regressive tendency is only too obvious, sometimes in sects that have themselves been foremost in the protest against some ecclesiasticism. In my own communion, the Church of England, I find myself sorely ill at ease when it is proposed to establish a new version of the Super-ego in a revision of the Canon Law. And everything that I know as a psychologist tells me that my concern at this regression to childhood is justified.

When we turn to Jung we find quite a different descriptive account of the human psyche. It is far more adequate than that of Freud in two respects; it makes full allowance for the free creative energy which is expressed in man's behaviour and its development, and it pays attention to the deep underlying factors of what Jung calls the impersonal or racial unconscious. These factors can only be expressed through symbols, and here Jung, like Freud, draws much of his evidence from dreams. But in Jung's account of the matter these symbolic processes draw their energy not only from tensions and repressions involved in the development of the ego through personal relationships but even more from the inherent tensions of the inner psyche itself. The Ego is set over against the Shadow, and what in Jung's notation is called the Self is the goal of the process whereby the so-called archetypes, anima, animus and the rest, seek fulfilment in a completed and balanced whole, of which the symbol, itself one of the deepest seated of all the archetypal patterns, is the fourfold *mandala*, the Golden Flower, the Cross in the Circle, the Wheel of Life. It lies beyond our purpose to expound or to criticize this system, but, as in the case of Freud, we may notice again the tendency of hypotheses to become entities. Archetypes as such do not exist. What exists is the individual, of whose total behaviour they enable us to give such an illuminating and often convincing account.

Jung does not, in point of fact, affirm or deny the metaphysical conceptions with which theology is concerned. In conversation with me he once described himself as a simple Kantian, accepting

the general positive but agnostic position of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. But as a psychologist he has pointed out with vigour the obvious parallel between the powerful and effective symbolism of religion and the similarly powerful and effective symbolism of the archetypal patterns. It hardly needs pointing out that the gods and goddesses of both primitive and developed polytheisms correspond with the greatest exactitude to Jung's archetypes, and that mythology and cult practice everywhere reflect precisely the processes which Jung finds revealed in dreams. What concerns us more closely is that this same parallelism is quite plain in many of the developments of historic Christianity. The facts and truths of Christianity are facts and truths, and as such stand in their own right. But they are mediated to us through representations, which are the only ways in which historical facts or theological truth can have any content for us, and these representations are only recognized as significant and effective when they draw upon the rich material of the archetypes. Thus the plain facts of the death and resurrection of Jesus, facts of which, so far as the historical data go, we can hardly form a picture, are clothed in Christian art in forms drawn from the archetypal material of the dying and risen God of youth and spring. The honour which we must needs pay to her of whom we know so little save that she was the Mother of our Lord, draws to itself a whole wealth of imagery appropriate to the anima.

All this is simple and obvious enough. But it is worth our while to remember that all this archetypal material is drawn from those deep levels in our psyche in which good and evil, and all the worth-whileness of personal being have not yet been developed. The power of the archetypes is equally at the service of the Ego and the Shadow, and it is in that conflict that the Self is born. It is small wonder, then, that the representations with which as Christians we must needs clothe our faith hold within themselves danger as well as inspiration, and perhaps above all the danger that we may lose the Christian values in the archetypal expression and be drawn not up and out to God, but downwards and inwards to the primal and undifferentiated matrix of our being.

It is at this point that the theories of Jung link up with the recent psychology of *Gestalt* or pattern, which I believe to be the most important development of the subject in the last quarter of a century. Jung's conception of the *mandala*, the basic archetype of completion, balance and order, expressing and driving into expression the harmony of the fourfold functions of the psyche, is closely akin to the hypothesis of *Gestalt*, the total situation in which we are placed, to which we must respond and of which we

are ourselves a part. For the *Gestalt* psychologists this situation is itself energic, striving and driving us to the completion of its own pattern. But there is nothing in the psychological theory to determine the value, beyond itself, of this result. Jung has, indeed, himself pointed out recently the danger in the modern world of the obsession of the human psyche by the *mandala* mentality, in revulsion from those wilder but more free archetypes which have so lately driven man, corporately and racially, into war. This threatened tyranny of pattern, or order, the ground of every kind of totalitarianism, is and has always been as obvious in the Churches as in the nation. It is the guarantee alike of discipline and of orthodoxy, and, in each case, it is quite capable of destroying in a very stranglehold that of which it is the guarantee. And this ambivalency of psychological function is something against which reason seems almost powerless to guard. Nevertheless reason, too, is a necessary factor in the psychological process, and a religion which ignores reason will be not only ambivalent but blind, and in such a religion freedom and progress are alike impossible.

Can we draw any conclusion from this very sketchy survey? One at least, that the non-rational elements in religion have every claim to be taken seriously, since they correspond to elements in the total spirit of man, his psyche or personality, which have as good a claim to be part of his being as reason itself. This is, indeed, implicit in that conception of religion which regards it, not necessarily rationally but in the actuality of cult and ritual, as dealing with man's inner conflicts. The Christian gospel of forgiveness of sin is not identical with Jung's doctrine of the union of opposites, but they are certainly not unrelated. And religion certainly does not consist in bringing the non-rational under the dominance of the rational. It is rather the fulfilment and harmony of both in our total response to that environment of which the Personal Energy and Meaning is God, in Whom we not only study theology, but live and move and have our being.

REASON AND RATIONALISM

By the Rev. H. C. Snape, M.A., Rector of Skelton, Cumberland

J. M. ROBERTSON, one of the most renowned self-confessing rationalists, defines rationalism for us thus. The name 'rationalist,' he says, 'stands for one who rejects the claim of revelation, the idea of a personal god, the belief in personal immortality, and in general the conceptions logically accruing to the practices of prayer and worship.' The rationalist, according to J. M. Robertson, argues as follows:

> 'Finding the practice of prayer to be incompatible not only with any sincere belief in natural law, but with the professed religious beliefs of the more educated of those who resort to it, I will not pray. Seeing all religions to be but halting manipulations of the guesses and intuitions of savages, to be still as uncritically credulous in their affirmations as they are blind in their denials, and to be thus mere loose modifications of older beliefs felt to be astray, I will go behind them all for my own theory of things, getting all the help I can alike from those who have reasoned most loyally on the deeper problems involved and from those who have striven most circumspectly to understand the process of causation in the universe.'[1]

Rationalism is thus a positive disbelief in the value of religious practices and the condemnation of religious institutions as harmful to the welfare of human society. I am assuming that there has been entrusted to me the task of examining whether it is more rational to be a believer in the realities implied by the practice of prayer and religious worship than to dispense with them. Is religion itself, as the rationalist asserts, a flight from reason? It is a question pertinent both to the theme of our conference and to the times in which we are living. Thousands of men and women although they may not call themselves rationalists yet by their silent absence from our churches proclaim their belief that religious practices are both contrary to reason and superfluous to life.

The rationalist claims that disbelief is rational because the account of man and his world given by the sciences shows religious beliefs to be nothing but survivals from pre-scientific ages. He stakes his all on the principle of natural uniformity. As Arthur Balfour stated in the *Foundations of Belief* published in 1894,

> 'Rationalism consisted essentially in the application, consciously or unconsciously, of one great method to the decision of every controversy, to the moulding of every creed. Did a belief square with a view of the universe based exclusively upon the prevalent mode of interpreting sense-perception? If so, it might survive. Did it clash with such a mode, or

[1] *Rationalism,* by J. M. Robertson, pp. 2 and 7.

lie beyond it? It was superstitious; it was incredible. Was it neither in harmony with nor antagonistic to such a view, but simply beside it? It might live on until it became atrophied from lack of use, a mere survival from a dead past.'

The history of belief appears to justify the rationalist's claim. As Lord Acton is reported to have declared,

> 'For 200 years from the time of Hobbes, unbelief has been making its way . . . Unbelief came to be founded on science . . . About one half of the classic writing, of the creative thinking of the world, was done by unbelievers. The influences that reigned were in great measure atheistic.' [2]

First of all the authority of an institution to possess truths delivered once and for all was called in question; next in the form of deism the claims of revelation were challenged. The last century saw the authority of the Bible impugned and nature herself was found to yield a message as ambiguous as any political manifesto. While traditionally she was supposed to proclaim a supreme being endowed with benevolence, others were saying that she only spoke of futile struggle, pain, and destruction. At each stage of the advance orthodox belief appeared to take up a stand from which it was destined later to retreat. To deism Bishop Butler in the *Analogy* and Archdeacon Paley by the argument from design appeared to make a successful reply. When the Bible failed us, we could once more take refuge under the authority of the Church. When nature failed the theologians fleeing from reason have had recourse by backward steps to the supernatural where no logic can penetrate and argument ceases to count.

The traditional method of proving religious beliefs to be true assures the apparent triumph of disbelief. For it accepts the prevalent mode of interpreting sense-perception and from the principle of the uniformity of nature it is argued that the laws of nature pre-suppose a lawgiver benevolent and omnipotent.

A special revelation was vouchsafed to mankind 2,000 years ago when for a brief period in a small district to the East of the Mediterranean certain miraculous events took place of which a record has been left to us in the narratives of the Gospels. What was then revealed is true because those who proclaimed the revelation performed miracles. That they performed miracles is a historic fact recorded by the Gospels. Obviously religious truth is left in a precarious position hanging by a thread to the structure of the sciences. The truths of history can never be completely verified; when it is claimed that certain historic events were miraculous in nature, the critical historian is pre-disposed to disbelieve in their historicity and is sure to find adequate reasons for his doing so.

[2] *Foundations of Belief,* by A. Balfour, p. 170.

Both the rationalist and the traditionalist-minded theologian assume that in our sense-perception the law of uniformity is a self-evident truth. Both believe that it is only through our senses that we come into direct contact with a reality outside ourselves. The theologian makes an exception for certain events which took place round 30 A.D. and claims that there are realities of which however we have no direct experience. But what is taken as self-evident truth the scientist only assumes as a working principle for the purposes of investigation. He *assumes* that in sense-perception he can discover sequences which are uniformly repeated as *e.g.* that whenever bodies are heated, they expand. He assumes that that will always happen but there is no proof forthcoming. By making that assumption he is inevitably no longer dealing with the raw stuff of experience. He has put on one side all prejudices save one, the prejudice that all happenings fall into a pattern of cause and effect. At the same time he has sacrificed all his wishes and desires to one end, that of bringing all his sense-experience under some particular generalisation, which will enable him to anticipate happenings, and so help us to control the world outside us.

What the generalisation is to be and how it is to be expressed so that others can understand it and use it depends on the scientist's imagination. Thus although the scientific investigator attempts to divest himself of all his personal idiosyncracies, all which makes up his inner self, yet his investigations depend upon this very inner self which he would cast out. They spring from his desire to investigate and their success depends upon the quality of his imagination no less than upon his ability to suppress all his personal prejudices.

This inner self, which we cannot account for in scientific terms, just because it is not perceived but is the perceiver is yet real to us since we are conscious of it; we are self-conscious beings. Living in this life is the mutual interaction between our selves, whatever they are, and the objects of sense-perception, whatever they are. From our inner selves come our wishes, desires, visions and intuitions. The prophets and mystics i.e. the founders of religions tell us that through our inner selves we can become conscious of a world of experience beside which the common-sense world of sense-perception seems a reflection or shadow. From our inner self come our hopes and beliefs, the stimulus of prayer and worship. In rejecting the conceptions logically accruing to the practises of prayer and worship it is difficult to see how the rationalist can retain any belief at all in the reality of our inner self and its endowment with a certain measure of freedom.

Yet, as we have seen, scientific investigation, which the rationalist accepts as the most rational of all human procedures depends

upon the initiative and free working of the despised inner self. Someone decides upon a field of enquiry, asks a question, conceives of a hypothesis, accepts or rejects it, and embarks upon an experiment. Where the resulting generalisation is secure and well-established, it seems to be an inevitable inference, until someone questions its tenure by conceiving of an improvement upon it. A science only seems a series of inevitable inferences because it is the aim of the scientist at every stage to detach himself, i.e. his inner self from his sense-perceptions in order that his generalisations may apply to anyone's sense-perception as he judges fit.

But as self-conscious beings life for us is something more than sense-perception. Out of the depths of our inner self we are able to imagine a world different from that given to us through sense-perception, which we hope will be realised and believe can be realised. Through our inner self in various ways and degrees we experience communion with a power beyond ourselves helping and loving. If the rationalist retorts that he has never had any such experience we can never prove to him the reality of such experience. But we can ask of him that he should seek to put himself in the position of those who entertain religious hopes and beliefs. No one can judge the value of prayer from without: he must be able to understand the spiritual needs from which the act of prayer arises and the beliefs which accompany it.

The rationalist can quite justifiably demand that he should judge religion by its fruits. But the fruits of religion are after their kind. Because they are primarily inward and spiritual they are human qualities felt and perceived instinctively rather than capable of being catalogued and labelled. Also religion is not in itself a blessing any more than art or science. There are true and false religions, evil and good. There is a close analogy between religious criticism and aesthetic criticism. We know quite well how in estimating beauty we need the sensitive ear and eye: we know how academies of art often hinder rather than promote the arts they were founded to foster. But we do not on that account condemn art as a primitive and barbarous activity or, because we are unmusical or insensitive to colour, expect a pastoral symphony to represent nothing but the bleating of sheep or every picture to be a photographic likeness. The rationalist cannot condemn religion completely out of hand because religious institutions often fail in their function or the fruits of some religions are poisonous and evil.

So long as men can entertain visions of another world, hope and belief will be active forces and so long as men can imagine better worlds their hopes and beliefs will take a more attractive shape than that of the ideal of intellectual consistency. Men do

not struggle for truth but for what they conceive are true things. 'Rationalism,' says J. M. Robertson, 'is in George Eliot's phrase the undertaking without opium, and perhaps the shrewdest challenge to it is the denial that the average man can so abstain.'[3] To call the spiritual ideals of men opium is but to indulge in abuse. If man cannot do without them, surely the most rational course is to see if they have not a purpose in life and to discover how they can be pruned and cultivated.

History seems to show us that the average man cannot live on denials and abstractions. Athens taught men how to criticise their gods until they died : men were left with a spiritual void until only Christianity provided a new dynamic. In the interval Socrates and the mystery religions rationalised by Platonism afforded consolation but failed to give force to any general hope or faith. The supremacy of reason was proclaimed in 1789. The French anticlerical really believed in the ability of the common man to be free, equal, and fraternal and such eventually was the balance of forces in France that the third republic repeated the example of Athens as a state whose institutions were animated by a belief in freedom of thought unattached to any supernatural loyalties. It has however become painfully plain to us that the average man is unable to maintain an attitude of positive disbelief. Into the soul swept clean of all the traditional beliefs there intrudes the positive dogma that man himself is a machine whose behaviour conforms to the principle of natural uniformity. Apply the proper pressures and he will react—not act, mark you—with the appropriate behaviour. Man no longer possesses that very reason which both theological and critical rationalism assumed was his glory and his privilege. All thinking save for the syllogisms of what is called dialectical materialism is now seen to be wishful thinking and therefore irrational. Dialectical materialism is the philosophic weapon of a new tyranny which threatens to use the achievements of science not only to deprive man of his spiritual freedom but also of his spiritual capacity. The end of rationalism as the most prophetic of rationalists, H. G. Wells, saw at the end of his life is mind at the end of its tether.

The traditionalist in theology secures the intellectual victory of rationalism by treating statements of belief as if they were scientific generalisations cut off from the spiritual needs which created them. As Arthur Balfour said,

> 'We no longer find ourselves dealing with a creed whose real premises lie deep in the nature of things. It is no question of moral intuition or mystical ecstasy.'

[3] *Rationalism,* by J. M. Robertson, p. 25.

He has cut off theology from its roots so that he is left with a formal system which is not even a consistent philosophy. M. Goguel in his latest volume *L'église primitive* describes the process:

> 'Every religion in the course of its development by a kind of internal necessity begins to show signs of dissolution. Of this there are three symptoms and more often than not they are found together: rationalism, moralism and ecclesiasticism. No religion can survive with any stability unless it has some expression in intellectual terms. But the intellectual expression of a religion tends to become more and more systematic: it becomes detached from the specific spiritual experience which created it and is then valued for its own sake. In this way a religion becomes completely rationalised: its character is no longer that of a relationship with God but of a conception of the universe or a *Weltanschauung*. Therefore theology is a means of expression for a religion but a theology which is cut off from experience, as every theology tends to be so as to become an end in itself, changes its character and loses its religious significance. There is then no fundamental difference between a theology and a philosophy.'

Once rationalised a religion seems to its believers to be unquestionably true and doubt becomes a crime. The injunction is no longer 'Taste and see,' but 'You must believe.' Of a rationalised religion the Roman Communion affords the supreme example. As G. B. Shaw wrote to Archbishop William Temple,

> 'The Roman Catholic Church is the stronghold of rationalism on earth and has damned itself over and over again by committing the most horrible crimes (like the burning of Joan) simply as the final term of a syllogism. As between the priest who has a first-rate collection of arguments to lead you by the logical path to the bosom of the Church, and George Fox knocking you down with his "I have experimental knowledge of God," I am for George all the time; and being myself fairly able to construct arguments to prove, as the witness in Dickens offered to, "in a general way anything," I judge the character of a man or a Church not by the reasons they find for things, but the things they find reasons for.'

Shaw expresses as no one else can the difference between the misuse of reason to enchain and the proper use of reason to persuade in freedom. What man has attained in knowledge, what advances he has made in the business of living, have only come when he was free, free to express what he imagined, free to judge and verify what he believed. The scientific method by which to-day we judge all methods of human enquiry is not a calculating machine but the device of men who are mentally free. Rationalism of any kind is condemned because it deprives the inner self of its rights. It is condemned by its fruits because it leads to tyranny. It is welcomed by those who refuse the duties those rights impose. For the self whose heart is hardened against the acceptance of the presence of the divine Father, lonely and afraid in its freedom, surrenders its freedom to think and welcomes the chains of a compelling

system. A living logic is not the master but the servant of the soul. The man, the windows of whose soul are open to the divine light, will never flee from reason, which will always be his trusty servant. We can make him our guide and accept what he believes. And more likely than not we shall find such to be not the rationalist, either of the atheistical or theological variety, but that despised creature, the average man, provided he possesses the healthy soul which God intended should be his natural endowment. As Macneile Dixon told his learned audience in his Gifford Lectures,

> 'Rationalists are much too simple-minded to act as guides or interpreters in this uncanny and incalculable world. And when I am in doubt among the philosophers I turn to the consensus of human opinion, to the beliefs of the plain man, that strange, indefinable being, on the surface ridiculous, in the depths profound. If he had words in which to express himself he could tell us things worth knowing about the greatest matters, even, I think, about the soul. You remember the curious and interesting Old Testament story of Balaam, a man of great reputation in his day, so great that the King of Moab sent for him in extremity. And he saddled his ass and went to meet Balak, King of Moab. And the Lord sent an angel to prevent him, and the angel stood across his path. And Balaam, though a man of high intelligence, did not see the angel of the Lord, but the ass saw him.'[4]

[4] *The Human Situation,* Macneile Dixon, p. 390.

THE FLIGHT FROM REASON IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE

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HISTORIANS of the future will look upon the first half of the twentieth century as the most critical period in the history of Biblical interpretation, and therefore of Christianity itself. What is hanging in the balance is the question, Jesus, God or man? This dilemma has expressed itself in one form or another throughout the centuries, but it has become more acute than ever before, because the study of Christian origins has, to say the least, called in question the ancient claim of dogma, that it is warranted by Holy Scripture. We are all familiar with the trends of Biblical scholarship at the close of the last century, and at the beginning of this. For traditional Christianity, two dangerous tendencies were emerging: first, towards the view that the Old Testament bore no intrinsic relationship to the life and person of Jesus, though obviously its influence on his thought and teaching was great; secondly, towards the view that, while it is difficult to penetrate the overlay of tradition and interpretation in the New Testament, the figure behind it made no claim to Messiahship, or if he did, he was disillusioned in the end. Reaction was at first negative and authoritarian, but the fact that the challenge had come from men whose scholarship and intellectual integrity could not be called in question, demanded a more constructive answer.

The first attempts to meet this criticism on its own grounds were not successful. A new approach to the problems revealed by Biblical scholarship had to be made, and new methods of criticism found. The full force of the counter-attack has developed during the past decade. Fundamental to it is the assumption that Christian dogma in its Catholic totality is true. It is claimed, therefore, that as Biblical scholarship did not approach its study from a theological point of view, its results are either invalid or incomplete. They had been obtained by methods which were scientific and secular. Its humanistic approach, and anthropological outlook were the product of nineteenth century Liberalism, and therefore, as such, of no more permanent value or validity than their social and political parent. Fundamental, also, is the right interpretation of history, a teleological one; history is not just the record of

events, it includes their interpretation, or, alternatively, it includes their effect. The whole Catholic dogma, or again, alternatively, the Church which gives it expression, is a part of the event, a part of the historical Jesus. Any interpretation of him must include an interpretation of them. Jesus cannot be isolated from history, past, contemporary, or future.

Now these two principles of the new Biblical criticism appear to be perfectly reasonable, but they can be made the refuge of a lie. Certainly the approach must be theological, and it has been, if by theological is meant that a careful study of theological problems must be taken into account. But it does not mean that only, or primarily; it means that in interpreting the Scriptures, the scholar, having prejudged the meaning of the texts must discover in them only what he has already read into them. Again, that history from a metaphysical point of view includes event plus interpretation, or effect, may be perfectly true; but surely the scholar in studying history is called upon to enquire, first, whether the evidence is sufficient to support the claim that the event ever took place, and what its nature was, and secondly, whether the interpretations placed upon the event, and its effects, are justifiable in the light of what the evidence has told him of the event itself. That was in fact what the Biblical scholarship which now enjoys the beatitude of malediction attempted to do.

So much for the principles of the new Biblical criticism. What are its methods? First, and foremost, is the typological method, with which are associated, to suit convenience or the exigencies of the text being expounded, the allegorical, the mystical, and that of accommodation. Typology is the science of the use of types or images to expound history and doctrine; to take a simple example, because Jesus is represented in Matthew as seated on a mountain giving the Sermon on the Mount, he is therefore the new Moses, and his teaching is the new Law. Now the typological method is no new method of Biblical exegesis, it is a very old one. In some cases the New Testament writers use it, as, for instance, when Paul refers to Christ as the Second Adam. It was used, though not without protest, from the time of the Rabbis until the nineteenth century. It was recognized as legitimate where the literal meaning of a text was not self-evident, provided that the interpretation placed upon it was not used as a basis of doctrine. But it was used indiscriminately, and in particular as a means of justifying doctrines to which the literal meaning of the text gave no sanction. Those who are familiar with the history of its use know to what abuses it was put. It allowed unbridled licence to the

nagination, casuistry and irresponsible buffoonery. Anything, by his method of exegesis, could be made to mean anything.[1]

In consequence of misuse, the typological method of exegesis ell into disrepute, and has long been discredited. It is now laimed that its revival is justified on the grounds that it is used y New Testament writers, and that therefore without it their eaching cannot properly be understood. That is true enough here the plain intention of the text is typological, or allegorical, nd the older criticism was not unmindful of its importance in this espect, but, as we shall see, the new criticism not only finds in the criptures many more types or images, than, to say the most, are pparent, but transgresses further by using them as the basis for octrines not readily found in the literal meaning of the text. leverly, it pushes the onus of these doctrines, and of their typo- ogical basis, on to the New Testament writers.

Essential to the discovery and working out of types is the ssumption that all the books of the Bible are, if not equally nspired, at any rate suitable quarries from which the gold-bearing uartz may be taken. The golden image found there may be a gure such as David, the Suffering Servant, Joseph, Isaac, Enoch, r it may equally well be a sentence in the prophets or the psalms r elsewhere, a part of a sentence, or a word only. No attention, nless convenient, need be paid to the context from which the mage is taken; and juggling with the meaning of words is allowed o the limits of a concordance, lexicon, and in many cases to the imits of the imagination. Despite an insistence, almost *ad auseam*, on the necessity of preserving intact the unity of the Bible, and that the interpretation of single passages must be in the ight of the whole, it is the key words, and the key passages, of vhich there seem to be infinity, on which arguments and doctrines re based. By this method obviously the Bible can be made to 'prove' almost anything, from ourselves as the Ten Lost Tribes, o the exact date of the Day of Judgment. It is, with all the espect due to their intentions, the method of the British Israelites, nd of the Adventists. Of course, if one can throw in the Pyra- nids for interpreting the date, that helps, but the Liturgy does ust as well.

[1] There is a nice example of the use of allegory by Biblical writers in Moritz's *Travels in England*, where the author, a German pastor, drops nto the Mitre Hotel at Oxford after evensong, only to find the College Chap- ains, already well in their liquor, exasperated to inebriate expostulation by he assertion of one of their number, that 'God is a barber.' It is only when he explains that the passage in Isaiah vii, 20 'The Lord shall shave with a razor' is to be interpreted allegorically, that they return happily to their cups.

We may now turn to some examples of this new learning. A great exponent of it is Father A. G. Hebert; we may take as our first model his book, *The Throne of David*. Having in his introductory remarks (p. 19 f.), by subtle inference brought back the whole spirit of Patristic and Medieval Scripture exegesis, and having put the older Biblical criticism to which he pays lip service in just that place where his theories require it to be, he develops his thesis. This is, that Israel had been given all the necessary types or images for its edification; the Reality of God, the Covenant, Sacrifice, the Priesthood, the Messianic Hope, a Universal Mission, the Law, but she was impotent to understand their significance, or to benefit by them, till all were fulfilled in Christ. His treatment of the material is completely arbitrary. In connection with the Messianic Hope, for instance, he makes the astonishing assertion that it is 'the central theme of the Bible' (p. 39). He certainly makes it so, but only by taking Golden Age passages which have not so much as a hint of a Messiah, and combining them with the few passages in the Old Testament where a Messiah is mentioned. To these he adds whatever passages, words, ideas from the psalms or elsewhere suit his purpose, and of course the Suffering Servant poems. This material, most of it torn ruthlessly from its context, without any consideration of its date or historical associations, is then, with the help of the New Testament and the Liturgy, made to find its fulfilment in Jesus. The same ruthless procedure is followed in his treatment of Israel's universal mission; here all evidence contrary to his thesis is omitted or ignored. So, too, with sacrifice; 'prophets and psalmists,' he says, 'frequently express delight in sacrifice, as a godly and religious thing' (p. 117). 'At the Last Supper,' he says, 'the whole Mosaic and pre-Messianic system of sacrifices is superseded and is fulfilled' (p. 190). 'The Holy Ghost has anticipated in the Old Testament the things which He was to bring to completeness in the New; and this instance of Sacrifice is the supreme instance of all. Here we see the Old Testament writers rising by means of the type or symbol to see the thing typified and symbolised; and that, not vaguely and uncertainly, but definitely and clearly' (p. 121). The discovery of Old Testament types to suit his indoctrinated interpretation of the New Testament is his sole objective. Despite the arbitrary manner in which he finds them, he has what one can only call the effrontery to warn his reader against reading in preconceived ideas, and speaks of the necessity of a careful use of the literal text. Father Hebert certainly observes the canon of approaching his subject theologically; he also interprets history teleologically, but he leaves behind him a trail of devastation.

In his second book, *The Authority of the Old Testament*, ather Hebert is somewhat more restrained, and though he pays ore attention to the work of Old Testament scholars, and indeed, as some interesting observations to make, his judgments remain urely arbitrary, and his method of exegesis has not changed. Ie finds in the Old Testament only what he wants to find, and it always what Catholic dogma demands. The authority of the Old estament lies in the New, and the full meaning of both can only e found in the Liturgy. His books are a supreme example of jobbing backwards.'

When we turn from this 'Jehovah's Witness' atmosphere of ne Old Testament to that of the New Testament, we are fortunate n having at our disposal for the exposition of this new criticism, ne work of Sir Edwyn Hoskyns and F. N. Davey, *The Riddle of he New Testament*. We may be grateful to them for providing us ith a new term with which to describe it, 'the modern living riticism.' At the outset of this book, the function of the historian s limited; our authors lay down that 'the critical historian is not oncerned with the ultimate truth of what Jesus taught, but only ith the actual substance of his teaching.' That privilege is reerved for the theologian pure and simple. The historian is 'a nere hewer of wood and drawer of water; it is his function to act s the slave of the theologian' (p. 171). They claim that they have olved 'the historical problem' (p. 179), presumably they write as istorians, but that does not prevent them from passing theological udgments.

What is their solution? As Father Hebert discovered that the Old Testament was conditioned by the New, so they have discovered that the New Testament is conditioned by the Old. They claim that the four Gospels support the view that 'Jesus acted as he did act and said what he did say because he was consciously fulfilling a necessity imposed upon him by God through the demands of the Old Testament' (p. 115). 'The word which had formerly been written on two tables of stone had now been written in the flesh and blood of Jesus' (p. 74). The method of this new living criticism as applied to the New Testament differs little from what we have seen of its workings in the Old. Having demonstrated what can be done with the meaning of words by the magic of semasiology (p. 20 f.), they proceed to show that Mark, though actually citing the Old Testament only three times, is nevertheless shot through and through with Old Testament images reflected in ideas, phrases, words. All have the same purpose, namely to bring out a 'Son of God' Christology (p. 112 f.) and to show the fulfilment of Messianic prophecy (p. 116 f.). They recur with amazing

regularity, in plain narrative, in miracle stories, in parables, in sayings, and they are used with great subtlety. Two examples will suffice. In the miracle stories of the healing of a blind man (Mk. viii, 22), and of one who was deaf and stammered (Mk. vii, 31), because the word 'stammerer' occurs once only in the Septuagint and here only in the New Testament, Mark must have had in mind Isaiah xxxv, 3 f., where the eyes of the blind are to be opened, the ears of the deaf are to hear, and the tongue of the stammerer is to speak plain. Our authors conclude, 'the similarity of these two miracles, and their congruence with this prophecy, show that the Markan narrative depends for its understanding upon the detection of this Old Testament allusion.' The two miracles 'seem to be introduced into the Markan narrative in order to point to the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy' (p. 119 f.). But it is not these two miracles of healing alone which are narrated as the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy. The whole series of miraculous happenings recorded by Mark rests upon this background. The second example is the saying of Jesus about the lamp and the bushel in Mark vi, 21. Here the lamp is the Lamp of David, and signifies, not that the Gospel is to be proclaimed, but that Jesus the Messiah will not always suffer humility; the time will come when he will take his throne and reign (p. 129). What is true of Mark is also true of the non-Markan parts of Matthew and Luke. 'The material is everywhere Christological' (p. 145). 'The critical method has itself revealed most clearly the living unity of the documents,' though this unity the authors admit, is 'very delicate' (p. 180).

Our authors conclude that 'throughout the synoptic material Jesus is called Son of God' (p. 113). 'No single strand in the evidence deprives Jesus of the conscious sense that he is bringing into being a new order and working out a purpose — in complete isolation' (p. 172). 'Thus the attempt to throw upon the evangelists the responsibility of having manipulated the earlier tradition in the interests of a remarkable Christology does not survive a rigidly critical examination' (p. 114). 'Primitive Christianity came into being because the Christians believed what he had said and done to have been the truth. The whole spiritual and moral power of the primitive church rested ultimately, not upon a mystical experience, but upon its belief that what Jesus had asserted to have been the purpose of his life and death was in very truth the purpose of God' (p. 177).

We may note the inconsequential nature of these conclusions. Our authors produce no evidence whatsoever to show that Mark, writing about 65 A.D., did not manipulate the tradition. Though

hey admit that he edits it by careful rearrangement of 'the para-doxical material of his tradition' (p. 114), no evidence is produced as to its nature or contents before it was edited, nor can such evi-dence be produced. Identification of the Jesus of History with the Jesus of the Gospels runs throughout the book without the slightest justification, and forms the basis of their statement that what the church believed was what Jesus had 'asserted.'

We may now turn from this 'Four-Square Gospel' of modern living criticism to see how the rest of the New Testament fares under its treatment. Here we may take as our exemplar *The Apostolic Ministry*, edited by the Bishop of Oxford. The impres sion created by this book is exactly summed up by Bishop Stephen Neill in *The Ministry of the Church*; 'the reader has a disturbing feeling that the conclusions were reached before the evidence was considered, that a certain structure of thought has been imposed on the facts rather than deduced from them, and that presuppositions which he may not be prepared to grant lurk all the time in the background . . . Here is learning in abundance; a caustic critic might be inclined to say that it is learning uncontrolled by scholar-ship' (p. 8). With that opinion we can only heartily agree. What is the skeleton in this embryo-apostolic cupboard? It is the one we are already familiar with. Father Thornton's essay can only be described as special pleading, and typology run amuck. Dr. Farrer is less extreme in his typology, though the parallel between Moses' appointment of the twelve tribal princes and their seventy assessors, on the one hand, and Jesus' appointment of the Twelve and the Seventy, and the appointment by the Twelve of the Seven deacons in Acts on the other, affords a not unworthy example of the workings of the modern critical mind; but, as he shows in his Bampton Lectures, he can do better than that. Neither he nor Father Thornton has any hesitation in using types as the basis of doctrine. However, in his essay in this book, Dr. Farrer specialises in special pleading. As an advocate of lost causes he is superb; see for example his attempt to give to Paul and Barnabas the same apostolic status as that of the Twelve (p. 128 f.), his defence of the claims which he makes for Stephanus (p. 147 f.), and his defence of the apostolic episcopate from the Pastorals (p. 160 f.). Dom Gregory Dix's article, apart from the *shaliachal* red-herring, and a good deal of illogical argument and theological sleight of hand in his treatment of Clement, was, I thought, the most reasonable of the collection. Throughout the book are, of course, omissions of evidence so characteristic of this kind of new criticism.

The modern critical school is thorough, if nothing else. All its findings have been gathered up, and shine forth as the basis of

full Catholic dogma through the translucent pages of our next book, Dr. Mascall's, *Christ, the Christian and the Church.* The circle is completed; Catholic dogma was found in the Old Testament, it was found in the Gospels, it was found in the Apostolic writings, and now it finds itself in itself; as I am sure Dr. Mascall would say, 'ontologically and realistically.' Its elucidation is accompanied by all the devices of exegesis and exposition characteristic of this new learning: here, the Fathers have come into their own, so too have the Schoolmen. We may take but one example. Dr. Mascall says, 'It thus seems to be possible to hold, without any forcing of the facts, that the interpretation of the Church and the Virgin Mary as the Second Eve, so far from being contradictory, are implied in each other. Christ was born from the womb of Mary, and Mary was born again from the side of Christ' (p. 134). For the illuminating doctrine of Mary as the Church, he is indebted to Hoskyn's fantastic exegesis of John ii, 4, 'Woman, what have I to do with thee? Mine hour is not yet come.' This means that, 'because Mary is the mother of Jesus, she will become the mother of those who believe in him. This second motherhood of Mary is anticipated, whose hour will come when the sacrifice on the cross has been offered' (p. 131f). Then, following Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, and Tertullian, he works out Eve as the type of the Church. The exegesis is as follows: Adam's sleep is the type of Christ's death; the birth of Eve from Adam's side is the type of the birth of the Church from Christ's side; as Eve was the bride of Adam, so the Church, the Second Eve, is the bride of Christ. On reading this kind of thing, and some of the hair-splitting arguments put forward by Dr. Mascall to justify his theological speculations, one cannot help but call to mind Dean Farrar's strictures upon the Schoolmen. 'The Schoolmen fall into the fundamental error of supposing that an elaboration of phraseology is a science of theology, and that we can add to our knowledge of God by dialectic formulae about Him. Can any other word but nonsense be given to discussions as to whether the Father begets the Divine Essence, or whether the Divine Essence begets the Son? Whether Essence begets Essence, or whether Essence itself neither begot nor is begotten? Such questions, as Erasmus says, it is more learned to ignore than to know.'[2] A glance at the bibliography, and at the index of Dr. Mascall's book, will show where its inspiration lay. Like all Catholic orthodoxy it is a repetition of traditional ignorance.

Qui s'excuse, s'accuse. Can the mind backed by the infallible dogma of the Church have its misgivings? Attack on the

[2] Bampton Lectures for 1885, p. 292.

typological method of exegesis had been the theme of three Bampton Lectures in the nineteenth century; W. Van Mildert preached against it in 1814, J. J. Conybeare in 1824, and Dean Farrar in 1885. Dr. A. M. Farrer comes to its defence in his Bampton Lectures, 1948, *The Glass of Vision*. He attempts to vindicate its use by providing it with a philosophical basis. His thesis is that images are the vehicles of ultimate truth, the means of our apprehension of God, the stuff of inspiration. He follows closely the presuppositions of the authors we have already mentioned. The God-given great images of the Old Testament 'interpreted the events of Christ's ministry, death and resurrection, and the events interpreted the images; the interplay of the two is revelation' (p. 43). 'It was possible for Christ and the Apostles to use the images meaningfully, because the old archetypes were there to hand, already half transformed under the leading of God in the expectant faith of Israel. Christ clothed himself in the archetypal images, and then began to do and to suffer. The images were further transformed by what Christ suffered and did when he had put them on: they were transformed also by their all being combined in his one person' (p. 109). All this is familiar; he then goes on to break new ground in his contrasting of the prophets' images with those of the apostles. The images in the prophets differ fundamentally from the same images in the Apostolic writings, for in the case of the former the great images of the faith stood behind their prophecies, whereas in the case of the latter, 'they are being freshly minted and reborn through Christ's incarnation'; 'the apostles know that they are transforming the images by referring them to Christ, or rather, that Christ has transformed them, by clothing himself in them and dying in the armour' (p. 133 f.). 'The Apostolic minds which developed and understood the images of the faith performed a supernatural act' (p. 109). 'In the apostolic mind, . . . the God-given images lived, not statically, but with an inexpressible creative force. The several distinct images grew together into fresh unities, opened out in new detail, attracted to themselves and assimilated further image-material: all this within the life of a generation.' (p. 43.)

Dr. Farrer's object is to sanction the typological method of exegesis as an authoritative basis for the claims of Catholic dogma. He gives a blank cheque to those who wish to use it, for his conclusions give the sanction of divine authority to any doctrine, belief, or practice which can be extricated from the Scriptures by the typological method, however remotely connected it may be with the ministry, death or resurrection of Jesus. His thesis ultimately stands or falls on a belief in the infallibility of the

Scriptures. Though with characteristic bravado he attempts to slip out of it by casting the onus of fallibility on the Biblical writers, nevertheless our knowledge of the 'divine events' recorded by their several witnesses depends in the last resort on the accuracy with which they are recorded. The long history of typology shows that it has always assumed the infallibility of Scripture, and its main purpose has been to preserve it, while at the same time allowing the Scriptures to say what they are wanted to say. The leopard has not yet changed his spots. Dr. Farrer's application of the method at the end of his Bampton Lectures is an excellent example of the fact that typology can prove anything to mean anything.

That brings our survey of 'modern living criticism' in action to an end. We have been privileged to review a new Apocrypha: there is a mass of apocalyptic as well, and it is not pseudepigraphical. Our review has been cursory, and, I fear, tedious, but it has been necessary, for the insidiousness of the new criticism's approach and of its method of exegesis are not appreciated outside the circles from which it emanates. Indeed, it may be doubted if it is appreciated there, for one can have no reason to doubt the integrity and sincerity of those who sponsor it.

The mountain has travailed and brought forth a mouse, a Church mouse. What are the results of its labours? They have shown us what all Christian people have known for a very long time; that the New Testament is latent in the Old, and that the Old Testament is patent in the New. But in doing this the Scriptures have been turned into the most subtle palimpsest ever devised by the art of man. From being in the Vulgar Tongue they have been retranslated into a language vieing in its incomprehensibility with that of the Vulgate itself. They have been degraded to the status of esoteric literature, full of veiled sayings, of word-puzzles, magical papyri par excellence; comprehensible only to the few whose minds can make their way through the tortuous maze of their divine unintelligibility. The Bible as a whole has been put into cipher, the only key to which is the full doctrine of the Medieval Church: the gospels have been reduced to the level of apocalyptic whose sole purpose is to recount the fulfilment of unfulfilled prophecy. Not without reason did Newman warn his followers that 'all persons, with very few exceptions, who try to go by Scripture only fall away from the Church and her doctrines.'[3]

The new Biblical scholarship claims also to have revealed the Jesus of History, but on its own showing he lies the more deeply buried beneath the literary accretions of the faith of the Early Church. The most that can be claimed is that the Jesus of the New

[3] Tract 85, p. 2.

Testament writers over a century and more has been discovered; but it is a Jesus stereotyped by a flatrate interpretation of Scripture. We knew the Jesus of the Scriptures before; we were familiar with the Catholic portait of him too.

Not only has the new Biblical criticism given us nothing, it must surely seriously discredit Biblical scholarship as a whole. A criticism which ignores evidence, or accommodates it to its theory, is no criticism at all, and it can certainly have no claim to scholarship. This eclectic treatment of evidence is nowhere better illustrated than in connection with New Testament eschatology. No account is taken of what is surely, at any rate in the Synoptic Gospels, Acts, the Pauline Epistles and Revelation, a very strong characteristic of primitive Christianity; namely, the expectation of an immediate Second Coming. When passages mentioning it are noticed at all, their literal meaning is either whittled away typologically, allegorically, mystically, or resort is had to that palliative of the new criticism known as 'realised eschatology.' We may not agree with Schweitzer, but he set New Testament scholars a problem which has not yet been solved; was Jesus a deluded fanatic, or did he never claim for himself the Messianic rôle? That is the problem raised by a great deal of the evidence in the literal text of the New Testament. How does the new school of criticism interpret the words in Acts iii, 19f.? 'Repent ye therefore, and turn again, that your sins may be blotted out, that so there may come seasons of refreshing from the presence of the Lord; and that he may send the Christ who hath been appointed for you, even Jesus: whom the heaven must receive until the times of the restoration of all things, whereof God spake by the mouth of his holy prophets which have been since the world began.' Father Hebert quotes the verse preceding this passage, but he is very careful in ignoring what follows; nor do any of the other books we have considered mention it at all. It isn't an isolated passage. There are plenty of other passages in the Synoptic Gospels whose plain and literal sense presupposes that Jesus' Messiahship dated from after the resurrection, and that he would return within the lifetime of some of the Twelve. What did Mark mean when he wrote 'the Son of Man also shall be ashamed of him, when he cometh in the glory of his Father with the holy angels'? (viii, 38). Why did the Early Church have all things in common, if its members, including the Twelve, did not expect the Second Coming in the immediate future? The passage in Acts sums up Pauline Messianic eschatology perfectly; it is also a succinct summary of apocalyptic eschatology. The picture of Jesus' Messiahship portrayed by the new criticism just does not fit in with these and other representations

of it, or of his Second Coming. Whatever be the right interpretation, the point is that these and similar passages have been ignored.

Again, the old school of criticism noted in the Synoptic Gospels a certain reluctance on the part of Jesus to make or accept the Messianic claim, but that in the Fourth Gospel that claim is made openly and avowedly. It was surely reasonable to conclude that the Messianic and other claims accorded to Jesus by traditional theology were called in question by the evidence. What has the new school of criticism answered? It has ignored the evidence, and has answered that the Synoptic Gospels, far from representing Jesus as reluctant to make and accept the Messianic claim, their every paragraph, every line, every word is pregnant with it. There is no difference between the Christology of the Synoptic Gospels, and that of the Fourth Gospel. The misconstrued reluctance on the part of Jesus to accept the Messianic claim was due to his 'complete isolation,' presumably from his environment, and to the complete failure of his disciples and others to understand the significance of a single word he uttered, despite the fact that his speech was cast in the language of the only literature they knew. An alternative device is to suggest that Jesus, and Mark, were guarding 'the Messianic secret,' Personally, I find it difficult to imagine anyone making a claim 'in complete isolation,' and in language which no one could understand. It just does not make sense. Too much typology is a dangerous thing; as a key to the Scriptures it fits another door, namely that of a prefabricated Jesus, built up out of Old Testament types. I know that the rise of the Early Church has to be accounted for; so too has the rise of Mohammedanism, and of the other great world religions.

May not the representation of Jesus as reluctant to make and accept the Messianic claim be due to the fact that Mark, or Peter, if you like, knew perfectly well that he did not make it during his lifetime? He was not Messiah then, his Messiahship belonged to whatever the experience was which lay behind the resurrection narratives. May it not be that Mark is a good historian, as well as a good theologian; recording event and interpretation; and that his editing of the various traditions is as superb as it is claimed to be? Why should not Mark have represented Jesus as making the Messianic claim openly during his lifetime, as does the author of the Fourth Gospel? It is especially strange if, as is claimed, his gospel is shot through and through with a 'Son of God' Christology?

A 'Son of God' Christology may be implicit in a few isolated

passages in Mark, but there are other Christological traditions here too. There is the one brought out by Schweitzer, that Jesus was hoping to force the coming of the Kingdom. The new criticism is not too happy about the account of the triumphal entry into Jerusalem. Hoskyns and Davey ask, 'what was involved in this public action?' (p. 64), but they are very careful not to answer their own question. Father Hebert, who does not seem to suffer from the 'complete isolation' complex, would seem to interpret it as the return of the Presence. Can the literal sense of this tradition mean anything other than that Jesus, who is represented as deliberately planning the action, was enacting a rôle in a Davidic kingdom which he thought was about to dawn? That is what his followers thought. There are plenty of other passages in Mark which reflect this same tradition. Assuming that Mark had no doubt that Jesus, during his lifetime, did lay claim to the Messiahship, in view of the presence in his gospel of at least two different traditions of its interpretation, why should only the 'Son of God' interpretation be allowed?

A further thorn, sharpened by the older criticism, in the flesh of traditional orthodoxy has long been that of miracles. Clearly some of them raise difficulties. A common compromise was to reject the 'nature' miracles, and keep the 'faith-healing' ones. But, as J. M. Thompson pointed out some forty years ago, we cannot pick and choose like that. All the miracles hang together, Virgin Birth, Resurrection, and the coin in the fish's mouth. The new school of criticism has now solved the problem to its own satisfaction, though it is not a new solution, Clement of Alexandria thought of it nearly eighteen centuries ago. The answer is that the miracle stories are not stories of miracles at all, but parables. They are of course based on Old Testament types, and like the other parables have as their purpose the proclamation of Jesus' Messiahship, and of his divine Sonship. Some of them are based on actual works of healing : these reveal the Messiah in action. In this way you can typologise the difficult miracles away, and keep what you want out of the others. A few miracles remain, but as Father Hebert sapiently remarks, if we believe that Jesus was a miraculous person 'the historicity of the particular miracles recorded of Him in the course of His ministry can be examined without fear or favour.'[4] Despite these paliatives, however, the problem of miracles remains, and with it a very large number of other problems, historical and theological.

The findings of this new school of criticism must surely discredit, not only Biblical scholarship, but the Christian religion too,

[4] The Authority of the Old Testament (p. 241).

The conception of God which lies behind them is the greatest disservice to religion since the days when human sacrifice became abhorrent to man. Can we believe in, can we worship, a god who makes a solemn covenant with his people knowing that they are impotent to keep it, and which anyhow doesn't matter, for he is going to Act in the dim and distant future; who gives his people laws which were not worth the stones they were written on, for they are impotent to keep them; who demands a sacrificial ritual which they are impotent to understand, and anyhow it was valueless; who gives his prophets a picture of a Golden Age which wasn't a bit like the Golden Age when it came? When he himself came down to put right all these misunderstandings, no one was allowed to recognise him, or to understand what he was doing, or what he was saying, till he founded a church on the basis of all the old images which had been swept away as futile.

The new school of criticism has a different conception of God from that of the men whose place in the world of scholarship and religion it attempts to usurp, and whose work it endeavours to discredit: no wonder it charges them with having neglected the theological approach. It was to vindicate the Catholic position that the 'new criticism' was reborn. Obviously it could not use their methods, or adopt their approach. True to its Catholic instincts it flees back to the images which gave it rebirth, flinging over its shoulder, as it flies from the face of reason, abusive epithets, 'démodé,' 'old fashioned,' 'nineteenth century Liberalism.' As it gathers speed to its Fathers, surely it could choose no better epithet for itself than the words of Tertullian, *credo quia absurdum est.*

REASON AND AESTHETICS

By Geddes MacGregor, D.Phil. (Oxon.); B.D., LL.B. (Edin.); F.R.S.L.; Rufus Jones Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion in Bryn Mawr College, U.S.A.

In the appendix to his *Hulsean Lectures*, published in 1893, Professor Hort wrote:

> 'There can be no surer sign of decrepitude and decay in faith than a prevalent nervousness about naming and commending reason.'

It was in this spirit, I gather, that, five years later, the Modern Churchmen's Union was founded. The situation to-day is more complex, since even the mathematical logicians spurn reason as a disreputable term. It is indeed remarkable that the British, who generally insist on being considered the most illogical people in the world, affecting to despise, for example, the logical temper of their French neighbours, should be among the foremost in a fashion, current in some intellectual circles, of restricting philosophy to logical analysis.

At any rate, my first task is to call attention to an ambiguity in the term 'reason.' Traditionally, theologians contrasted reason with faith; but when such a distinction is made to-day it is not always clear what is meant by it. The mediaeval distinction was comparatively simple, because the Fathers and Schoolmen had in mind, generally, the New Testament faith, πίστις, on the one hand, and, on the other, the νοῦς or λόγος of Greek philosophy. Though the latter terms were variously used in Plato and Aristotle, they were conveniently wide enough for the mediaeval Schoolman to relate to them with little difficulty his simple notion of beauty and art. According to Aquinas, sense is 'a kind of reason,' and so it 'derives pleasure from things duly proportioned, as being similar to itself.'[1] The senses serve reason by delighting in beauty, which is, moreover, a sort of good.[2] The broad attitude of the whole Graeco-Christian tradition has been that the senses, though ordinarily to be treated as dangerous tyrants impeding our salvation, may nevertheless become profitable servants, even sympathetic friends of the human soul, when they are, so to speak, won over to the side of the angels. I think there is a good deal of truth but also of error in this ancient notion which has for so long influenced Christian thought about beauty. This aesthetic was probably fairly adequate in the intellectual context in which it was developed; now that the context has greatly changed

[1] *Summa Theol.*, 1, 5, 4 ad 1; cf. 1-2, 27, 1 ad 3.
[2] Cajetan, in 1-2, 27, 1 ad 3.

it is not only inadequate but misleading, for it leads to an intellectual muddle. The contemporary plain man is caught up into this muddle whenever he contrasts reason with art. Having been taught, however indirectly, by the empiricists that there is no faculty by which we may intuitively apprehend supposedly fundamental truths, and that we must look to sense-data to furnish us with reliable information, he comes to regard discursive argument as a sort of court of first instance and sensory apprehension as a final court of appeal. This is bad enough; but the case is worse when he turns to art which, unless he happens to be exceptionally endowed with artistic insight, his muddled prejudices lead him to misunderstand. He commonly takes art to be a kind of sensuous 'mysticism,' intellectually disreputable, but nevertheless capable of redemption by receiving the *imprimatur* first of 'reason' and then of sense-data. Nevertheless, he notices that logical, discursive argument, though safer, surer, and less prone to error than art can ever be, is always slower and sometimes clumsier. It seems to lack the immediacy and agility of art, which so wantonly yet often successfully goes straight to sense, the fount of all knowledge, and says more cleverly though less accurately that which could have been said through the more respectable medium of discursive argument. The plain man, I submit, flees from reason only with a bad conscience, for he has a superstitious reverence for it; only he thinks art is handier, quicker, and after all life is short. It is true that he may much relish 'a nice bit o' colour,' particularly if it seems to him to be rationally displayed, that is, displayed according to his philosophic presuppositions; but in his heart he tends on the whole to despise the artist and to revere him whom he supposes to say the same thing far better by discursive argument.

Let us turn to an ambiguity in the term *aesthesis*. It has been used on the one hand in reference to sensory apprehension, on the other to the apprehension of beauty. If the experience of beauty is wholly reducible to sensory apprehension, the experience of a healthy schoolboy devouring apple-pie during the long vacation would be for him an experience of the beautiful. It is indeed aesthetic experience in one of the senses in which the term has been used; but it is not experience of the beautiful. In order to have this, I must detach myself somehow from the sensory object; there must be what has been conveniently called 'psychical distance' between me and the object of my contemplation. The habits of life, particularly of life in a highly industrialized community, make this difficult. It is true that some people seem to have a greater natural flair for it than others, just as some people seem to have

natural flair for clear thinking; but on the whole the process is robably rather, as Edison said of genius, one per cent. inspira- on and ninety-nine per cent. perspiration. At any rate, genuine rtistic, contemplative activity needs just as much effort as does enuine thinking, and in particular it requires just as much de- chment from emotion and other psychological influences and reoccupations. It is doubtless true that both artistic and intel- ctual activity have primitive instincts and emotions as their sychological ground or basis; but while this is interesting enough h its way, it tells us nothing about the nature of the artistic and ntellectual activities, or of judgments of value about these. I may now very well that honeysuckle cannot grow in mid-air; that it ust have soil as its basis, without which it cannot take root and ower. But though I were an expert in soils, my information about nem would not in itself give me the slightest hint that would nable me to determine the nature of honeysuckle or the peculiar xperience of apprehending its form or perfume. Aesthetic ex- perience, in the sense of experience of the beautiful, whatever this nay be, implies value-judgments the validity of which stands or alls with that of other value-judgments. If there be a war in which he adversaries can be described in any terms such as order and haos, light and darkness, reason and emotion, aesthetic experi- nce is certainly to be found, no less than morality and thought, n the side of order, light and reason. In such a situation it must e indeed the first line of attack.

Since I address myself to Christians, and since Christianity is neaningless apart from some such view of the situation, I propose o accept this, and go on to examine more closely the nature of esthetic experience and to consider certain misunderstandings bout its relation to reason. I am willing to adopt Croce's view of esthetic experience as the expression of impressions; this is at any ate a convenient description. In my contemplation of a beautiful bject I do not simply sit back and allow the beauty to pour into ne, as it were; my apprehension of the beautiful, whatever else it nay be, is an activity of mine; it is something that I do with sense- lata. In what I call everyday experience, I do not engage in this ctivity. If I get a long-distance call on the telephone, fumble urriedly for a pencil to note something my correspondent is say- ng, and at length unearth one among the papers on my desk, I ay no attention to the artistic merit of the pencil I discover, not aring whether it be a rare piece of carved ivory or finely wrought old, or a cheap, ill-sharpened stump. I select only the sense- lata immediately necessary for the exigencies of a moral situation; y a process involving what appears to be a mixture of crude

sense-perception and hazy logic, I can mentally label the pencil as an instrument that will fill the bill, and that is enough. It is true that there is a sort of confused aesthetic experience here, just as there is a sort of hazy thinking; indeed, what I am doing is to confuse and adulterate the artistic and intellectual elements of experience deliberately, as a matter of convenience, as a musician might bang his fists violently on the piano like a savage bear, in order to raise an alarm against an assailant, instead of delicately using his trained fingers to play a sonata. When I am genuinely awakened to artistic contemplation, I not only attend much more closely to the sense-data and their arrangement, but most carefully set aside all intellectual, moral and other activities which would impede my aesthetic detachment. One might live all one's life under the shadow of York Minster and know it chiefly as a large stone mass from which to take one's bearings in setting out for, say, the butcher's shop. And then, by means of some psychological jolt, one might suddenly detach the aesthetic element in one's experience and for the first time apprehend the beauty of the Minster, or some of it; as the artist would put it, 'really see' York Minster.

But though art is a movement by mind rather than mind being moved, and is therefore describable as a mode or aspect of reason in the wider sense of this term, it is sharply distinguishable from reason in the narrower sense of logical reflection or ratiocination. It can never be a discourse, being by its nature alogical as well as amoral. This means that I may very well be aesthetically convinced without being or needing to be logically convinced. A simple example of this may be found in caricature; say a cartoon of the House of Commons being addressed by Mr. Churchill wearing a waistcoat woven in the pattern of a Union Jack. Satisfactory evidence might easily be procured to show that this statesman has never appeared in such colourful attire within the precincts of the House, and even the possibility of his ever doing so is too remote to have any practical significance. Yet it would be 'in character,' and would be aesthetically convincing apart from such evidence. It would so convince both his friends and his political opponents; and the most rigid upholder of sartorial convention, though morally horrified by the notion, might delight none the less in the conceit. Fundamentally, all art is like this, though more subtle artistic expression demands even greater detachment. It is this detachment which is sought by artists and poets of every age. The present age is no exception: the impressionists, the post-impressionists, the surrealists, and whom you will, all seek this detachment to the extent that they are genuine artists. It is an

esthetic question whether they are genuine or bogus in their seek-ng, and also whether they are aesthetically successful, that is, ex-ressive, in their art; but whether this is or is not conducive to a norally good end, and whether it is or is not intellectually co-erent, are questions wholly irrelevant to and meaningless for esthetics. If I were acting the part of a murderer in a play, I hould feel by no means grieved or insulted were someone to come ound after the show to tell me that in his opinion I had been a ery competent murderer: on the contrary, I should be dis-ppointed if an intelligent critic found me an incompetent nurderer. But if a jury in a law court expressed the view that I ad been a competent murderer I should be dismayed.

I confess that I find it difficult, therefore, to sympathize with hose who want to impress art into the service of any general edu-ational programme. Poets and artists ought not only to be exempt rom such service; in their vocational capacity this is strictly for-bidden to them, just as it is forbidden to a thinker to think the houghts prescribed by a political party or a totalitarian State. By hinking tendentiously, such a 'thinker' would cease to be a hinker at all; and such an artist would cease to be an artist. There s no question of whether the moral end of the educational pro-ramme be good or bad: it is in any case vitiated to the extent hat either the thinker's or the artist's prostitution is demanded. To say to a poet, 'You shall write Christian lyrics,' or to an artist, 'You shall paint Communist pictures,' is like saying to a sociolo-ist or other scientist, 'You shall discover that the Nordic races re superior to the Latin.' This might be peculiarly unfair to the oet, artist, or scientific investigator, when these were in any case ndependently coming to the demanded conclusions: it would be omewhat like saying to a man with laryngitis, 'Don't raise your oice,' or to a man with a wooden leg, 'Keep on making that funny oise when you walk.'

Rather is the shoe on the other foot. Though the artist, aving the right to the same kind of independence as the scientific nvestigator, ought not to be required to help to educate the people n any general direction, he is, on the other hand, entitled to be ducated *by them*. If we do not like the work of an artist because ve believe that, however good it may be aesthetically, it is de-noralizing or otherwise bad in its general influence on society, it s our duty to try so to change society that its artists will not be able so readily to make such work aesthetically convincing. The rtist, as such, is a simple, childlike creature, morally irrespon-ible. He has his impressions which it is his *métier* to express, nd if we think they are muddy impressions, it is for us to purify

them. 'Begin by purifying the source,' says François Mauriac, 'and they who drink of the water cannot be sick.' If an artist sees the world as a mad, irrational, sordid chaos, it is no use asking him what good can come of his presenting such a horrible picture. He will be quite within his rights if he replies, 'I haven't the least notion,' and goes on painting feverishly. Surely no one would suppose his work to be aesthetically the worse for his having so seen the world and so vividly expressed what he saw; for most of us agree that the world is a remarkably mad and sordid place. Yet some of us think it is also from another point of view otherwise, revealing order, purpose, and the divine love. It does not follow that the artist is less great for not having seen this: it is his attention to what he sees, and, incidentally, his courage in portraying this, that count, just as it is the scientific investigator's fearless attention to his data, and also his courageous hypotheses, that make us admire his work. It may be our business, however, to confront these workers with the data which we think they have neglected, and here other artists with access to such data may be able freely to help us.

There is nevertheless another aspect of our problem. I have been considering the fundamental element in art; that which, I think, radically distinguishes it from all other forms of human activity. But such aesthetic experience may have concomitants which enrich without adulterating it. There is, in other words, a legitimate and profitable as well as an illegitimate and unprofitable way in which the artist may be affected by rational influences which stand apart from his work's essential character. If a creative artist happens to be also an intellectually reflective, moral, even religious man, one of two things may happen when he sets about his artistic activity. On the one hand, having received an impression of a mad, disorderly world, he may decide that this seems to conflict with, say, what he considers to be his religious principles, and he may therefore try to tone down his artistic expression of that impression to make it accord better with his moral and religious views and less offensive to others who share these views. This is morally inexcusable, since he is 'cooking' his aesthetic experience just as one might 'cook' unwelcome scientific evidence. It also ensures that his art will be bad: such art is always enfeebled, commonly exhibiting nauseating sentimentality. It is this kind of didacticism in art that is intolerable because it is both aesthetically flabby and morally insincere. Examples have ever abounded, and the reputation of a particular age or country for lack of artistic talent is often due rather to this moral failure. On the other hand, however, the artist we have in mind may face his problem more

onestly. Refusing to do injustice to any aspect of his experience, e will do his utmost to integrate this at every point, before coping vith further impressions. From the point of view I would main- lain, genuine religion is indispensable to such full integration. It s one of the peculiar characteristics of genuine religion that it ucceeds in integrating the whole of conscious experience in such a vay that it can, so to speak, put back the whole conscious ex- perience into the quarry whence impressions come, in such a way s to change and enrich these impressions without hurt to the purity of their expression in conscious mind. What this quarry is, precisely, we cannot pretend to know. Ostensibly we have access o it through the senses; but to what extent the quarry is, for xample, the unconscious and the preconscious, and in what neasure it is something external to what even the modern sychologists call mind, is a profound philosophical problem vhich cannot here be considered.

Let me try to make the point plainer. Though we may know nothing at first hand about the impressions, we do know what hap- pens when they are expressed. Apart from religion, what happens, deally, is that we have to take whatever impressions come our way. Since their source is evidently, apart from any light that religion may cast upon it, a very wild 'place,' it is not surprising that the genuine artist (creator or appreciator) expresses a savagery tamed only by the beauty of the aesthetic act of expressing it. Neverthe- ess, such is the nature of mind that it proceeds to assemble and order what has come out of the chaos into the light of aesthetic consciousness; that is, it reflects on what it already knows at a more primitive level. It may even go on to the sphere of action and consider duties arising out of the experience it has enjoyed. Such morality, apart from religion, may, I think, be taken very seriously indeed. But—and this seems to me to be a crucial point —the cycle of experience which I have envisaged is, apart from religion remarkably sterile. From genuine *aesthesis* we may go on to genuine thinking and even end up with action which we call rational or moral. But what then? Not only is all our experience limited by what happens to have come into our field of impressions in the first instance, but all that we know and do seems to be lost, as it were, in mid-air, where it spends itself, and we are obliged to start all over again as though nothing had happened, searching once again for grist for our purposeless mill. From the religious point of view such thoroughgoing idealism is no less barren than positivism and hardly less arbitrary in its choice of the pheno- mena which it calls 'facts.' There is, however, within the religious consciousness a kind of experience, whatever be its nature, which

enables us to integrate and unify all our experience in such a way that even the grist for which we have still to go on returning is enriched by our unified experience in such a way as to yield awareness of some kind of order beyond ourselves. One is reminded of Browning's 'gardener' who, after ten years of toil in the hard, unkindly soil of his spiritual vineyard, could say that this soil was manured by his own sweat and blood. This is a typically religious conceit, and it is in religion that the apparently autonomous elements in experience can be reconciled, so that our unified experience fertilizes the next field of impressions to which we direct our expressive activity. The impressions are none the less impressions; it is with them that we have still to do; only they are manured by the 'sweat and blood' of our art, of our thought, of our moral effort, as these are in genuine religion gathered together and somehow immortalized.

Of course the artistic experience itself frequently has among its emotive concomitants an experience of pleasure, of achievement, of satisfaction, just as our logical activity may be accompanied by such experiences. But both may be accompanied rather by a sense of inadequacy, of uneasiness, of dissatisfaction, even perhaps what the existentialists call 'anguish.' Art frequently betrays this uneasiness, which is from a religious point of view a very good omen, just as it is also a very healthy sign from this point of view when a thinker, grounded in the Socratic principle, is sceptical enough to recognize that thought itself may get in between him and reality, so that in the last resort he must stand poor and naked before unfathomable mystery. Art and logic can both display this sense of their own insufficiency, and in doing so they seem to spill over, as it were, into religion. Nevertheless, when this happens, and they recognize their failure, they recognize also that it is not a complete failure. If we regard art as in the same case with logic, sharing the grandeur and misery of reason, in the widest sense of this term, we shall not go far wrong in interpreting the place of either in the pattern of Christian life.

REASON AND AUTHORITY

By St. John Ervine

MY purpose in this paper is to restrict the word reason to the word wisdom; and I am encouraged to do so by the fact that most of us, when we say that anything is contrary to reason, mean that it is contrary to the general experience and the general good sense. This understanding of reason does not exclude the possibility that there is a wisdom which transcends the general experience and good sense: the wisdom of the sages and saints and seers, the wisdom of the mystics and poets, and the wisdom of God. But such wisdom as this cannot be appreciated instantly by the majority of people until a long time has elapsed and it has, almost subconsciously, become part of the general habit. The wisdom of unique men and women slowly seeps into the systems of ordinary men and women who cannot act on it, even when they confess that it is wisdom, until it has, in a phrase used by Keats, been 'proved on their pulses,' until, that is to say, it has been understood emotionally rather than intellectually.

The witness of all who comment on mankind appears to be unanimous: there is no hope, they testify, in the majority of people. If it were not for the minority of 'exceptionally clever and enterprising' men and women, we should still, they all conclude, be swinging from branch to branch, if, indeed, we had developed so far as that. Despair about the human race is deeper to-day than ever it was. Ernst Haeckel, fifty years ago, lamented in *The Riddle of the Universe*, that we 'had made little or no progress in moral and social life,' despite our enormous advance in mechanical invention, and he quoted Alfred Russel Wallace, the co-discoverer with Darwin of the theory of the origin of species, who said that

> 'Compared with the astounding progress in physical science and its practical application, our system of government, of administrative justice, and of national education, and our entire social and moral organisation, remain in a state of barbarism.'

A distinguished Spaniard, Ortega Y Gasset, in a brilliant work, entitled *The Revolt of the Masses*, asserts in italics that

> 'The characteristic of the hour is that the commonplace mind, knowing itself to be commonplace, has the assurance to proclaim the rights of the commonplace and to impose them wherever it will.' If we let ourselves be ruled by the mindless lout, he says, 'thirty years will suffice to send Europe back to barbarism. Legislative and industrial technique will disappear with the same facility with which so many trade secrets have often disappeared'; and he cites Herman Wely, the German

> physicist, who was in the habit of asserting that if 'ten or twelve specified individuals were to die suddenly, it is almost certain that the marvels of physics would be lost for ever to humanity.'

Dr. Bertrand Russell, in *The Scientific Outlook*, is as emphatic on this subject as Wely.

> 'It is customary,' he says, 'among a certain school of sociologists to minimise the importance of intelligence, and to attribute all great events to large impersonal causes. I believe this to be an entire delusion. I believe that if a hundred of the men of the 17th century had been killed in infancy, the modern world would not exist. And of these hundred, Galileo is the chief.'

The late Poet Laureate, Robert Bridges, is the last witness I shall cite. In *The Testament of Beauty*, a work less widely read than it should be, he says downrightly:

> There is now no higher intellect to brighten the world
> than little Hellas own'd; nay, scarcely here and there
> liveth a man among us to rival their seers.

Here, of course, is excessive despondency. If the seers of Greece have not been surpassed and have scarcely been equalled in the twenty and more centuries that have elapsed since their death, then the outlook for man is bleak, indeed. Revelation, as Mr. Bernard Shaw has said, is not revelation if it is not continuous. If it be true that our minds have not grown since the great days of the Greeks, and that there has been no revelation since the Crucifixion, then it is time we gave up the pretence that we are alive when we are both dead and damned.

Is there any prospect that man, in the immediate future, can develop his mind more than he has hitherto done? The authors of *The Science of Life*[1] offer us little hope that he can.

> 'There will certainly remain,' they say, 'a considerable proportion of mankind incapable it seems of being very much educated, incapable of broad understandings and co-operative enterprise, incapable of conscious helpful participation in the adventure of the race, and yet as reproductive as any other element in the community. For a number of generations, at any rate, a dead-weight of the dull, silly, under-developed, weak and aimless will have to be carried by the guiding wills and intelligence of mankind. There seems to be no way of getting rid of them. The panics and preferences of these relatively uneducatable minds, their flat and foolish tastes, their perversities and compensatory loyalties, their dull gregarious resistances to comprehensive efforts, their outbreaks of resentment at any too lucid revelation of their inferiority, will be a drag, and perhaps a heavy drag, on the adaptation of institutions to modern needs and to the development of a common knowledge and a common conception of purpose throughout mankind. Obsolescent religious forms and plausible political catchwords will be used to rally and canalize their mental weaknesses. The brighter, more energetic

[1] H. G. Wells, Julian Huxley, G. P. Wells.

types of stupidity and egotism will be constantly organizing and exploiting the impulses and uneasiness of this universally diffused multitude. For here we are not writing of any social class or stratum in particular. The inferior sort is found in greater or less abundance at every level.'

I have recited this extract at length because it contains an ample statement of the general belief of intellectuals about the mass of people, in addition to hinting at the dangers inherent in a society where the rulers must appeal to a mindless mob for their authority. It has special point at this time when an irresponsible and even frivolous electorate is openly bribed for votes. The distrust felt by the governors for the governed is as old as the human race. Man has been so perverse and prone to wickedness that even his Maker, in a mood of deep despair, decided to make an end of him and the whole earth, 'both man and beast, and the creeping thing, and the fowls of the air,' and revert to the dark, disordered world of void and formless water. But the divine despair did not last for long. There was a remnant of grace left on the evil earth, and out of this remnant God hoped to create a better race.

So a new experiment in organising man was made. And here let me remind you that no fewer than five experiments are mentioned in the first twelve chapters of *Genesis*, and that none of them was successful.

The most interesting of the five experiments, however, is the effort of the Creator to replace a degenerate people with a selected family. We must note that a new principle was now brought into the divine arrangement of human existence: the principle of election and choice. In the previous arrangements, this principle never appeared. Adam was not asked if he would like to live, nor was he asked what he wished to be. Neither are we. Life was imposed upon him, and he was made man. He was not consulted about the creation of Eve. He was not asked if he felt as lonely as he looked. His entire social system was drastically changed by company of a very different sort of creature from himself. Without his knowledge or consent, an operation under anaesthetic was performed on him, and when he had recovered consciousness, he was told that he had a wife. Surgery had been established, and so had communal life.

After the Fall, the age of transition, as Dean Inge has somewhere remarked, began, and a variety of changes, mostly for the worse, ensued. The family was founded. Hard and exacting labour took the place of light gardening and a mild interest in zoology. The tailoring trade was established; the first murder was committed, by a vegetarian; a penal code, of which branding and

exile were the chief features, was devised; urbanisation began; polygamy was instituted; musical instruments were invented; and the average duration of life was greatly reduced. The world became exceedingly wicked. 'And it repented the Lord that He had made man on the earth and it grieved him at his heart.' But He tried again.

All observers of human society from Plato to Dean Swift and Professor Julian Huxley have observed and been impressed by the load of ancestral inheritance which mankind has to bear even when, like H. G. Wells, they have tried to console themselves with the reflection that it proves the brotherhood of man to be a physical fact, and not merely a pious aspiration. The extent of the load can easily be exaggerated, by simple arithmetical progression, for example, so that by setting down the number of our parents, grandparents, great-grandparents and so on, we can reach a tally of forefathers for a single person which far exceeds the greatest total of people the world could ever have contained. From all these ancestors, some of them saints, some of them scoundrels, some of them high in the world, some of them low, some of them, perhaps, of alien origin, brown or black or yellow, each of us has derived some habits and character, with the result that we are carrying around with us not only our own nature and habits, but the nature and habits of a mob. That is what was in Walt Whitman's mind when he wrote:

> Do I contradict myself?
> Very well then, I contradict myself,
> (I am large, I contain multitudes.)

Ugly-minded and mean-souled men and women will create an ugly community. Their religion will be as ugly as their homes and cities. A great nation cannot be created out of a licentious people even though they claim to be free.

These are difficulties enough, one might suppose, in the way of creating a fine and intelligent people, but there are others of which we need only note one: which is that while we have succeeded amazingly in adding to the mechanical conveniences of existence, and have extended the average duration of life by at least thirteen years, we have scarcely, if at all, increased the intellectual and spiritual quality of the population. There is, indeed, ample cause to believe that the intellectual and spiritual quality of the generality of people has deteriorated. A world in which the chief demand will be for more football pools and increased opportunities to go to the dogs cannot fill our hearts with hope of its improvement. Dr. John Burnet, in his Romanes Lecture on *Ignorance*, which was delivered in the Sheldonian

Theatre in Oxford on the 18th of May, 1923, propounds the thesis that great increase of learning is accompanied by great increase of ignorance; that the more knowledge there is to acquire, the less able are the majority of people to acquire it, and that a subject may become so abstruse that even highly intelligent men cannot understand a word of it.

> 'It is plain,' he says, 'that no one can possibly know more than a fraction of what is worth knowing. It seems rather that the more there is to be known, the less of it we can know, so that the growth of what, for any one of us, can only be potential knowledge is necessarily to the same extent a growth of actual ignorance.'

I have myself been told by a biologist that biology is now so complicated a subject that only exceptionally expert persons are capable of discussing it. If this be true, a time may come when specialists will experiment with our minds and bodies without so much as a by your leave, on the ground that even if we were told the purpose of the experiments, we should be none the wiser. Some of our neighbours in Europe have come very near to that point already.

Men, Burnet asserts, have become so specialised that archaeologists, who give their thoughts to one period of time, are totally uninterested in archaeologists who give their thoughts to another period — except to the extent of expressing contempt for them. I myself once met a man who told me that he was not interested in anything that had happened in the world since the end of the thirteenth century. But he was a Cambridge man.

After Burnet has made this disturbing statement on the increase of ignorance, he makes an equally alarming assertion:

> 'I am certain,' he says, 'that the young men of to-day'—he was speaking in 1923—'are absolutely and relatively more ignorant than those of 40 years ago, and, what is worse, that they have less curiosity and intellectual independence. In Scotland, at any rate, this is true. Every University teacher in that country whose memory can carry him back a generation knows that we have had to lower our standard of teaching and examination progressively for the last 30 years in every department except the physical and natural sciences. With that exception, no doubt a considerable one, I hear the same thing on every side. The complaints of teachers in the Department of English Literature are still more vocal than ours in the Department of Classics, though English is a compulsory subject in the schools, and no one can enter the Faculty of Arts without passing a Leaving Certificate Examination in that subject.'

If that be the melancholy fact in Scotland, where learning is loved, how much worse must it be in England, where learning is loathed. Our despondency deepens when we read in the *Report of the Royal Commission on the Press* that the three

Sunday newspapers which have the largest circulation are *The People*, *The Sunday Pictorial* and *The News of the World*. The last-named, indeed, has the largest circulation in the world.

Those Sunday papers are the mental fare of at least 33 million men and women out of a total population of 50 million in this country. Our illiterate ancestors who spent Sunday morning in church, listening to their pastor reading fine prose from the Bible and the Book of Common Prayer, were better employed than our contemporaries who debauch their minds with the execrable English of the Sunday press, such minds, that is to say, as are left after the cinemas have finished with them. Our alarm increases when we hear that the Minister of Transport told the House of Commons on the 30th of May, 1949, that the amount paid by the railways for articles lost or stolen in transit rose from £180,462 in 1938 to £2,671,383 in 1947, and that the total for 1948 was likely to be larger. The number of young persons in Borstal in 1938 was 11,000: it had risen to 18,000 in 1946.

What, then, must we do to be saved? Are we to seclude a family from the world as Noah's was secluded or breed from carefully-graded stock, as was done by the Spartans, or to subject the population to very strict rule, at Plato proposed in his *Republic* and *Laws*, as the Communists are trying to do to-day, or shall we trust to luck and hope for the best?

Dr. Bertrand Russell, in *The Scientific Outlook*, foresees a time when men will be bred for specific purposes, in the way that the Spartans bred them to be soldiers, and that some will be bred to govern, while others will be bred to breed. Professor Haldane, in *Heredity and Politics*, goes so far as to suggest that we should deliberately breed mental deficients because they can perform monotonous tasks without feeling bored! Russell does not disguise his belief that this specialisation will result in tyranny which may be disastrous. 'The government, being an oligarchy, will instil submissiveness into the great bulk of the population, confining initiative and the habit of command to its own members,' and he asserts that a new ethic, growing out of scientific technique will replace the Christian ethic in which the importance of the individual soul is emphasised. This new ethic, he says, 'will have little use for the superstition of guilt and punishment, but will be prepared to make individuals suffer for the public good without inventing reasons purporting to show that they deserve to suffer.' The majority of children will be taught to be 'co-operative,' i.e. to do exactly what everybody is doing. Initiative will be discouraged in these children, and insubordination, without being punished will be scientifically trained out of

them.' Experts will decide what each child's occupation shall be.

> 'Those children, on the other hand, who are destined to become members of the governing class will have a very different education. They will be selected, some before birth, some during the first three years of life, and a few between the ages of three and six. All the best-known science will be applied to the simultaneous development of intelligence and will-power.'

This, I remind you again, is what the Spartans stupidly did, with the result that they disappeared off the face of the earth. But even these favoured children will be limited by law.

> 'They will not be allowed to question the value of science, or the division of the population into manual workers and experts. They will not be allowed to coquette with the idea that perhaps poetry is as valuable as machinery, or love as good a thing as scientific research . . . A great deal of scientific knowledge will be concealed from all but a few . . . Discoveries which upset the official view of fundamentals, if they are made by young men, will incur disfavour, and if rashly published will lead to degradation.'

This, you will recall, was one of the laws laid down by Plato.

> 'There will be, of course, an official metaphysic,' Russell continues, 'which will be regarded as intellectually unimportant but politically sacrosanct. In the long run, the rate of scientific progress will diminish, and discovery will be killed by respect for authority.'

All rebels and innovators will be despatched to the lethal chamber. Criticism will be forbidden.

> 'I do not see,' Russell concludes, 'how art or literature could flourish in such a world, nor do I think that the emotions from which they spring and to which they appeal would meet with governmental approval.'

Russell had not long to wait for confirmation of that belief. The ineffable Zhdanov, who recently died, made it very plain to Russian authors, scientists and composers that their works must conform to an official standard if they did not wish to be liquidated. The single regret we need feel about Zhdanov's death is that it did not occur much sooner. Russell describes his picture of the world as fanciful, but it is not so far removed from actual experience in recent years that we can safely dismiss it as improbable or impossible. Our only consolation is that should it ever be established, its inherent wickedness must cause its collapse. But many innocent people will have to suffer agony and brutal death before it collapses. The tyranny of Hitler was doomed to die because it was essentially evil, but multitudes of men and women were tormented and murdered before its doom was fulfilled, and European civilization has received so deep a wound that few people of our age expect to see it healed.

Our first task is to make up our minds what it is we want. That is easy enough. What is hard is to decide how to get what

we want. Our ideal community is one in which every citizen shall be well-born, well-found, well-educated and well-bred. Its inhabitants will be able to think and act and move and speak as freely and easily as is compatible with the right of other people to do the same, nor is our hope of such a society dissipated by the knowledge that men's needs are not equal. A navvy needs more meat than a clerk. A scholar needs easier access to books than a scavenger. Women have needs that are not men's. The solitary-minded man cannot live comfortably with gregarious people, and would die of embarrassment in one of Mr. Butlin's camps, where matiness is compulsory and a tendency to wander off by yourself is discouraged.

That brings us to the crucial point: the relationship between the state and the individual.

If we are entering a world in which the state will increasingly assume authority over its inhabitants until that authority becomes paramount, it is essential that we should consider with the greatest care what this thing called the state is and what the effect of its unquestioned and supreme power may be on those who are subjected to it. If a country is controlled by one party, membership of which is closely regulated and involves the total submission of those seeking it to the people who direct the party, and if the general body of the population cannot choose a candidate of any other than the party in power to represent them in parliament, what hope can there be of growth and development and all the qualities which are implied when we use the word Progress? If all the newspapers, publishing houses, theatres, cinemas, concert halls and assembly rooms are controlled by a government which cannot be removed from office because it has devised a constitution which forbids any opposition to it, and can, therefore, remain in authority for as long as it likes, how can the electorate express itself adequately or make its discontents and disappointments effectively known? If the radio belongs to the Government, and no person may use it without the Government's consent, or say a single word which the Government does not sanction; if the religious belief of the community is rigorously ruled by the party in power and all organized religion or dissent from a particular creed is forbidden; if no man may own his house or any other property, except, perhaps, small personal things of no particular importance; if every mill and mine, if every means of transport, if all works of any sort, if the entire land, if all these are owned and directed by the Government, and that Government is restricted to one group which is responsible to nobody but itself, how will the people so ruled be affected in their minds and bodies? If the

esponsibility for his family is lifted from a father, and all he has o do for his children is to get them, which is easy enough, dare ve believe that the results for the community will be good? What ill be the effect on a nation if its inhabitants may suddenly, and vithout explanation or redress, be transported from one part of ne country to another on the plea that this transfer is essential o the nation's welfare? The citizen's life, as in Plato's *Republic*, s regulated in all its aspects.

The point we have now to consider is this. If this amorphous hing we call the State, whose constitution is still, and may re-nain, partisan and narrow, becomes, as it threatens to become, he prevailing power in life, is it not time that we thought about ts moral character? So far, the single theory about the State in his respect is an evil one: the theory propounded by Machia-elli, that the State's morality is different from the individual's nd not only is, but ought to be, unscrupulous. There is no need o dwell on his doctrine, which is familiar enough — the fact that ve use the word Machiavellian to denote devious acts sufficiently lemonstrates the general conception of that doctrine, which is et out in *The Prince* and *The Florentine History*. It may be ummarized in the assertion that the State may commit with im-unity deeds which, were they committed by an individual, would ause him to be put in prison or hanged. The State may rob and teal, act unjustly, deprive people of their liberty, separate hildren from their parents and train them in beliefs which their arents abhor, destroy property, compensating or not compensat-ng its owners as it pleases, and it may commit murder. None of hese acts is permissible to private persons. The State can im-rison and torment and kill a man because it objects to his pinions or dislikes the shape of his nose. It can punish him for roposing changes in the constitution of his country or the habits f his countrymen or in the mechanical devices they employ. If ne disobeys its decrees, however villainous or mistaken they may e, he can be made to suffer. There is no wrong which the State nay not do to individuals in the knowledge that it will escape hastisement and even reproach, unless its behaviour outruns the eelings of the majority of its people; and even in that case, the State can, if it is careful to maintain well-paid and contented roops, overcome opposition.

It is obvious that there must be some distinction between what nay be done by the State and what may be done by any one of its nembers. The individual cannot be permitted to wage war or execute his own justice or make his own rules and regulations in egard to traffic or main drainage or water supply. The community

cannot allow him to build his house where and how he pleases, nor can it tolerate misconduct which may cause a riot or an epidemic of disease. But the basis of all State activity must be the welfare of the community, and not the prestige and power of those who administer the State's affairs. The rules and regulations are not matters of conscience: they are matters of convenience; and are, therefore, subject to discussion and alteration. The rule of the road is a means, not of preventing traffic, but of promoting it. If travellers were allowed to drive as they pleased, first on this side and then, as the whim seized them, on that, traffic would cease, and there would be confusion, accidents and death. By insisting on a rule of the road, we not only permit traffic to flow, but enable the slow traffic and the fast to move without impeding or upsetting each other. Here, obviously, is something that meets with general approval and commends itself to general good sense. Any person infringing this rule is a bad citizen and must be punished for his misbehaviour. On this point, all can agree. But there is no sanctity in a particular rule of the road. It is neither nobler nor wiser to keep to the left than it is to keep to the right; and if a State should arise which insisted that the universal rule of the road should be to keep to the left and that those people who kept to the right were immoral and ought to be punished for their wickedness, and made war on them for their evil ways, that State would manifestly be evil as well as foolish.

If we are to obtain a balanced society, in which all men may live ample lives, we must, I think, abolish the belief that the State is supreme over the individual, and restore our faith in the sanctity of personal liberty. The State, if it be permitted unlimited authority over its members, will attempt to make them uniform, because a uniform people is more easily governed than a diverse people. But uniformity is contrary to universal law. All life is diversity. The variety of the world is its most pleasant quality. Observe how careful nature is to avoid uniformity. There is not one shade of green but many shades; green that is almost blue, green that is almost yellow, green that is almost black, light green and dark green, the green of pine trees and the green of grass, the green of apples and primrose leaves and falling water. If we try to eliminate this variety, we shall fail in our effort, because the universal law will overcome and defeat us, but we may last long enough to destroy our own lives.

> 'If we imagine,' says Professor Jennings, 'a human population all subjected throughout life to the same environment, we should still have differences in temperament, in aptitude, in ability, in morality, of perhaps all the diverse types now observed.'

Are we, then, to sit down in despair, taking our chance of survival, but feeling fairly certain that our chance is a slight one, and that man is destined to degenerate and disappear? I see no reason why we should despair or abandon hope.

Consider what a strange variety of inventions and devices this not very robust creature, man, has made. He seems to be the least important animal on an insignificant star, yet he has risen, like Caliban, from the slime in which he once floundered, and, like Caliban, has aspired to beauty, but unlike Caliban, has achieved it. This man, once a blob of protoplasm in a swamp of warm and watery mud, has ascended a long way up the height of God's imagination. He has developed his soul, and thought of music and mathematics and abstract ideas. He has invented words and learnt how to communicate his intentions and desires. He has composed verse and discovered how to cure disease. All things that are in the earth can be used by him for purposes that might seem unimaginable. How did he discover that out of unlikely materials he could manufacture pigments that might be transformed into pictures? By what alchemy of mind did he learn to stretch guts and wires so that when they were touched or tapped, lovely sounds would issue from them?

This puny thing, this man, has produced Phidias and Praxiteles, Aristotle and Plato, Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, Dante and Shakespeare, Beethoven and Mozart, Einstein and Newton, Michelangelo and Galileo, Homer and Milton, Lister and Lincoln, Joan of Arc and Florence Nightingale, Gandhi and St. Francis of Assisi. Out of his aspiring mind have come the Parthenon and *Paradise Lost*, the Cathedral at Chartres and the Fifth Symphony, the bridge at Sydney, the Mersey Tunnel and the Virgin of the Rocks. He has measured the universe and scaled the sky and plumbed the sea. He has almost subdued the earth and overcome the air and made the waters of the earth his servant. Alone among animals he has thought of laughter and love and compassion and pity. Danger has not daunted him from adventure in misty and remote places, nor has death deterred him, even when it was certain. He knows how to soothe pain, and how to bear it when it must be borne. He has never lost hope, never finally abandoned belief, and he has imagined great things. Have we no cause to feel proud of him, no ground for faith that great as his achievements are, he can make others that will make them seem no more than a boy does at a bench when he is learning how to handle tools? Even if this earth should be dissolved, reduced to a cinder or turned to ice, is there not the daring hope that man will emerge from its ruins, as he has emerged from so many ruins,

and will one day stride the universe as easily as he strides the globe?

There is a school of biologists who believe in Emergent Evolution. This means that man, having created, or somehow obtained, a certain state of well-being, will find that this state, in itself, allows a still greater state of well-being to develop: one which no one foresaw. It sounds uncommonly like the mechanistic or accidental theory of life, but we cannot rule out the fact of accident in evolution, or ought I to say, the discovery of facts by chance. Columbus set out to find a new way to the Indies, and failed in his endeavour; but he discovered America. Emergent evolution is not, as my summary statement suggests, a doctrine of accidental development.

> 'Aspirations,' says Jennings, 'do influence the course of events. Thoughts, ideals, purposes, are among the determining factors for the happenings in nature.'

In other words, if we want a thing hard enough, we shall get it. A finer race will be raised by those who desire it. We become what we believe.

But it will not be created by a people who have subjected themselves to slavers, whether the slavers be private persons or government departments. The beginning of all improvement is made by individuals. If we improve ourselves, we help to improve our neighbours, not by forcing our opinions upon them, but by our example.

You will, I fear, find this paper vague and inconclusive. I am not Professor Harold J. Laski, and cannot present you with a plan for running the earth, if not the universe, as if it were an annexe of the London School of Economics. The fact that man exists when the whole of history makes us wonder how he has contrived to survive the misfortunes and disasters which have befallen him since time began, is sufficient in itself to make me believe that there is a purpose in his life and that he will overcome his troubles. Browning, who, like Tennyson, is emerging from unmerited neglect, has a word of encouragement for those who are still able to aspire. 'Progress,' he says in *Paracelsus*:

> Progress is
> The law of life, man is not
> Man as yet,

but, he leaves us to infer, one day will be. 'Come, my friends,' Tennyson exclaims with equal assurance, ''tis not too late to seek a newer world.'

But the search depends on the company we keep. Those odd people of our time who refuse to bow their heads at the sound of

Jesu's name, but reverently raise their hats when mention is made of Mr. Kingsley Martin, and read *The New Statesman* with a respect that is withheld from *The New Testament*, excite little hope in me that they will ever find the Promised Land. I feel more certain that those who faithfully imitate Christ are likelier to find it. Need we feel dismayed that He had no Five Years' Plan for rejuvenating society? Must we despair because He never so much as mentioned the nationalization of the means of production, distribution and exchange? It is enough that He existed. Is it conceivable that He would have underpaid or overworked anybody, or that He would have allowed a child through any act of His to suffer from malnutrition? Our concern is not with what He said, but with what He was; and we know that there were acts of which He was incapable. When we have learnt to love our neighbour as ourselves, and can forgive the faults of our enemies as freely and fully as we forgive our own, we shall be very near the gates of the earthly paradise we have sought so long.

BEYOND REASON—THE OCCULT AND THE PSYCHIC

By the Rev. J. D. Pearce-Higgins, M.A.

> 'If anyone advances anything new which contradicts, perhaps threatens to overturn the creeds which we have for years repeated, and have handed down to others, all passions are raised against him, and every effort is made to crush him. People resist him with all their might; they act as if they neither heard nor could comprehend; they speak of the new view with contempt, as if it were not worth the trouble of even so much as an investigation or regard, and thus a new truth may wait a long time before it can make its way.'
>
> (Goethe, *Conversations*, Bohn Library, p. 97.)

PARANORMAL phenomena have been occurring since the beginning of human history, and ancient literature is full of a great number of diverse if ill-authenticated phenomena. Classical scholars will recall, in the pages of Herodotus and Livy and many other writers, scores of so-called 'portents' which are accepted at their face value as 'portending' something of usually dire significance.

To-day our whole mental climate has changed, and far from expecting paranormal phenomena — what are roughly called 'miracles' in biblical language — owing to our belief in scientific laws and in the regularity of nature, we have developed a very

strong resistance to even the willingness to consider such events as possible, let alone credible or proven. Dr. G. N. M. Tyrrell in his Pelican volume entitled *The Personality of Man*, from which I shall have occasion to quote extensively, has devoted several brilliant chapters to an analysis of this resistance of which, already many years ago, William James had perhaps given as good an account as could be desired in *The Will to Believe* when he wrote :

> ' Why do so few scientists look at the evidence for telepathy, so called? Because they think, as a leading biologist, now dead, said to me, that even if such a thing were true, scientists ought to band together to keep it suppressed and concealed. It would undo the uniformity of nature, and all sorts of other things without which scientists cannot carry on their pursuits.'

The flight from reason, and good solid evidence in factual array, is not confined only to theologians or politicians, but to scientists also. There is, however, some sign of a considerable breaking down of this resistance, and recently Prof. A. C. Hardy, President of the Zoological Section of the British Association, drew the attention of his hearers to the importance which the proven fact of telepathy may make in his domain of science.

Paranormal phenomena in the popular mind are usually associated with physical phenomena such as Poltergeists.[1] H. Price's conclusions on these phenomena are as follows :

> ' I have found that Poltergeist phenomena are as true as they are ancient and widespread. I have seen movements of objects in Poltergeist infected houses that a dozen conjurors with a ton of machinery could not have duplicated under the same conditions. . .
>
> All we know is that Poltergeister have been worrying people for hundreds of years ; that they always play the same sort of pranks ; and that the phenomena are similar whether noted at Timbuctoo, or at Tooting. They stamp and bump, and knock and smash, and push people out of bed and ring bells. They lock doors and throw pebbles ; they move furniture and break windows and destroy china. Their nuisance value is undeniable. As Dr. Johnson remarked of ghosts, "All reason is against it, all experience for it." ' (Harry Price, *Search for Truth*, p. 301.)[1+]

Physical phenomena in the séance room, if genuine, are at least as arresting as those of Poltergeists. A very considerable class of such phenomena are connected with exhibitions of levitation of objects. There seems little reason to doubt the genuineness of many of such phenomena, though what their value is and how

[1] For evidence see Sacheverell Sitwell's book *Poltergeists* ; the late Harry Price's *Poltergeist over England* and his books on Borley Rectory ; as well as chapter 24 of Dr. Tyrrell's Pelican book.

[1+] For Borley Rectory, see *Law Times*, August 9th, 1941, where Sir E. Jelf considers the haunting as ' legally proved.' He is ' at a loss to understand what cross-examination could possibly shake the evidence.'

hey are to be explained is not so clear. I myself, witnessing the phenomenon known as the 'direct voice,' handled a small speaking trumpet used in connection with the voice, which was being levitated through the air, and, passing my hands around it several times, was quite convinced in my own mind that it was not being moved by secret trick threads or wires, nor yet by the medium crawling on the floor in the dark. Since the trumpet was illuminated by two large spots of luminous paint and its outline clearly visible, I regard this as good evidence, even though it was not as strictly controlled as laboratory experiment requires.

This department of psychic research is the one most open to conjuring fraud, and when one has read books such as Houdini's *A Magician among the Spirits*, which exposes many of the tricks resorted to by fake mediums, one is indeed bound to be sceptical. Nowadays, of course, in the laboratory the most elaborate electrical and mechanical devices are installed to control the experiments.

H. Price asserts that in certain experiments with the Austrian medium Willi Schneider on May 22nd, 1922, in Baron Schrenck-Notzing's home at Munich,

> 'a heavy musical box in a sealed gauze cage jumped about and wound itself up; handlike pseudopods clammy and crawling emerged from the cabinet; articles were displaced when no human beings were near them; inanimate objects directed by the intelligence of an invisible entity were operated upon at the request of the sitters.
>
> 'The same marvels were witnessed again through Rudi Schneider under the merciless scientific and instrumental control of his person in my own laboratory.' (*Search for the Truth*, p. 300.)

Dr. Tyrrell modestly calls the evidence for levitation with the medium D. D. Home 'puzzling.' Sir W. Crookes considered this evidence to be so convincing that he wrote :

> 'To reject the recorded evidence on this subject is to reject all human testimony whatever, for no fact in sacred or profane history is supported by a stronger array of proofs.'

An account of a series of levitations at which President Lincoln was present tells how a grand piano, weighted with the President and several others sitting on top of it, was raised and lowered. One of the company, Mr. Soames, said :

> 'When I relate to my acquaintances, Mr. President, what I have seen to-night, they will say "You were psychologised and did not really see it"; to which Lincoln quietly replied, "You should bring such a person here, and when the piano seems to rise, have him slip his foot underneath the leg, and be convinced by the *weight of evidence* resting upon his *understanding*."' (Quoted in Tweedale, *Man's Survival after Death*, p. 450.)

This somewhat Johnsonian retort does exactly state the case. Prof. H. H. Price writes (in Introd., p. xvi sqq., to Whately Carington,

Mind, Matter and Meaning) that the chief problem about Psychokinesis is not so much to make it intelligible as to remove the obstacles which make it appear unintelligible.

With another type of physical phenomena of the séance room, known as *Materialisation*, so much fraud with mediums regurgitating swallowed cheesecloth has been proven that one has to be even more on one's guard. These phenomena, however, are not necessarily as absurd as they appear to be and *may* be capable of some other explanation. Carington suggests that perhaps in the phenomena of physical mediumship we see the 'subjective walking about the room'; that is, the ideas in the medium's unconscious mind embody themselves in a visually and tangibly perceptive form. And in Poltergeist phenomena we seem to see the same.[2]

I would simply point out that modern phenomena of the séance room are in fact in direct line with some of the paranormal phenomena recorded both in the Old and New Testaments, and I would suggest that it is by no means always necessary to find complicated critical reasons for writing them off as superstitious wonder stories.

The main interest to-day, however, lies in the more purely mental realm, with such phenomena as Telepathy, Precognition and Clairvoyance.

In telepathy a person whose body is in one place can have knowledge of what is in the mind of a person whose body is in another place, without any physical action taking place in the intervening space. Action, moreover, in the physical world can be taken as a result of the knowledge so acquired. Thus something can happen in the ordinary world as a result of telepathy which would not happen otherwise.

The experiments of Prof. Rhine in America (*Extra Sensory Perception* and *The Reach of Mind*; Faber) and those of Dr. Hettinger, Soal and Goldney, and the late Whately Carington in this country have convinced the researchers that telepathy is a proven fact. It is worth noting that already by the beginning of the century there was a respectable body of evidence associated with the names of competent investigators proving telepathy, but materialistic science has been slow to accept the evidence which is so subversive of its basic assumptions.

[2] The cases of the repeated materializations with the medium Florence Cook of 'Katie King' in the presence of Sir W. Crookes and others, and of Mrs. F. Marryat's daughter (conveniently summarized in Tweedale, *op. cit.*, pp. 337-352) do not, if authentic, admit of Carington's type of explanation. One wonders why these remarkable phenomena, which appear to me to shed possible light on biblical narrative, have not received more scientific attention.

Prof. H. H. Price (*Hibbert Journal*, January, 1949) points out that telepathy is incompatible with the materialist conception of personality. Materialism would have to explain it by radiation analogous to wireless. But no such radiations are perceptible, nor is there any fading evidenced—one would expect telepathy from Bombay to Bristol to send weaker signals than, say, telepathy from one room to another, but in fact no such weakening is evident.

The method of working of telepathy appears to be that it works through the subliminal or subconscious, from the subconscious of the agent *via* the subconscious of the percipient up to the percipient's consciousness. The subconscious of the percipient receives signals from the agent, and these signals, clothed in pictorial or symbolic form which is taken from the associative material present in the percipient's mind, reach the consciousness of the percipient in symbolic form. Sometimes these symbols are accurate and undistorted, giving a true picture of the agent's message or situation. But often there is a considerable degree of distortion due to the passage through the subconscious mind of the percipient; *e.g.* the main outlines but not the details may be correct.

> 'The signals get through best when consciousness is partially displaced from its normal position of control. While consciousness remains in control these signals do not get through to any considerable extent. Indeed human personality is so constructed as to keep them out. Unless they were rigidly censored, they would interfere with our adaptation to life. Only on rare occasions do these signals come through with sufficient power to break into normal waking consciousness. This occurs in some very interesting cases of "crisis" apparitions.' (Tyrrell, *op. cit.*, p. 131.)

We probably all know of cases where a death or illness message has been received when the percipient was engaged in some routine household task, or sitting half asleep by the fire.

A most important point to notice is that these telepathic communications are sometimes of such force as to produce hallucination, and the appearance of what we should call 'external' vision. And not merely in one single individual, but such as may be shared by several percipients. The hallucination may be auditory as well as visual, but is not usually tactile.[3]

Whately Carington has made a careful analysis and investigation of the normal mechanisms of the mind which are used in telepathic communications and has some interesting speculations on the normal processes of association of ideas which surely have an integral part to play in the process.

[3] Tyrrell, p. 63 ff.

He points out that persons who share in common some religious or political or other interest are likely to have in their subconscious minds a large number of common associations of ideas, which will facilitate telepathy between them to a greater extent than is likely between persons who have not the same common mental furniture. There may, in fact, be such a thing as a common subconscious mind, and the suggestion is now being made that while our focal points of consciousness are separate and individual, at the subconscious level our minds are joined together, since it may be simpler to assume that a set of subconscious minds which share common associations are in fact *one* common mind rather than a number of identical separate minds. I think when one considers our great housing estates and observes the rows of identical dwellings in which the great majority of our people live, and the identical culture in wireless programmes and cinema programmes that they and we enjoy, we will realise just how much mental furniture we all share together—at least as a national unit. A simple example: if I give my address to anyone who is not familiar with the place, Hanley Castle, where I live, the word Hanley is almost invariably spelt HANDLEY, not, I think, from a literary association with the works of Surtees, but from our common enjoyment of the late B.B.C. comedian!

The proven fact of telepathy between living minds, which is apparently independent of material adjuncts, leads one to wonder whether communication between the minds of living beings and of those who are no longer 'in the body' is possible. The idea which is implicit in the psychoanalytic theory[4] of dreams, that they are of endosomatic origin and confined to a mind 'encapsulated in a body or cranium,' is one which is quite discordant with the anciently held view that in dreams the spirit may travel, or at least receive messages from the outer world or the angelic world. Obviously a very large number of our dreams are of purely private quality, either of endosomatic origin ('it's that confounded cucumber I ate and can't digest') or at least the product of our own subconscious minds working out their own problems. If the precognitive dreams popularised by the late John Dunne are correctly interpreted, and many other cases would seem to confirm that they are, then the mind in that subconscious state of sleep (and also of the very similar hypnosis) is not in fact limited to bodily encapsulation but has fringes at least in contact with a great realm of a far wider content than that of accumulated individual memory. And what is possible in dreams might also

[4]See M. Culpin, *Spiritualism and the New Psychology*.

equally be possible in telepathy. Telepathy from discarnate minds would then be the normal method of communication from the departed, and there is of course a great deal of evidence which has convinced many investigators that this is in fact so.[5] While I fancy that a very considerable proportion of the so-called spirit communications at séances of a low order and at the services of the Spiritualist churches are probably to be explained very largely as the rendering back by the medium to the individuals of the congregation the loving thoughts about the departed which are already present in their own minds, tinged with that emotional colouring of good cheer and comfort which *ex hypothesei* the mediums and the churches exist to supply (and therefore one should not look for good or convincing evidence in this quarter), what are we to make of communications which do in fact convey information which is not the property of either the medium or the sitter? There are far too many authenticated cases[6] of completely new or unknown information being conveyed to the recipients for us to be able to write off all spiritualist communications in this easy and complacent fashion, as, for instance, does Lily Dougall in her otherwise beautiful essays in Streeter's *Immortality*.

The remarkable story of John Whiteman (the 'London' case recorded by Dr. Tyrrell in *Personality of Man*, p. 192) is as good a case as could be wished for. Briefly, the medium in this case by automatic writing recovered the story of a clergyman who had been drowned in the wreck of the 'London' on January 11th, 1866 —a man totally unknown to any of the persons present. It is interesting to note that this communicator, who said that he had lost his life apparently in spite of a cowardly attempt to save it at someone else's expense, and was full of remorse, asked for the help of the prayers of the living with the words 'Help me by prayer — it is everything.'

Closely related to telepathy is the phenomenon of Precognition, or foreseeing an event before it happens (*e.g.* as in John Dunne's dreams mentioned already). Miss Margery Bazett in her recent book *Beyond the Five Senses* (Blackwell, 1946) — an interesting and sensitive account of mediumship from the point of view of the medium — records a number of such precognitions, and Dr. Tyrrell has many more (*op. cit.*, pp. 74-89, 119, 124 and 178 sqq.). Prof. Osty, the French investigator, writes:

> 'Twelve years of experience with many metagnomic percipients and a considerable number of persons have given me that absolute certainty

[5] See Tyrrell, chap. 18, for the Gurney, Myers and Verrall evidence.
[6] See Drayton Thomas, *Some New Evidence for Human Survival.*

> that there are human beings who can foretell the future of other persons. I say the "future of other persons"; I do not say the future in general, which I have not verified personally. I am as certain of this just as I am certain of what we call the earth, the sun, the stars, minerals, vegetables and animals. It is a fact verifiable by experiment against which our prejudgments will not now avail, now that men of science have courage to investigate the facts.'

How far this faculty sheds light upon Old Testament prophecy and also certain New Testament incidents (*e.g.* the cure of the nobleman's son) I cannot treat here and now.

I have now given you an extremely abbreviated account of some of the main facts of paranormal phenomena. To endeavour to bring back to the fold all these factual sheep which I have led out to pasture is a task of no small magnitude.

I hope that the array of evidence will do two things. Firstly, help to overcome the resistance that some of you may feel with regard to the consideration of paranormal phenomena, and bring you to realise that here there is a real field of study not merely for scientists but for scientific theologians.

Secondly, I hope that the evidence will have been sufficient to make you realise that the Bible is crammed with paranormal phenomena, which simply cannot all be written off on grounds of superstition.[7]

I fancy that with a growing acceptance of these psychic facts a good deal of our anthropological literature, which is mainly from the standpoint of materialistic psychology, as well as some of our biblical criticism, will have to be reconsidered; and in fact much of the Bible will be found to be patient of a good deal simpler exegesis than critics have hitherto been prepared to admit. It is really amazing to find that a recent writer on the Transfiguration does not devote any consideration at all to the possibility of whether the narrative is true or of what actually happened, but treats the whole matter from a literary and verbal standpoint.[8] I suggest that the new typological exegesis can be explained as a flight from reason on the part of intellects baffled by the aridity of present criticism, and despairing of further progress in the critical historical field. On the other hand, one must beware of the danger which besets the possessors of a new technique to apply it indiscriminately to all the records, and madly jam every inexplicable left-handed event into the right-hand shoe of 'psychic phenomena.'[9]

[7] E. W. Barnes, *Rise of Christianity*, chap. iv.

[8] Boobyer, *St. Mark and the Transfiguration Story*.

[9] See Maurice Elliot, *Psychic Life of Christ*, for instances of this, in a book containing much valuable material as well.

None the less, there is a considerable kernel of events and facts which, to put it modestly, is much more capable of explanation on the lines of known paranormal phenomena than on any other, and this knowledge, I submit, should provide a *critique* which should be used along with that of psycho-analysis[10] in addition to the more familiar techniques of anthropology, archaeology and literary-historical criticism.

With regard to the problem of survival — the most important that can occupy the human mind — I should wish to draw your attention first to the position of the Church of England with regard to the evidence from psychic phenomena, as far as it can be ascertained.

A committee appointed by the 1920 Lambeth Conference to report on the Christian Faith in relation to Spiritualism in its report rightly distinguished between religious cults and practices created on the basis of what has been believed to be discovered, and the investigations of the human consciousness carried out by scientific bodies such as the Society for Psychical Research. This report recognised the existence of telepathy, the subliminal self, and of evidence pointing towards communication with the dead.

A second committee was appointed by the Archbishop in 1937, which numbered among its distinguished members Dr. Francis Underhill, Canon L. W. Grensted (who drafted the report), Canon Harold Anson, the present Dean of St. Paul's, Dr. William Brown, Mr. P. E. Sandlands, K.C., and Lady Gwendolen Stephenson. After twelve years this committee has as yet made no official report, but a report *has* been circulated, and publicized by the spiritualist newspapers and Mr. Hannen Swaffer, in which it is stated that all the members, with the exception of a small minority of two, found that psychic phenomena are facts and that the 'spirit hypothesis' (or survival) is logically sound.[11] We must indeed deplore the failure in courage and liberalism on the part of the authorities to publish this report, whose contents have been so widely publicized unofficially to the detriment of the good name of the Church. While the authorities may well be forgiven for reluctance to commit themselves finally on a problem of such grave import, they might well have issued an interim report with safeguarding provisos. It might well have seemed advisable for the Church to establish a standing committee to keep in touch with the continued investigation and to present reports from time to time.

[10] See *The New Psychology and the Hebrew Prophets*, and *The Old Testament and Modern Problems in Psychology*, by J. W. Povah (Longmans).

[11] H. Price, *Search for Truth*, p. 302.

Perhaps this is something that the Modern Churchmen's Union might profitably undertake, since from the list of members given above it will be seen that it was strongly represented on the 1937 committee.

With regard to the evidence itself, I should venture to suggest that perhaps we ought to be careful to avoid taking isolated individual cases either in or out of the Bible, but rather to endeavour to form a synoptic picture of the whole of the phenomena at our disposal. The phenomena lead us at once to a picture of the human mind and consciousness as something of far wider scope than hitherto considered possible.

Prof. Price, in his article in the *Hibbert Journal* (January, 1949), suggests that the phenomena bid us return to an older psychology, and one which is familiar to biblical students, of Body, Soul (*Psyche*, which includes the mind) and Spirit. It is the soul or mind which is the subject of psychic investigation, as well as of psychological and psycho-analytic study. This part of man's nature is at once conscious and subconscious. By means of the subconscious part we contact all those extraordinary phenomena of telepathy, precognition, clairvoyance, as well as the physical phenomena of psychokinesis in its widest sense.

Abnormal psychology, with its many records of dissociated personality,[12] and our own normal awareness of slight degrees of dissociation,[13] seem to indicate that personality is capable of considerable variation in the strength of its *internal* cohesion; while paranormal phenomena suggest that its *external* boundaries also may not be clearly defined ('fuzzy' is Prof. H. H. Price's word). Further, the subjective records of sensitives (Tyrrell *op. cit.*, chap. 22) as well as of mystics[14] tell of experiences similar to that of St. Paul ('in the body or out of the body I know not'), but there appears to be a difference in quality between the experience of the medium and that of the mystic. Even if we accept the survival hypothesis as the true explanation of the relevant paranormal facts, this does not necessarily entail any conflict or incompatibility between the two types of experience, as Dr. Inge suggests and fears.

It may well be that the experience of the 'medium' proves beyond doubt the immaterial nature of the 'psyche,' and its survival in a mental world akin to the clear-cut world of dream and clairvoyance, after the death of the body: while the mystic's

[12] See B. Hart, *Psychology of Insanity*, chap. iv.
[13] Tyrrell, p. 195; Bazett, p. 71.
[14] cf. *Republic*, Book X, for Myth of Er.

experience carries him beyond the bounds of the 'psyche' into the realm of the spirit. If this is so, then the '*religious* quality' of the hereafter state (notably absent in the majority of the cases considered as evidential of survival) would largely depend upon the degree of spiritual awareness of the individual. In this mysticism has always been at variance with popular eschatology, and with its sharp dividing line between the natural and supernatural. The Johannine mysticism requires no Matthaean apocalyptic, and the paranormal evidence is more in line with John than with Matthew.

A discussion of this subject would lead us far beyond the scope of this paper, which has only set out to try and show that the study of paranormal phenomena appears to provide new and indispensable arguments for the Christian apologist in his fight against materialism, by giving proof of the *immaterial* nature of consciousness and its independence of physical adjuncts.

Paranormal phenomena open a new door upon the world of our consciousness, and the vistas which the study of this new country opens up to us are as exciting and wonderful as that of any of the new worlds opened to human consciousness by the discoveries of the past.

> 'In the present crisis of the world's history one thing stands out clearly. It matters profoundly what view we take of the value of the human individual. Only if we are intellectually convinced that it extends beyond the bounds of its atomic consciousness, and reaches out potentially to that for which the ordinary name is God, can the future of human society be secure. From the nature of man springs the possibility of the mystical divine union, the promise of limitless inheritance and the hope that in literal truth "this mortal shall put on immortality."' (Dr. Tyrrell, *op. cit.*, chap. 30.)

In short, the crisis of our time is a crisis of eschatology. Until the Churches have widened their teaching so as to include the new knowledge of the paranormal, and have restated their eschatology in terms far different from the traditional apocalyptic, there is little chance, it seems to me, of missions or revivals having more than temporary and superficial results, 'for if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for the battle?' How much more so when the trumpet happens to be the Last Trumpet! A religion without a rational, moral and spiritual eschatology is a religion without dynamic.

MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF HISTORY AND THEIR CHALLENGE

By S. G. F. Brandon, M.A., D.D., C.F.

I

ONE of the most important books on Christianity remains still to be written. It concerns the question of the subsequent influence of some of St. Paul's *ad hoc* arguments. Time and time again we find the great Apostle occupied with a contemporary problem of faith or practice and setting forth his judgment thereon in terms which are clearly meant to settle the matter in hand and that alone. Then we may see how that ruling later becomes pregnant with meaning for the Christian mind concerned with some wholly different subject.

We cannot pursue the topic here, but it is important that we should notice that the Christian evaluation of History may fairly be regarded as the unexpected fruit of one of Paul's *ad hoc* arguments.

When Paul wrote his Epistle to the Christian community in Rome about the year 56 there can be little doubt that Christians generally were still living under the spiritual tension of their first eschatological hopes. In other words, they believed themselves to be living in the brief interlude between the First and Second Comings of Christ. Hence, though they were still in the world, they were not of it, and in its affairs, past or present, they had no real interest, which means in turn that History, the history of a doomed world, had no essential significance for them.[1]

In this Roman Epistle, however, Paul was concerned in answering a question which was then very pertinent—'Hath God cast away his people?'[2] By this time it was clearly apparent to the most optimistic Jewish Christian that the Israelite people as a whole would not accept the Gospel, and so the problem of reconciling this unpalatable fact with the idea of divine providence was becoming urgent. Paul had his solution. It was to invoke the old prophetic idea of a Godly Remnant and by a thoroughly rabbinical dialectic to show that those who accepted Jesus as the Christ,

[1] The Dominical saying, 'Let the dead bury their dead' (*Matt.* viii, 22; *Lk.* ix, 60), has possibly a deeper significance than that which attaches to the specific incident recorded. Paul's evaluation of the past is significantly given in *I Cor.* x, 11; cf. J. Weiss, *Der erst Korintherbrief* (Goettingen, 1910), p. 254; O. Cullmann, *Christus und die Zeit* (Zürich, 1946), pp. 18, 132.

[2] *Rom.* xi, 1 sq.; cf. ix, 1 sq.

whether they be Jews or Gentiles, were the true Israel of God and hence heirs to all the divine promises.

When Paul used this argument there can be little doubt that he intended it to do no more than meet an objection which he and many of his fellow Christians felt to be serious. But in effect he had made possible a transition in Christian thought which was destined to have the most tremendous consequences.

The turning-point came with the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 and therewith the final disappointment of the primitive hope in the speedy Return of Christ. As the ferment of those terrific experiences died down the sager minds among the Christians set themselves to re-orientate the *Weltanschauung* of the faith. It was then that Paul's *ad hoc* apologetic began to bear other fruit.[3]

The Church found itself obliged to take account of a world which had strangely not met its expected doom; consequently, it had to understand its own position *vis-à-vis* this world, which meant in particular considering its own antecedents. Now, since in contemporary thought a high premium was placed upon antiquity,[4] the Church could not admit to being an institution of so recent an origin as the lifetime of its obvious Founder would imply[5]; nor need it do so, because Paul had shown the way for it to claim an antiquity more venerable than any of which the institutions of Graeco-Roman culture could boast. And so the Christian Church, affirming itself to be the true Israel of the spirit, claimed as its own the traditions of the historic Israel, and among those traditions was included that *Heilsgeschichte* or philosophy of History, set forth in terms of Yahweh's providence,[6] which was the unique achievement of Hebrew nationalism.

Thus at a crucial stage in the development of its thought the Church came to be possessed of a peculiar interpretation of the past of mankind; just how peculiar that interpretation is it is essential that we should understand, although here only the most summary statement can be attempted.

Briefly we may note that the substance of the Hebrew philosophy of History is to be found in the Hexateuch. Therein three distinct cycles of tradition have been fused together into a majestic narrative which traces the story of Yahweh's providence from the very

[3] cf. *I. Peter* ii, 9-10; even on a conservative estimate of this document the object of Pauline influence must be an open question.

[4] Josephus' apologetical tract *Contra Apionem* affords interesting evidence of the contemporary evaluation of antiquity.

[5] cf. Cullmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-110.

[6] cf. Cullmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-3.

creation down to the settlement of Israel in the promised land of Canaan. These three cycles really represent three successive stages in the development of the theme and comprise, first, a miscellaneous collection of Semitic folklore and mythology which has been skilfully welded into a coherent story, and may conveniently be entitled the 'Primaeval History' — it takes the story of mankind from the beginning on to the appearance of Abram, the ancestor of the Chosen People. The second cycle is constituted by a series of tales about the great eponymous Patriarchs and it enables the story to be brought down to the Sojourn in Egypt. The third stage is covered by the supreme drama of the Exodus, the Giving of the Law, and the triumphant Settlement in Palestine. The origin of this, the most crucial stage in the manifestation of Yahweh's providence, is a subject of absorbing interest; it would seem that the primitive nucleus was perhaps provided by a kind of liturgical *credo* used at an annual festival at which the various Israelite tribes renewed their allegiance to their war-god Yahweh, rather after the manner of the Greek and Italian amphictyonies.[7]

It is in the Hexateuch, then, that the essential pattern of the demonstration of Yahweh's providence on the stage of History is laid down. In the other books of the Old Testament that pattern is variously elaborated to fit the facts of Israel's ever changing fortune. In particular we may note that in process of time the gradual worsening of the nation's political position generated apocalyptic hopes of increasing fervency whereby the traditional theme of Yahweh's saving intervention was projected into the future, and with the rise of monotheism the range of these hopes became universal. The logical conclusion to this philosophy of History came in the disastrous revolts against Roman suzerainty in A.D. 66-70 and 135, when Israel's national existence in the land of Yahweh's ancient promise ceased until it was revived in ambiguous circumstances in 1948.

II

It was, then, to an heritage of doubtful worth that the Christian Church laid claim. However, at the time and for many long centuries that heritage was a great asset, for it gave to Christianity the confidence to challenge the spiritual authority of the most

[7] cf. M. Noth, *Das System der Zwölf Stämme Israels* (Stuttgart, 1930), pp. 58, 69-70; 90; E. Sellin, *Geschichte des Volkes Israels,* Band I, p. 101; W. F. Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity* (Baltimore, 1946), p. 125. See the present writer's article in *The Modern Churchman,* Vol. XXXVIII (1948), pp. 128 sq.

venerable institutions of paganism and to construct and propagate its own proud and exclusive *Weltanschauung*. Accordingly, the Church saw itself as the fruition to date of the divine purpose which, initiated consequent on the Fall of Man, had majestically unfolded in the drama of Hebrew history until in the fulness of time 'God sent forth His Son, born of a woman' and known to men as Jesus of Nazareth. The life of Jesus was seen, therefore, as the climax, or rather as the focal point, of History; it had inaugurated a new age wherein the benefits of the salvation won by Christ might be mediated through the Church to all mankind which was willing to be saved.[8]

But, as we shall have cause to see more clearly later, this heritage had also a doubtful side. Because, as a philosophy of History, the Hebrew *Heilsgeschichte* was the peculiar creation of the Hebrew people, being fundamentally national in inspiration and conditioned by the vicissitudes of fortune experienced by that small Semitic people whose land constituted a vital strategic link between the great empires of the Ancient World. Moreover, its intellectual horizons were essentially those of a small Semite nation of the Near East and comprehended, and that badly, only those civilizations with which it had immediate contact; of the world which lay farther east it apparently knew nothing, as it necessarily did of the transatlantic world, and it seems even ignorant, too, of an earlier civilization of its own Levantine sphere, namely, that of Minoan Crete.

However, unconscious of these limitations, the Church could claim to explain the whole course of human history in terms of God's providence, and the opportunity of so doing was soon taken. Early in the third century Julius Africanus compiled a universal chronology commencing with the creation and ending with the year 221.[9] In this scheme the span of the world's existence was believed to be six thousand years; Christ had been born in the year 5500 from the creation, hence the Church was conveniently placed for estimating the past and the future. Eusebius of Caesarea, writing in the full flush of the Christian victory under Constantine, took a longer and more optimistic view, and the

[8] 'Unsere Zeitrechnung . . . geht nicht von einem Anfangspunkt, sondern von einem Zentrum aus; sie nimmt als Mitte eine der Geschichtsforschung zugängliche Tatsache an . . . die Geburt Jesu Christi von Nazareth.' (Cullmann, *op. cit.*, p. 13.) The custom of reckoning forward from the birth of Christ, *i.e.* the era B.C., apparently first established itself in the eighteenth century; the era *anni domini* was the invention of Dionysius Exiguus in 525.

[9] cf. S. J. Case, *The Christian Philosophy of History* (Chicago, 1943), p. 35; *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, p. 471 a.

title of one of his works, namely, the *Praeparatio Evangelica*, is expressive of his evaluation of the past. But the classic exposition of the Christian philosophy of History had to await the downfall of the Empire in the West. It came with the sack of Rome by Alaric and his Goths in the year 410. The civilized world reeled under a shock so profound that instinctively it was felt that the catastrophe must have some cause deeper than that of the inefficiency of the military defence of Italy. The answer of those who had continued faithful in their allegiance to the old gods of Rome was obvious and immediate — the Eternal City had fallen to the barbarian because, by turning to the Christian God, it had deserted the deities which had brought it to empire. To meet this attack the great Augustine of Hippo took up his pen to write the *De Civitate Dei* — 'the City of God.' The main theme of this long and diffuse work is that the Divine City was destined gradually to supplant the Earthly City; that the *pax Romana* had been part of God's dispensation for the coming of Christ; that the Church was the visible expression of the mystical City of God and was divinely appointed to claim the allegiance of all men.[10]

Thus was the Christian interpretation of History evolved and established, and as such it remained virtually unchallenged throughout the Middle Ages, being only adjusted to sanction the theory of the Holy Roman Empire.

III

The birth of the modern critical spirit which the Renaissance marked soon made itself felt in historical studies, although the chief field of its operation and the one in which it was to make its most notable achievements was that of physical science. So far as History is concerned, we may notice first, as a significant example, that in the early fifteenth century Laurentius Valla had demonstrated the falsity of the 'Donation of Constantine' and exposed the unhistorical character of the celebrated correspondence between Abgar of Edessa and Christ.

But the first real presage of a new approach to the history of mankind came with the publication in 1725 of the *Scienza Nuova* of Giambattista Vico.[11] Vico was a strange genius who certainly lived before his time, for effective appreciation of his work did

[10] cf. Case, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-47; B. Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (London, 1946), pp. 374-383.

[11] cf. R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, pp. 63-71; B. Croce, *Teoria e Storia della Storiagraphia*, pp. 248, 255, 262; S. Hampshire, 'Vico and his "New Science"' in *The Listener*, Vol. XLI (April 7th, 1949), pp. 569-571; E. Neff, *The Poetry of History* (New York, 1947), pp. 83-8.

not come until half a century later, when the German philosopher Herder perceived its worth. Nevertheless, Vico blazed a trail which was later to be converted by others into the main highway of research into the history of human culture. In short, Vico set out to explain the past of mankind, not by a study of divine revelation enshrined in a sacred literature, but by an investigation of what might be termed secular data, in this case of language as affording the key to the mentality of past generations.

Hume's criticism of the nature of historical evidence[12] may fairly be regarded as a prelude to the significance of the work of Edward Gibbon. For the famous *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* truly constitutes another milestone along the road of modern historiography by its cynical undertaking to study only the so-called 'secondary causes' of the success of Christianity in the Roman Empire, since that undertaking implied that the rise of Christianity could be adequately explained as a phenomenon of a specific cultural environment which was intelligible in terms of normal human experience.

The nineteenth century brought as great a revolution in historical studies as it did in the natural sciences. Many factors contributed to this change, the most notable of which we must briefly describe.

Of most immediate consequence was the rise of the positivist conception of History. According to this view the task of the historian was held to be the collection and careful study of the facts relevant to a specific subject, a fact being, according to von Ranke's notable dictum, 'wie es eigentlich gewesen,' *i.e.* an event 'as it really happened.' The highly critical use of data which was thus inculcated had in particular serious consequences for Christianity when its basic documents were submitted to examination along these lines, no plea being allowed of their sacred character or of their supernatural inspiration.[13] These consequences are now generally well known and accepted, although a large and influential section of Christian opinion still refuses to face their logic and continues to propound interpretations of Christian Origins as though a critical study of those Origins had never been made.[14]

But the challenge to the Christian philosophy of History was developing along a far wider front than that of the obvious salient

[12] cf. Collingwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-6.

[13] cf. Collingwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-141.

[14] See the present writer's article, 'The Logic of New Testament Criticism,' in *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XLVII (1948-9), pp. 144-152.

of the basic documents of Christianity. In fact, scientific research into many diverse subjects was steadily building up a world-view which fatally contradicted the traditional Christian *Weltanschauung*.

First, geology and astrophysics demanded the conception of a universe which in its history differed profoundly from that set forth in the traditional cosmology of the Church. Next, biology made its contribution and in the theory of the evolution of species gave to the modern mind a new concept of vast import. Thus gradually the cosmic frame of a new *Weltanschauung* was being fashioned.

But the most obvious change in historical outlook was brought about by the rise of a scientifically-ordered archaeology, with its kindred disciplines of palaeography, comparative philology, anthropology, and the comparative study of religion. Working along these different lines of research the scholars of the Western world have become progressively informed of the past of the human race to a degree far beyond the range of any previous knowledge — a fact which is not surprising since that knowledge had been limited almost completely to what the Bible and Greek and Roman literature provided. Thus civilizations hitherto unknown, such as those of Crete and the Indus Valley, have been brought to light, documents have been discovered and rendered intelligible by the decipherment of the ancient tongues in which they were written, and the knowledge derived from the study of primitive peoples still existing in the world has been utilized to illuminate customs and institutions of the remote past. The result of all this activity has been that the frontiers of History have been pushed back in time far beyond those envisaged in the old Christian view, and in space they have been extended beyond the conventional confines of the Near East to embrace mankind the whole world over.[15]

IV

The effect of all this new knowledge has been immense; in fact so immense that those who have been especially concerned to evaluate it have just ignored the question of its implied contradiction of the traditional Christian interpretation of History.[16]

[15] cf. V. G. Childe, *Progress and Archaeology*, pp. 1-11; Albright, *op. cit.*, chapter 1.

[16] Accounts of Christian historiography are, of course, given in the relevant works, as, for example, by Croce, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-203; Collingwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-56. For a Christian scholar's survey of the subject see the work of S. J. Case cited in note 9 above.

Indeed, confronted with this exuberant richness of data, the professional historian has mainly concerned himself to understand it in its immediate context, a task which, with the increasing specialization of the techniques employed, is of sufficient magnitude for most men. Hence, the presentation of any wide-ranged conspectus of History has become the collaborative effort of a team of experts such as is found in the well-known *Cambridge Histories* and the great French synthesis of studies under the title of *L'Evolution de L'Humanité*.[17] And the radical impossibility of discerning in the jungle of historical fact any pattern or purpose has been proclaimed in well-known words by the late Dr. H. A. L. Fisher,[18] while the idea that an adequate Philosophy of History can be constructed has been scornfully dismissed by that great authority of the Ancient World, Eduard Meyer.[19]

Nevertheless, despite such warnings, many with great or little competency have essayed the task of interpreting the rich and intractable data of History.

The first of these interpretations to demand our attention by priority of date and the profundity of its influence upon subsequent thought and action is that propounded by Karl Marx and since elaborated by many disciples. We may cite here the concise summary of its theme as defined by A. Labriola in his important study, *La Concezione materialistica della Storia*:[20]

> 'History is the fact of man in so far as man can create and perfect his instruments of work and with such instruments can make for himself an artificial environment, the which reacts upon him in its complex of effects, and so his native situation and the way in which he in turn modifies it constitute the occasion and the condition of his development.'

Hence, thinking along these lines, a representative of the Marxist interpretation such as Professor V. Gordon Childe is found evaluating human history on the essentially biological criterion of population; in other words, that judged as a whole, we may regard the story of mankind as 'a progress,' since, as a species, *homo sapiens* has not only succeeded in maintaining itself against

[17] On this collection see the general study of the director, H. Berr, *En Marge de L'Histoire universelle* (Paris, 1934).

[18] 'One intellectual excitement has, however, been denied me. Men wiser and more learned than I have discovered in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can only see one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave . . .' *A History of Europe* (Edward Arnold & Co., London; one vol. ed., 1936), p. v.

[19] *Geschichte des Altertums* (Stuttgart u. Berlin, 1910), Band I, i, p. 182; cf. J. Burckhardt, *Weltgeschichtl. Betrachtungen* (Bern, 1941), pp. 43-6; Croce, *op. cit.*, pp. 57 sq.

[20] ed. B. Croce, Bari, 1945, p. 153

innumerable and powerful foes, but has abundantly propagated itself at the expense of all other forms of life. Accordingly, Professor Childe[21] considers the Industrial Revolution to be a success because of the 'upward kink' which it caused in the population curve, and when he turns to examine the ancient economic 'Revolutions' he does so with the significant remark:

> 'It is hoped that a consideration of revolutions, so remote that it is impossible to get angry or enthusiastic about them, may help to vindicate the idea of progress against sentimentalists and mystics.'

The next interpretation of History to merit our attention is that put forth by Oswald Spengler in the famous book which is usually entitled in English *The Decline of the West.*[22] Spengler assures us in his preface that the book was planned before 1914, but its actual publication in July 1918 was momentous, for it answered the needs of the German mind in the bitterness of defeat after the First World War, as it seems again to have done in the dark aftermath of the Second.

Spengler's book is a remarkable feat of erudition and imagination, and, although it is easy to expose its many errors of fact and inconsistencies of logic, it remains a most notable monument of Western thought during a period of unprecedented crisis.

The basic concept of Spengler's interpretation of human history, and the one which especially concerns us here, is that of a culture as an organism of a thoroughly biological kind. For example, he states clearly that the immense duration of either Chinese or Classical culture renders the course of their respective lives no different from that of the individual man, animal, tree, or flower.[23] All share a common pattern in the cycle of their lives from birth to death. Hence, the history of any specific culture is predetermined by a kind of biological necessity; hence, also, by examining a culture at any given moment its degree of maturity may be exactly defined and its future foretold.[24] In such a scheme it is manifest that individual and communal initiative and effort, achievement and failure, can have no ultimate significance, for all that is definitive is determined by the specific stage reached in the life-cycle of the culture concerned.

We must now turn our attention to an interpretation of the nature of History which, despite the fact that it has not come much to the public notice, is likely in time to work a more profound change in historical theory than the more spectacular and

[21] *Man Makes Himself* (London, 1941), pp. 12-14.
[22] English translation, 2 vols., New York, 1945 (1926-8).
[23] *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 104; cf. p. 107.
[24] cf. *op. cit.* Vol. I, pp. 31 sq.

publicized systems. This interpretation is essentially associated with the veteran Italian philosopher, Benedetto Croce, and with the late Professor R. G. Collingwood of Oxford. The following extracts from Croce[25] give a fair summary of his view as it concerns us here:

> 'History is thought, and, as such, thought of the universal in its concreteness, and therefore always particularly determined . . . the fact concretely thought has neither cause nor end outside itself, but only in itself, coincident with its real quality and with its qualitative reality . . . in thought, reality and quality, existence and essence, are all one, and it is not possible to affirm a fact to be real without at the same time knowing what that fact may be, that is, without qualifying it.'

Professor Collingwood propounds a similar view:[26]

> 'The processes of nature can therefore be properly described as sequences of mere events, but those of history cannot. They are not processes of mere events but processes of actions, which have an inner side, consisting of processes of thought, and what the historian is looking for is these processes of thought. All history is history of thought. But how does the historian discern the thoughts which he is trying to discover? There is only one way in which it can be done: by re-thinking them in his own mind. . . . The history of thought, and therefore all history, is the re-enactment of past thought in the historian's own mind.'

We may next briefly note an interpretation which is particularly significant for the fact that, while its sympathy is clearly on the Christian side, its line of argument is unconsciously a challenge to the traditional Christian philosophy of History. The interpretation concerned here is that put forth with great erudition by one of America's leading sociologists, namely, Dr. P. A. Sorokin. His thesis is propounded at length in the four solid volumes of his *Social and Cultural Dynamics*[27] and summarily in a single volume entitled *The Crisis of our Age*.[28] In the main Dr. Sorokin limits the field of his study to Europe in the past 2,500 years, but for that period he assembles an enormous mass of data which he often analyses with great ingenuity. As a result of his investigations he claims to distinguish three fundamental types of culture. One he designates *ideational* and equates it with

> 'a unified system of culture based upon the principle of a supersensory and superrational God as the only true reality and value.'

The other type, opposing this, is the *sensory*, the nature of which is well illustrated in the following passage:

> 'The decline of medieval culture consisted precisely in the disintegration of this ideational system of culture. It began at the end of the twelfth century, when there emerged the germ of a new — a profoundly

[25] *Teoria e Storia della Storiographia* (Bari, 1943), pp. 49, 64, 65.

[26] *The Idea of History* (Cambridge, 1946), pp. 215; cf. pp. 282-3, 293; see also *An Autobiography*, pp. 75, 78 (*Pelican* edition).

[27] Published 1937-1941 (New York).

[28] First published 1941 (New York).

> different — major principle, namely, that *the true reality and value is sensory*. Only what we see, hear, smell, touch, and otherwise perceive through our sense organs is real and has value. Beyond such a sensory reality, either there is nothing, or, if there is something, we cannot sense it; therefore it is equivalent to the nonreal and the nonexistent. As such it may be neglected.'

The third type is constituted by a transitory blend of the *ideational* and *sensory* forms of culture, and this Sorokin calls *idealistic*.[29] Now from our point of view the important thing about Sorokin's interpretation is that the disastrous change from the *ideational* through the *idealistic* to the *sensory* system of culture, which has befallen Western society, appears to be a natural psychological process, and to it the Christian belief in divine providence manifested in history is consequently but an irrelevant idea, current only during a specific period when the *ideational* form of culture was predominant.

In our brief survey of these modern interpretations of History we come now to what is surely the most impressive of all, namely, that set forth by Professor A. J. Toynbee in the six volumes of his great work *A Study of History*.[30] With a learning which would more than match that of any other worker in this field, and with a patience of scholarship and a calmness of judgment which affords an even stronger contrast, this great English historian undertakes to survey the whole field of human history from the dawn of culture down to modern times and in all parts of the world. Having explained his method of classification, Dr. Toynbee distinguishes twenty-one societies, or civilizations, which have either existed or are still existing.[31] Then he proceeds to examine them in detail in order to discover what laws, if any, operate to effect their genesis, their maturity, and their decline or sudden supersession. The basic principles which govern these processes he terms *Challenge-and-Response* and *Withdrawal-and-Return*, and they are deduced from an examination of relevant data extending over the whole world and back to the preliterary era. As such, however, these principles are derived from what happened in each specific case, but they do not explain why it happened. For example, the beginnings of Egyptian civilization are attributed to the gradual desiccation of the North African continent, consequent on the cessation of the Ice Age, which caused certain of the Lower Palaeolithic hunters and food-gatherers to descend from the Libyan plateau and face the challenge of living in the tropical

[29] *The Crisis of our Age*, pp. 19-20

[30] The first three volumes were published in 1934, the next three in 1939. An abbreviated single volume version has also been published by D. C. Somervell.

[31] *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 51-146.

swamp of the Nile Valley.[32] But it is not clear why some of these primitive North African peoples were thus moved to undertake so hazardous a task while others were not. Consequently, the fact that those who accepted the challenge achieved great things, whereas those who did not accept it remained at a miserable nomadic level of existence, can be understood as the effect of the original decision; but this does not explain the causes which led to such diversity of decision.[33] However that may be, the important fact for us is that Professor Toynbee in his interpretation of History, despite his recognition of the cultural value of Christianity,[34] challenges the Christian philosophy of History in an absolute sense. This he does, perhaps unconsciously, by his basic assumption that the fortunes of human society can be adequately explained in terms of the success or failure of its constituent communities in responding to the demands of their various environments, whether those environments be physical, climatic, or human.

V

And so we may conclude our survey of those recent interpretations of History which challenge the validity of that interpretation which has come to form so integral a part of the orthodox Christian *Weltanschauung*. Of the profound seriousness of their challenge there must be no mistake. Indeed, so basic is that challenge that we may say without exaggeration that the task of facing it is the most urgent with which Christian apologetic has now to do.[35] For the modern conception of the past of mankind, despite all its diversity of interpretation, has a single logic which completely negates the Christian estimate of History as the revelation of God's providence; it is that the story of the human race is essentially the story of the natural evolution of the species *homo sapiens*.[36]

[32] *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 302-15.

[33] For example, it is notorious that the Berber peoples of North Africa never anticipated the development of that country which was achieved by the Carthaginians and the Romans: cf. O. Meltzer, *Geschichte der Karthager* (Berlin, 1879), Band I, pp. 81 sq.

[34] See his essay entitled 'Christianity and Civilization' in his book *Civilization on Trial* (Oxford, 1948).

[35] 'The revolt against the religious interpretation of history is one of the most important events of modern history itself.' E. Frank, *Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth* (New York, 1946), p. 134.

[36] 'Human culture taken as a whole may be described as the process of man's progressive self-liberation. Language, art, religion, science are various phases of this process. In all of them man discovers and proves a new power—the power to build up a world of his own, an "ideal" world.' E. Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (Yale University Press, 1945), p. 228. See also the humanist treatment of the subject put forth by L. Mumford, *The Condition of Man* (London, 1944).

Accordingly, complex though that story may be and containing such an imponderable factor as human personality, it is nevertheless regarded fundamentally as a process of the reaction to its environment of a certain natural species, distinctive only by its possession of nerve ganglia of extraordinary richness.[37] Moreover, although that environment may contain stimuli of great variety, they are all of a natural order, so that no scope is afforded for the operation of supernatural factors, whether by direct intervention or through some over-all controlling purpose. In other words, universal history has become a purely secularized account of the way in which Man has either solved or failed to solve the problems which his environment has set him, be that environment constituted by Nature or created by himself through his technology, customs, and institutions.

So far as the challenge has been recognized by Christian scholars it has been but feebly faced. The best work seems to have been done by Mr. Christopher Dawson,[38] but his very achievements serve to emphasize both the immensity and the radical difficulty (some would say the impossibility) of the task. For in his brief and rather meagrely documented surveys of certain ancient cultures he has shown the vital part which religion has played in animating those cultures; but the complexity of the causes which brought about their decay, besides the hard question of the relative truths of the religions concerned, defies his analysis. And that fact brings us to notice a practical point of great importance: to set forth an interpretation of History a scholar of the calibre of Professor Toynbee requires some nine volumes,[39] each of about 500 pages, and therein, moreover, he does not concern himself with the epistemological questions which the study of History necessarily involves — such then is a minimum index to the magnitude of the labour which will be required if the composition of an adequate Christian *apologia* is to be attempted. Efforts have been made, and doubtlessly others will be made, to avoid so immense a task by attempting to show that the Christian *Heilsgeschichte* is essentially the key-pattern wherewith any naturally defined epoch or the historical process as a whole must be interpreted; the expositions of

[37] cf. C. Sherrington, *Man on his Nature* (Cambridge, 1946), pp. 23 sq.; W. E. Le Gros Clark, 'Anatomical Background of Mental Processes,' in *The Listener,* Vol. XLI (1949), pp. 881 sq.

[38] See particularly his *Progress and Religion* (London, 1931); *The Age of the Gods* (London, 1933); *Religion and Culture* (London, 1948).

[39] The publication of the three concluding volumes of *A Study of History* has been promised.

Niebuhr,[40] Brunner,[41] Berdyaev[42] and Cullman,[43] and most recently of Professor H. Butterfield,[44] may be mentioned in this connection. But such attempts, valuable though they may be as contributions to a greater synthesis, completely fail to grapple with the real problem, if the traditional Christian philosophy of History is to be defended as such. For the inescapable point is that Christianity asserts that a certain set of what it alleges to be historical facts constitutes the divine plan for mankind's spiritual salvation — this is no other than an appeal to the authentication of historical evidence, and as such it must be taken for judgment into the forum of historical studies where the criterion is an austere one and no special plea of sacred character or origin can be accepted.

VI

It is invariably easier to analyse a problem than to solve it. And enough has already been said to show how difficult the task of solving the problem involved here must be. But to make this statement is to assume that the problem as set can be solved, and that is an assumption of which we have grave reason to be doubtful. Indeed, when the fortuitous character of the Christian philosophy of History, which has been briefly sketched above, is considered, it would seem that the only fair and useful thing to do is frankly to admit the element of historical contingency therein, thus acknowledging the severe limitations of its applicability.

If this necessary confession be made, the Christian apologist will then be in a position to construct a philosophy of History soundly based on reason and expressive of human experience. Its theme will surely be that of Schiller's famous aphorism: *Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht* — 'World-history is World-judgment.' But in the development of this theme certain qualifications will have carefully to be borne in mind, for they concern snares into which many earlier thinkers have fallen. The first is the obvious but the so-often-forgotten fact that it is impossible for Man living within the stream of Time to apprise it as a whole — in other words, there can be no complete philosophy of human history until that history is completed.[45] Then the essential polarity of historical theory must be remembered. On analysis 'the fact in

[40] *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (London, 1942), 2 vols.

[41] *Christianity and Civilization,* Vol. I (London, 1948).

[42] *The Meaning of History* (London, 1936).

[43] *Christus und die Zeit* (Zürich, 1946).

[44] Under the title of *Christianity and History* in the B.B.C. Third Programme and published successively in *The Listener* from April 7th, 1949.

[45] cf. H. D. Oakeley, *History and the Self* (London, 1934), p. 17.

itself,' von Ranke's 'wie es eigentlich gewesen,' can rarely be defined; what is called an historical fact is usually an inextricable compound of an event and its interpretation — here the work of Croce and Collingwood balances the positivist view of History, but the synthesis still needs to be worked out. Next, it must never be forgotten that the significance of History is nothing worth unless it illuminates the meaning of life for the individual man. It is all too easy to talk of the rise and fall of civilizations and of the flowering and decay of cultures, but these are abstract things and justice can only be done to persons — the error is vividly demonstrated in Jewish history in the refusal of the individual to be satisfied with the vicarious immortality which was offered by the hope of Israel's continuance as a nation in its holy land.

The task before Christian thinkers to-day is indeed a formidable one, but there is no cause for despair — far to the contrary, since never before has there been so urgent and so widespread a seeking to understand the meaning of our human past. The two world-wars have brought home to all the enigma of human affairs, while the amazing extension of our historical vision, which modern research has achieved, has made plain that that enigma is no new thing but inheres in the story of mankind from the beginning. And it is an enigma about which we cannot be content to suspend judgment, because it challenges most profoundly the innate teleology of our thought. Hence the stream of secularist literature which continues to issue forth from the Press in an effort to find some adequate solution. Hence, too, is Christian theology called upon, not to defend an antique philosophy of History with which it became fortuitously associated in its earlier days, but to provide an interpretation of mankind's past which will demonstrate the unceasing operation of those fundamental principles of God's providence to which Christian experience testifies.

The task, moreover, is as immense as it is urgent, and the scholars of the Church must be prepared to devote to it at least as much patient toil and hard thinking as has gone to the making of Toynbee's great study or to the compilation of that superb synthesis which the French *savants* are giving to the world under the title of *L'Evolution de l'Humanité*.

We may note in ending that Professor Toynbee has chosen cryptically to prefix his *Study of History* with four words from St. John's Gospel[46] 'Work . . . while it is day' — to the Christian scholar those words must surely sound a warning and he must needs complete the saying, 'the night cometh, when no man can work.'

[46] ix, 4.

RETURN TO REASON

by the Rev. D. E. H. Whiteley, M.A., Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and Tutor at Ripon Hall.

THE return to reason is part and parcel of the return to God: no return to God can be called complete unless it includes a return to reason; and no true or lasting return to reason is either possible or desirable unless it is one aspect of the return to God. 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God,' we read in the book of Deuteronomy, 'with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might.'[1] That is to say, we must worship with our whole personality, with all that we are or have. We must not lay too much stress upon the fact that, according to all three synoptists, Jesus Christ added or approved the addition of the words 'with all thy mind,' since in the Septuagint 'mind' is barely distinguishable from 'heart.'

Nevertheless, it is beyond question that we must worship God with all our faculties, including the faculty of reason. The word 'faculty' is not here intended to be understood after the manner of 'faculty psychology.' Thinking, feeling and conation are not separate parts of the human mind, but distinguishable aspects of the total activity of each single human personality.

What we require is not so much a 'return' to reason as a turning to reason; there never was a time when the state of reason was so flourishing that we should be satisfied with merely returning to it. Human history is, of course, a story of regressions as well as of progress, and it is true that the present century, in spite of signs of progress which we are often tempted to take far too much for granted, exhibits all too clearly, among other instances of rebarbarization, that 'flight from reason' of which our President has spoken. In spite of this, we must attempt more than any previous age has yet attained. The golden age of Christian reason lies not in the past, but in the future.

The word 'reason' is not free from ambiguity, and this ambiguity is not lessened by the widely differing associations which it has acquired in different minds. In this paper the word will be used in two, and in only two, senses which it is necessary to distinguish as carefully as the difficulty of the subject will allow. There is firstly the use of the word 'reason' in the sense of 'logical reason,' or as Aristotle would say, '*dianoia*,' the faculty which we employ in the study of mathematics or of pure logic. 'Reason' in the second sense, which for convenience I propose

[1] Deut., vi, 5.

to call 'non-logical reason,' is very much harder to define.' Richard Hooker was surely thinking about 'non-logical' as well as 'logical' reason when he said:

> 'Scripture indeed teacheth things above nature, things which our reason by itself could not reach unto. Yet those things also we believe, knowing by reason that the Scripture is the word of God.'[2]

For the moment I shall use the term 'non-logical reason' to cover the debatable land which lies between logical reason upon the one hand and faith or insight upon the other. More careful analysis will reveal the fact that 'non-logical reason' is a 'portmanteau term' covering things so different that in the end no single 'portmanteau' will contain them.

This investigation will be carried out in three different spheres; in the sphere of personal religion, in the sphere of Christian Theology and in the wider sphere of the life of men and nations. In each of these three spheres the role of 'reason' will be examined in the light of the fundamental conviction that a return to reason apart from a return to God would be a nightmare and that a return to God without a return to reason would be the dream of an opium-eater. According to Plato, 'justice' is found when the citizens of a state or the faculties of an individual perform their own functions and do not meddle with the affairs of others. It is a condition of the well-being of men and of nations that reason should neither be too faint-hearted to perform the functions which belong to it nor have the temerity to usurp those which do not.

Ten years ago this Conference had to be cancelled because of the outbreak of war. The problems which face us to-day are no doubt less immediate, but their gravity has not diminished. Even if we can disregard those who warn us about the perils of atomic warfare or of mass-starvation due to misuse of the land or to the increase of population — and this is a big if! — we can hardly disregard the words of Emil Brunner when he says:

> 'A new era has begun, in which the scholar, the artist, the seer and the saint are replaced by the soldier, the engineer and the man of political power; an epoch which is no more capable of producing real culture, but merely an outward technical civilization.'[3]

He concludes his first series of Gifford Lectures with these words:

> 'Humanity therefore is facing in our time, as at no time before, this alternative: either to continue along this road of the modern age, the road of emancipation from the Christian truth which leads to the total

[2] *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity,* III, viii, 12.

[3] *Christianity and Civilization,* Part I, 'Foundations,' p. 1. (Nisbet, 1948, 10/6.)

replacement of anything truly human and even to its complete physical annihilation; or to go back to the source of justice, truth and love in whom only lies the power of salvation.'[4]

We must go back to the source of truth. What does this involve in the sphere of personal religion? Clearly we must understand our religion so far as we are able. God does not demand that everyone, or, indeed that anyone should have a perfect understanding of the faith which he professes: God does demand that every Christian should understand his faith and its implications as well as he is able. It does not take much of a man to be a Christian; but it does take the whole of any man: it does not take much brain to be a Christian; but it does take all the brain that any man possesses. We require all the knowledge of the Bible and of its background that we are able to acquire, and we must think it out with all the vigour of our logical reason. Within its own sphere the logical reason is supreme: the same proposition cannot be both true and false either in theology or in mathematics. In point of fact, no Christian doctrine is contrary to the dictates of the logical reason. This point must be pursued further when we pass from our consideration of the function of reason in personal religion to an examination of the role of reason in Christian Theology.

Personal religion has implications in the field of practical conduct, and if we are to do our duty as Christians in the practical sphere we must acquire the relevant technical knowledge and apply it in the pursuance of our vocation. A Christian surgeon must know the anatomical location of the vermiform appendix and must be able to form a rational judgment upon the desirability or otherwise of its removal in the case of any person who may become his patient. This subject is too important to be omitted, but it is now becoming so generally recognized that it would be superfluous to develop it any further.

With regard to our first sphere, that of personal religion, we can conclude without more ado that it is impossible either to understand or to practice the Christian faith without the use of reason, without, that is to say, all the reasoning power which we possess. A person of low intelligence who honestly does his best to use the ability which lies at his disposal is nearer to God than one of far greater intellect who is mentally indolent in his religion even if his grasp of the Christian faith is vastly superior to that of his less able brother. On the other hand, to speak of personal religion which is exclusively intellectual is to be guilty of a contradiction in terms. Personal religion, above all for the Christian,

[4] *op. cit.*, p. 158.

involves knowledge of God as well as knowledge about God. This knowledge of God is not exclusively intellectual or exclusively affective or exclusively conational: it is a response of the whole personality. Clearly, reason is bound to acknowledge and to respect the specifically religious element in personal religion. Yet without encroaching upon this reserved territory, we must recognize something in personal religion which is often called reason, but which is obviously not reason in the strictly logical sense of the term. When people say that something is either in accordance with or contrary to reason in this non-logical sense, they may mean only that it is consistent or inconsistent with the prevailing climate of opinion. The fact that any doctrine is either contrary to or in accordance with a given climate of opinion does not in itself tell us whether the doctrine is true or false. It is probable that nineteenth-century liberal theologians were blinded by the prevailing climate of opinion to many aspects of the truth which the neo-orthodox theologians of our own day have been enabled to comprehend by the climate of opinion of the twentieth century. It is equally probable that other aspects of the truth were more easily visible in the atmosphere of the nineteenth than of the twentieth century. 'Climate of opinion' is a most important factor and should be distinguished from 'logical reason' with which it is frequently confused. But we should beware of assuming that present or past climates of opinion are either right or wrong simply because they are past or present. All climates of opinion, including our own, should be treated not romantically but realistically.

But when a man speaks of reason he may be referring neither to logical reason nor to a climate of opinion, but to something more elusive. When a man says, 'This is unreasonable,' it is often the case that, were he to accept it, he would do violence to his own spiritual integrity; he would, in fact, be offering to God the unclean sacrifice of a lie. This use of the term reason is of course incorrect; it nevertheless is extremely frequent. The truth which lies behind this usage is no doubt badly expressed, but, none the less, it is of supreme importance. Both in conduct and in belief God demands from human beings something which is specifically human, something which is impossible for the material creation. With regard to conduct Emil Brunner has written:

> 'He has created man, and man alone, in such a way that he has to execute God's will, not in blind, dumb and ignorant necessity, but in hearing God's word and answering Him by his own decision.' [5]

Our wills are ours to make them God's, not to destroy them. Blind mechanical obedience is sub-human. The same applies

[5] *op. cit.*, p. 89.

n the realm of belief. According to Nicholas Berdyaev for men f an authoritarian, materialistic type :

> 'The authority of the Pope possesses a right to constrain analogous to that possessed by natural objects,'[6]

hereas

> 'Authority of an inward and spiritual character presupposes freedom and rests upon it. The refusal to recognize the freedom of the spirit is one of the temptations of the devil which Christ repelled in the wilderness.'[7]

In the sphere of personal religion the logical reason must play s proper part, but not go beyond it. In personal conduct reason nd technical knowledge are essential. The term reason is fre- uently employed in the loose sense of 'climate of opinion'; we ught to be aware of the importance of climates of opinion in rder to avoid being misled by the climate of opinion prevalent n the age or in the intellectual group to which we belong. Finally, hose who speak of the claims of reason are often referring vaguely o the important fact that we must not violate our spiriual inte- rity, that in conduct and in belief alike we must respond to our reator in a manner which is not mechanical and sub-human but ree and specifically human.

The two spheres of personal religion and of Theology inevit- bly overlap, since every Christian ought to be a theologian so far s his ability and his opportunities permit, and because a theology hich loses contact with the Christian religion is doomed to desic- ation. It is true that individual non-Christians can make out- tanding contributions to Biblical or to patristic scholarship, but the climate of Theology should cease to be that of the Christian eligion, disaster would be inevitable. Since then the spheres of ersonal religion and of Christian Theology must overlap if either s to remain healthy, our discussion of reason in the sphere of heology will to some extent both overlap with and supplement ur consideration of the function of reason in personal religion. wo topics which fall within this sphere have been selected for xamination :

(1) The limitations of reason.

(2) 'Reason' and the Old Testament.

The claims of reason in the logical sense are generally ad- itted. Emil Brunner recognizes, in addition to 'objective'

[6] *Freedom and the Spirit*, p. 142. (Geoffrey Bles ; 1935.)

[7] *op. cit.*, p. 144.

rational truth, a sense of the word truth which enables him to say:

> 'We cannot "possess" this truth as we possess other truths, but we must *be* in this truth, we must *live* in this truth, we must *do* it.'[8]

He goes on to say:

> 'Hence a conflict between objective and personal truth can arise only when the limits between them are not observed; for instance, when something is stated as a truth of faith which is a statement in the sphere of the truth of the world; or a statement in the sphere of personal truth is stated as objective truth. Science has the presumption to think it can understand the mystery of God which discloses itself only through revelation and faith; and the Church has the presumption to declare as revealed truth that which is only a primitive view of the world.'[9]

He adds that:

> 'Theology is thought about the content of the divine revelation as such.'[10]

Now if Theology is thought it must be rational in method, even though its subject matter is far less amenable to rational treatment than the subject matter of physics. The primary data of Theology are given in Revelation; but there is a distinction between the raw material and the finished article. For example, the Bible states that God hardened Pharaoh's heart, and there is a type of religious experience which can be verbalised in the saying that salvation is due to God alone and takes place in spite of man. No rational theology can neglect such data, nor can it explain them without remainder. There is something in Christianity, indeed there is very much, which transcends conceptualisation. But it is wholly unjustifiable, indeed it is a fault of excessive rationalisation to conclude, on the basis of such data, that by nature all men are damned and that some are saved by the grace of God alone, saved like a piece of furniture which is carried out of a burning building without any activity of its own. This is not reverence for that which transcends conceptual expression: it is an attempt to treat non-rational data as if they were wholly rational.

We pass on to reason and the Old Testament. Brunner asks why Copernicanism shook Christian Theology; he replies:

> 'Because the Church did and had done for centuries what it should not have done. The Church had mixed up truth-of-God with world-truth. It had established and dogmatically canonized the Biblical world-picture of

[8] *Revelation and Reason*, 1941, first British edition, tr. O. Wyon, pp. 371-2. (S.C.M. Press, 1947.)
[9] *op. cit.*, p. 373.
[10] *op. cit.*, p. 385.

antiquity . . . This ancient world-picture is merely the vessel in which the divine revelation is given to man, but has itself nothing to do with that revelation.' [11]

All this is now generally admitted; indeed, I may be asked why I am wasting time raking the ashes of a dead fire. During the last few years fruitful use has been made of the Old Testament in the study of the New by scholars who have realized that the Biblical Revelation is unitary and that the primary categories of the New Testament are semitic and are derived from the Old Testament. We are told to think in Biblical categories, such as the creation of the world, the end of time and the resurrection of the body.

I agree that the origin of New Testament Theology is to be found in the Old Testament, that Christ and His apostles thought in Old Testament thought-forms. But is it certain that we are not confounding the vessel in which the New Testament Revelation has been given to man with the Revelation itself? It is agreed that the cosmology of the Bible is not part of the content of Biblical revelation. If we do not bind the living truth that God made man in His own image to that intellectual corpse, the three-storey theory of the Universe, is it not rash to suppose that other Biblical truths must be tied to the semitic thought-forms in terms of which they were originally expressed? For example, all Christians agree that the whole human personality survives death and that the whole of human life matters to God, including its material aspects. Need we confuse this indubitable truth with the highly dubious Semitic theory that man is an 'ensouled body' and use the misleading term 'resurrection of the body' to the exclusion of the term 'immortality of the soul?' I am speaking not about those who believe in the resurrection of the flesh but those who believe in the preservation by God of the whole personality, yet persist in the use of the phrase 'resurrection of the body' and pour scorn upon those who employ the phrase 'Immortality of the soul' by which they mean exactly the same thing. They remind me of the Dickensian character who said that the French were a poor lot because they called 'water' 'eau.' Our ancestors made a mistake when they confused Christian truth with obsolete scientific theories; I fear that similar mistakes are being made in our own day. Their elimination is an essential part of that return to reason which is an integral element in the return to God.

We come now to the third and last section of this paper, the

[11] *Christianity and Civilization*, p. 83.

return to reason in the life of men and of nations. When we speak of 'reason' in this sense we usually mean 'reasonableness,' that is common-sense, mutual forebearance and freedom from slavery to irrational urges. When we accuse a man of being unreasonable, we do not normally mean that he is mentally deficient or that his logic is at fault; in any case, weak logic is more often the result than the cause of unreasonableness. For example, we say that the Russians are unreasonable, and they say the same about us. I am for the moment leaving out of account the mutual charges of malice, of desire for conquest or world domination. The realities which are comprehended under this vague heading 'unreasonableness' are as follows:

1. Lack of mutual knowledge;
2. Lack of common ethical standards;
3. Deep-set psychological maladjustments and spiritual malaise.

The West and the East are both to blame on each of these three points, and the third is the most important being more the cause than the effect of the two others: we do not know each other because we do not trust each other; and the less we know the less we trust. Our divergence in ethical standards is partly cultural in origin and partly spiritual.

Shall we say then 'Solve the spiritual problem and the other problems will solve themselves?' This plausible suggestion is based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of man. In this life man is unitary. We speak of man as body, soul and spirit or we divide him up in some other way: however we divide him up, we must realise that we are recognising distinguishable aspects of an indivisible whole. I do not presume to say how our difficulties are to be solved: I would only say that we must face them altogether or not at all. In the countries served by the younger Churches you will often see together in the mission compound three buildings — a church, a hospital and a school. This architectural trinity bears silent but eloquent testimony to the all-important fact that man is a whole and that all his problems, physical, intellectual and spiritual, must be faced together. We return to our beginning: the return to reason is part and parcel of the return to God; we must return to God, we must turn to Him and love Him not with our mind alone or even with the spiritual side of our nature alone, but with every fibre of our being. 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart and with all thy soul and with all thy strength; and thy neighbour as thyself.'

'WHAT LACK I YET'

St. Matthew's Gospel, xix, 20

By the Rt. Rev. J. L. Wilson, Dean of Manchester

NO one regrets more than I do the absence of Chancellor Bezzant, whose place I am taking as the preacher at the inauguration of this Conference.

My work has lain outside England for the last eleven years. The tasks on which I was engaged have left me little time for reflective thought and have ill equipped me to address you on the main subject of the Conference.

But I owe so much in my own spiritual life to the example and teaching of past and present members of the Modern Churchmen's Union that when I was honoured by the invitation I found it difficult to refuse; but I cannot contribute anything academic or philosophic. I will put forward instead some reflections on what I consider some of the more important tasks of Churchmen in general and Modern Churchmen in particular. Hardly anything will be new, but some past exhortation may bear repetition.

First and foremost there is the necessity of renewing our own spiritual and devotional life. 'Blessed are they whose soul melted away for the very fervent desire that they have for God and His righteousness.' Dean Inge writes:

> 'The soul of man when it is healthy is athirst for God. To know this is so is the foundation of all true religion.'

There was one special time now seven years ago when with all my heart and soul I longed for the Living God — perhaps not with the truest motive because I was in anguish of mind and body. In order to give you some idea of the setting, I will quote an extract from *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, a recent novel by George Orwell:

> 'He thought of the telescreen with its never-sleeping ear. They could spy upon you night and day, but if you kept your head you could still outwit them. With all their cleverness they had never mastered the secret of finding out what another human being was thinking. Perhaps that was less true when you were actually in their hands. One did not know what happened inside the Ministry of Love, but it was possible to guess: tortures, drugs, delicate instruments that registered your nervous reactions, gradual wearing-down by sleeplessness and solitude and persistent questioning. Facts, at any rate, could not be kept hidden. They could be tracked down by enquiry, they could be squeezed out of you by torture. But if the object was not to stay alive but to stay human, what difference did it ultimately make? They could not alter your feelings: for that matter you could not alter them yourself, even if you wanted to.

> They could lay bare in the utmost detail everything that you had done or said or thought; but the inner heart, whose workings were mysterious even to yourself, remained impregnable . . .'

It was in such a situation that I experienced a test of my Christian faith and love.

By the grace of God, and that phrase is not used lightly, I recalled the sufferings infinitely greater of Jesus, whose faith in His Father never wavered. There may have been much that our Lord did not fully comprehend, but the words 'Into Thy hands I commend my spirit' showed His trustful obedience. Why should I doubt that He would explain in time?

When they asked me why God didn't save me, I was able to answer what I knew to be true, that He was saving me — not from pain, punishment or death (indeed at times I hoped for that merciful release), but saving me rather by giving me the spirit to bear my trial with patience. The remembrance of the words 'Father forgive them' were also present in my mind, but I was conscious, during one painful episode, of some doubt as to whether I would be sincere if I repeated those words. The faces of my torturers were cruel, and they looked as if they were enjoying their cruelty. How could I say honestly that I loved them? By the grace of God I saw those men in my imagination as little children before they had been conditioned by their nationalist religion and their intoxicating lust for power, but I saw them by faith also as they were capable of becoming. 'Look, Father, look on His anointed face and only look on us as found in Him.' How many have yet been redeemed I do not know, nor is it likely that I shall ever know, but six years later, from amongst the Japanese prisoners who were serving sentences for war crimes, forty-six have been baptized and confirmed, and two of them were Japanese who were present on that day of anguish when God so comforted me.

I had many months to spend cut off from all speech with my fellow-men and without reading of any kind, but God's comfort was with me in many a sacrament; the sound of birds, the occasional sight of trees when a door was opened, but most of all the deep contentment of prayer life. 'What peaceful hours I once enjoyed — how sweet their memory still,' for in the busier world it is more difficult to discipline oneself to this quiet receptive waiting upon God, but I know that all the providential care, the freedom from fear, the clearer insight and the forgiving love are all available to any of us who will receive it humbly.

In the more prosaic and ecclesiastical or academic world our discipleship will be different and in some ways more difficult. But

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If we say that we are athirst for God and the further question comes — Are ye able to drink of the cup that I drink of? — dare we be honest with ourselves and say we are able? For amongst the ingredients of that cup for many of us will be unpopularity or neglect. And are we honest when we say that we don't mind that; we expect it? Yes, but when it comes, do we resent it? Can we so accept it in Christ's name that it doesn't make us sour and resentful, self-pitying with the weakness of calling attention to what we think is persecution? What glorious inspiration comes from those who meet opposition or neglect, not only with calm resignation, but with the cheerful buoyancy of those whose minds are stayed on God.

A second need that I see among liberal Churchmen who have helped people through their intellectual and moral difficulties to a reasonable faith is to help them to find a rest for their soul in God. Perhaps I myself have missed this way, but I find that I long for some of the aids which other schools of thought in the Anglican Communion do give — prayer meetings, quiet days or retreats (though perhaps that is not the right word for the spirit's reinforcement which we seek), spiritual direction and counsel, and the fellowship of those who will speak of the verities as well as the problems of the Christ life. In the realm of the devotional life surely there is room for development of a piety (*pietas*) which will incorporate all that is good and true and lovely in the new revelations which God's graciousness has given in man's more recent discoveries, yet combining it with all that is best in our tradition. There are men and women, boys and girls, who need the discipline of holy obedience, the sacrament of penance, training in prayer and worship, but freed from the incredibilities which are so often mingled with these forms of spiritual exercises. And surely we are lacking in devotional commentaries like Archbishop Temple's on St. John's Gospel; commentaries which will relate the new biblical knowledge to needs of the soul in its pilgrimage.

Thirdly, our task is not yet finished in educating people in England about the new knowledge of the Scriptures and historical criticism. After nearly a hundred years it still remains true that a large majority of people are left in pre-critical darkness. The risks of a policy of silence are as grave as the risks of candour. The hurt that we sometimes give to simple piety through new views of truth can be distressing but is often exaggerated. The taunt is often made about members of our Union that our views are long out of date. There is some measure of truth in

the taunt — for some of our ideas are crystallised in a mould of thirty years ago; in some quarters the idea persists that we are afraid of accepting the results of later scholarship lest we should be thought orthodox. For those seeking truth such considerations are irrelevant, for the discovery of our treasures will be both new and old, but there is a sense in which our thinking as Christians is prescribed. If we remain disciples of Christ our thinking must be 'engaged thinking,' to use the term of the existentialists.

How often our Master insists upon action. 'Whosoever doeth the will of God shall know of the doctrine.' 'Not everyone that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven but he that doeth the will of my Father.' St. John reports the saying, 'I am the way, the truth, and the life.' The phrase is so familiar that we may miss its significance. For Jesus to say 'I am the truth' is really an extraordinary saying. The truth is not 'embodied in a tale' but in a Person, interpreted by love. On the human level to know the truth about a person is only gained by love, and the Divine Truth is personal and is similarly known. Love of persons is not speculative but manifests itself in action.

There are new facts of history at the present time. There is the new fact of the universal Church in which the members of our Union have played far too small a part. Our thinking must be engaged here. There is the new fact that politics and economics are providing the food for most of the serious thinking of our generation. The fact of the atom bomb, and the fact of rival ideologies cannot be ignored, and Christian thinkers should be engaged in the social and international spheres to find where love may be best expressed and most effective.

Loyalty to truth will be loyalty to Christ in all these realms of thought. We will gain new knowledge of His doctrine on all these matters by our devoted obedience in action to what we already know. Fearless, trustful, confident, the Christian will continue on his adventurous road.

During our Conference this week we will ask to be guided by God that we may know what is our reasonable service in these spheres as well as in the realm of aesthetics and morals, but we will keep in mind our Lord's benediction on the woman who expressed her devotion in the pouring out of the precious ointment. The outpouring of love in costly devotion is in human terms beyond all reason, but wherever it is given without any taint of selfishness to mar the gift, it is unspeakably precious.

OLD BELIEFS AND NEW KNOWLEDGE*

By the Rt. Rev. E. W. Barnes, D.D., D.Sc., F.R.S.

THE Christian faith, as we all know, arose some nineteen hundred years ago in the eastern Mediterranean. Naturally it has marks of its origin. Associated with it were beliefs no longer held. The discarding of such beliefs in the past led to trouble, though it is now generally realized that they were not essential to Christianity. But the process of adjusting old traditions to new knowledge still goes on, for knowledge in our present era increases steadily. With change old religious anxieties show themselves anew.

Significant change began almost exactly four centuries ago, when Copernicus put forward the theory which implied that the earth is not the fixed centre of the universe. To the new astronomy the Roman Church became bitterly hostile: the English Church showed greater wisdom, in part because of the quarrel between England and Rome. At the end of the seventeenth century, Newton gave the *coup de grâce* to the old view. It became generally accepted that Christianity lost nothing by assuming that the earth rotates both on its own axis and round the sun.

About the same time our growing culture repudiated belief in witchcraft; but many clergy, including the great John Wesley, felt that such repudiation was the denial of a Christian principle.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the new geology with its plain repudiation of the old Jewish story of creation as given at the beginning of the book of *Genesis* aroused great perturbation, which was increased when just a century ago Darwin published his *Origin of Species*. One of the leading bishops of the time, Wilberforce, attacked with widespread Christian approval the idea that man was a transformed ape. About the same time the publication by a group of English clergymen of a book called *Essays and Reviews*, which showed sympathy with the new culture of the era, caused an indignant outburst. But the full fury of conservative opinion fell on an able missionary bishop named Colenso, whose critical analysis of the origin of the Pentateuch is now almost universally accepted. To read an account of the life of Colenso and of the attempt of the then Archbishop of Capetown to deprive him of his See is to get an amazing picture of the

* Address by the Bishop of Birmingham to his Diocesan Conference.

foolishness possible less than a century ago. A very great Archbishop of Canterbury, Tait, prevented proceedings more discreditable than actually occurred. Later, the influence of another great Archbishop of Canterbury, Davidson, quietly smoothed the way for the general acceptance alike of evolution and of biblical criticism.

The process of change is not ended. With the growth of scientific education belief in the uniformity of nature has spread widely. Men, if they are wise, do not assert that miracles cannot happen but that we find no convincing evidence for them. Here is an outlook which differs completely from that of the men who wrote the books of the Bible. Naturally it produces grave anxiety in some to whom the Bible—as indeed to ourselves—is a supreme source of religious understanding.

I have given this brief story of change during the last four centuries to make you confident that present-day anxieties will pass away. Religious belief and scientific knowledge must be brought into harmony: but we have no reason to think that the essential principles of our faith will be harmed by the process of change. Consider that faith and its credentials. That at the heart of the universe is a God of power, wisdom and love is the outcome of our deepest spiritual experience. That Jesus the Christ knew God with a certainty to which we cannot pretend, and that God was in Him 'reconciling the world to Himself'—these are beliefs of which many of us grow more confident as the years pass. They have nothing to do with a fixed earth, or with witchcraft, or with Biblical inspiration, or with denial of evolution, or with belief in physical miracles. Increasingly the more thoughtful of our contemporaries who take religion seriously realize these facts. They are convinced that the world of nature with its splendour and beauty is God's world, that our presence in it is the outcome of His purpose, that in it right, not wrong, will in the end triumph, that we were made to find God and to serve Him, that as we fully serve we grow towards the likeness of Christ.

This new realization, I am happy to think, is spreading. I judge from numerous letters which I have received during the last two or three years. I judge also in part from Confirmation returns in the Birmingham diocese: by the number of older people who come forward. Some of them most certainly feel that they can take this step more confidently if they are not supposed to be thereby pledged to obsolete opinions. Sooner or later we shall have to alter our credal statements. Meanwhile, let us welcome all who find in the Christ and His religious teaching the realization of their highest spiritual experience.

Remember that all true knowledge is God's revelation of Himself. He who fears knowledge fears God's activity. On fuller knowledge we may hope to build a finer civilization. In that civilization religion will be essential; and such religion will, I am convinced, be based on the life and teaching of Jesus the Christ.

THE VICTORIAN PERSECUTION AND ITS REVIVAL

I AM not a theologian but I spent my earliest days in a rectory occupied by three of my ancestors, and I am as loyally attached to the Church of England as Queen Elizabeth and Lord Burghley, to whom we owe that tolerant and wide-minded Church. Ever since those two gave peace to England after the butcheries of the three previous reigns, the Church they stablished (for it was they who stablished it; between the death of Warham and the death of Mary Tudor all was confusion and murder) has striven to maintain the cause of pure religion, undefiled by heresy-hunting, that last infirmity of noble mind.

There have been blunders, such as Laud's disastrous attempt to impose uniformity, and crimes, such as his execution by a Puritan House of Commons. But since the prosecution of the Seven Bishops by James II resulted in their acquittal and was followed by his departure from England, the Church has been reasonably free from bigotry and persecution.

But even in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there were intolerance and minor persecution; and there are instances on which Parliament ought to reflect before increasing the facilities for religious prosecution.

In 1847 Renn Hampden, who for ten years had done much to improve the study of divinity at Oxford, was appointed Bishop of Hereford. Thirteen Bishops presented an address of remonstrance to the Prime Minister because Hampden had said in his Bampton Lectures that the authority of the scriptures was greater than the authority of the Church. The Dean of Hereford announced that he should vote against his election and did so. Hampden was elected by a majority of the Chapter of Hereford, and his election was confirmed by the Vicar-General of the Province of Canterbury in Bow Church. Archbishop Howley is reported to have said that he would rather go to the Tower than consecrate him; but Howley died a month after the confirmation,

and the new Archbishop Sumner duly consecrated him. Hampden proved an exemplary Bishop.

The Puseyites were bitterly opposed to Frederick Denison Maurice, and in 1853 he was deprived of his Professorship of Divinity in King's College, London, because he was considered unsound on eternal punishment and had said that the object of the Christian religion was salvation, not damnation. In 1864 Pusey declared in writing that he and Maurice worshipped different Gods. The successors of the Puseyites are the Anglo-Catholics; and no writer has influenced the Anglo-Catholics more than Maurice.

In 1860 *Essays and Reviews* was published. It was a volume consisting of seven separate treatises, not written in co-operation but put together with a common object, which was to reconcile the central truths of the Christian religion with new scientific discoveries and modern philosophical developments. The first essay was written by Frederick Temple. The *Westminster Review* claimed the book as a contribution to the cause of materialism, and Thomas Carlyle called it atheistical. Six of the writers were Anglican clergymen. The book had a large circulation and early in 1861 the Bishops met to consider what course they should take. Two of them declared at once for prosecution. One was Wilberforce; the other was Hampden, whose opinion was uncompromising. 'It is,' he said, 'a question of Christianity or no Christianity.' The result of the meeting was an open letter, signed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York and all the Bishops, unanimously agreeing in the pain it had given them that any clergyman of their Church should have published such opinions.

The two beneficed clergymen, of whom Temple was not one, were prosecuted, and the Dean of Arches held them guilty of laxity of views concerning the inspiration of Scripture, justification by faith and the eternal punishment of the wicked, and sentenced each of them to a year's suspension from office and benefice. They appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, who allowed the appeal.

To this judgment the Convocation of Canterbury replied by resolving that the book contained teachings contrary to the doctrines received by the United Churches of England and Ireland in common with the whole Catholic Church of Christ.

In October, 1869, Temple was appointed Bishop of Exeter, and a committee was formed by Shaftesbury and Pusey to protest against 'the horrible scandal.' Pusey publicly declared that

Temple had participated in the ruin of countless souls and had the blood of all those souls upon his head. High Church and Low Church joined forces. The Dean of St. Paul's, the Archdeacon of Taunton and the Vicar of St. Mary's, Oxford, spoke thunder. The agitation in the diocese was great, and from all parts of the country the Dean of Exeter received letters about the sword of the Lord and of Gideon, exhorting the Dean and Chapter to go to prison and promising to visit them there. From the clergy of the Exeter diocese assembled in their rural deaneries protests poured in. Strong pressure was put on Temple to disavow the opinions of his collaborators, but this he absolutely refused to do. The Chapter of Exeter elected him by thirteen to six. His election was not effective till it was confirmed by the Vicar-General of the Province, and in Bow Church Bishop Trower, Sub-Dean of Exeter Cathedral, put his legitimacy and his character in issue. His elder sister had to prove that he was born in wedlock, and Ralph Lingen, Secretary of the Education Department, in which Temple had served, had to testify that he was respectable. After much legal argument the Vicar-General held that he had no power to disobey his Royal mandate and that the election must be confirmed. At his consecration in Westminster Abbey on December 21st the Bishop of London, who presided in the Archbishop's absence due to a convulsive seizure of the most alarming kind immediately after writing a letter to the Rural Dean of South Malling, in which he declined to pronounce Temple unfit to be a Bishop but said that he felt very strongly that Temple ought now to repudiate *Essays and Reviews*), announced that protests against the consecration had been received from several Bishops but overruled them.

When in 1885 Temple was translated to London, Pusey had just died; but his most eminent disciple, Canon Liddon of St. Paul's, cordially welcomed Temple as his new ecclesiastical superior; and 654 out of 700 clergy of the Exeter diocese in a farewell address said:

> 'We feel sure that the same devotion to God and disregard of self, the same unsparing energy and reliance on the help of the Holy Spirit through Jesus Christ, the same sense of justice and power of influencing all classes for good, and the same readiness at all times to take counsel together with them as friends will secure the like results among the vast multitudes now to be committed to your charge.'

In 1874 the Bishops were gravely perturbed by the steady progress of ritualism, and the Archbishop of Canterbury introduced what Mr. Gladstone called a Bill to put down Ritualism. The object was to establish a New Court for trying ecclesiastical

crimes, subject to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Bishop was to have a veto upon every prosecution. Dr. Pusey sounded the tocsin of alarm and the flag of earnest resistance was hoisted by the High Church party, who saw, and rightly saw, in the Bill an intention to reduce the varied ritual of the Church to a dead level of monotonous uniformity. The moderate old-fashioned High Churchmen joined hands with the Puseyites. But nineteen Bishops supported the Bill in the House of Lords, including Temple, and only one Bishop (Salisbury) opposed it. In spite of the opposition of Lord Salisbury and Mr. Gladstone, the Bill passed into Law. Mr. Gladstone never spoke more eloquently. He pressed earnestly for freedom, which he said was better than discipline. Leaden uniformity, he said, was spiritual death. But he pleaded in vain; for England was hot against 'the Mass in masquerade.' The judge of the new Court was Lord Penzance.

The High Churchmen determined to stand fast for their principles, and it was many years before the peace of the Church ceased to be disturbed by the Act to put down Ritualism.

The first prosecution under the Act was directed against Charles Ridsdale, Vicar of St. Peter's, Folkestone, for a variety of practices alleged to be at variance with the rubric in the Book of Common Prayer. Penzance pronounced on all material points against Ridsdale, who appealed on the question of vestments, wafer bread and the eastward position. The Lord Chancellor, Lord Cairns, who was a Low Churchman, presided over a Court of ten Judges, with the Archbishop of Canterbury and four other Bishops as Assessors. Judgment was delivered in May, 1877. The eastward position was sanctioned, provided that the act of consecration could be seen by the people. The use of wheaten bread was enjoined, but it was held not to have been proved that Mr. Ridsdale used any other, and on these two points judgment went in his favour. But on the question of vestments the Court went the other way. They pronounced the surplice to be the only legal garb for parochial clergymen at all times of their ministration, including the time of Holy Communion.

The rule in the Judicial Committee has always been that there should be only one judgment, that of the majority, and that it should be delivered as the judgment of the Committee. But on this occasion Sir Fitzroy Kelly refused to be bound by the rule. He freely stated, and the statement found its way into print, that Sir Richard Amphlett, Sir Robert Phillimore and himself, none of whom had been present when the Lord Chancellor read the

dgment, dissented from the majority of their colleagues. He lded in words also published : 'It is a judgment of policy not of w.' Sir Richard Amphlett, a Churchman of the broadest and ost secular type, who had no sympathy with the Ritualists except victims of injustice, said to my father, 'It was a flagitious dgment.'

The next case was that of Arthur Tooth, Rector of St. James's, atcham, who was suspended by Penzance for three months on count of his offences against the Law of Ritual. After the three onths he continued to behave as before. Thereupon three ggrieved parishioners applied that he should be declared in con-mpt, and Penzance sent him to prison. Within a month the rosecutors applied for his release, and he was set free. At the me time Penzance locked up his church. Tooth then climbed in y a window, followed by a number of Ritualists, and repeated all is offences. He then applied to the Lord Chief Justice, who on chnical grounds quashed the proceedings.

Alexander Mackonochie, Vicar of St. Alban's, Holborn, made his practice to kneel before the elements at the Holy Com-nunion, use lighted candles on the table at that service, burn in-ense and mix water with the wine. The Judicial Committee held ll those practices illegal. Mackonochie treated the judgment with ontempt, and in 1878 Penzance sentenced him to suspension for hree years with the prospect of losing his benefice if he then re-umed the practices.

Meanwhile an inhabitant of the parish of Clewer in the diocese f Oxford called upon the Bishop to proceed against the Vicar, Thomas Carter, for Ritualistic practices. The Bishop refused on he ground that these prosecutions were bringing the Church into idicule; that Carter was advanced in years, respected and be-oved; and that the great majority of his parishioners approved of vhat he did. The parishioner applied to the Lord Chief Justice o order the Bishop to prosecute Carter, but the House of Lords, overruling the Chief Justice, decided that the Bishop's discretion vas absolute and could not be reviewed by any Court. This was n 1880.

It was now six years since Parliament at the instance of the Archbishop of Canterbury and eighteen other Bishops, but against he advice of the greatest Liberal (Gladstone) and three of the visest Conservatives (Salisbury, Carnarvon and Gathorne Hardy), n Parliament had passed the Act to put down Ritualism, and if here was anything more rampant in the Church than Ritualism it vas litigation. Archbishop Davidson has recorded that at no other

period were so many clergymen in process of prosecution — and every one of them was a man whose character and parochial industry were above praise. In March, 1880, five of the most admirable clergymen in England were before the Courts and large sums of money were being subscribed by fellow-Christians with the object of sending them to gaol.

In the autumn of 1880, when Pelham Dale of St. Vedact's in the City of London, was sent to prison, the Archbishop of Canterbury publicly declared that this proceeding was calculated to retard, if not to defeat, all his hopes and efforts after peace.

A year before Penzance had condemned R. W. Enraght, Vicar of Holy Trinity, Bordesley, for alleged irregularities, including vestments and the use of 'wafer-bread' in the Holy Communion. Some time after the trial was over a statement became current that the specimen produced in Court was a wafer which Enraght had consecrated and delivered to a communicant, who had then secretly abstracted it for the purposes of the prosecution. Streams of indignant memorials flowed into Lambeth, and on December 12th, 1879, application was made and acceded to in Court that the wafer should be handed over by the Registrar to the Archbishop, who reverently consumed it. Hardly had Dale been sent to prison than Enraght was sent there too. The whole fury of the High Churchmen now burst forth. The English Church Union, of which Charles Wood (afterwards Lord Halifax), a man personally revered by all parties in the Church, was the President, recommended the immediate and general adoption of the disputed vestments.

Three more notorious prosecutions followed, those of Sidney Faithorne Green, Alexander Mackonochie and Bell Cox. All three prosecutions failed in their final stages. They had only made the Act to put down Ritualism odious and futile. This was the end of the attempt to put down Ritualism by criminal proceedings.

In January, 1881, the Archbishop of Canterbury had received a Memorial signed by nearly five thousand clergymen, including five Deans and twenty-seven Canons, including Liddon and Stubbs, expressing their desire for toleration of Ritualists. This was immediately followed by a Counter-Memorial with an almost equal number of signatories, including two Bishops and seven Deans. At least one-third of the clergy of the Church of England must have signed one or other of these Memorials.

In these circumstances Mr. Gladstone, at the Archbishop's request, appointed a Royal Commission on the Ecclesiastical

Courts. There were twenty-three Commissioners, of whom one was Penzance, and in May, 1881, they met for business with the Archbishop in the chair.

One of the Commissioners was Edward Benson, Bishop of Truro, an accomplished and scholarly man, a High Churchman in theology, with a mind, if possible, more ecclesiastical than Mr. Gladstone's own. In October he said in an address to his Diocesan Conference:

> 'Confidence has been shaken whether justifiably or not. It is no use denying that disquietude exists. Never, I suppose, since England possessed a judicial system has there been such a perpetual murmuring against decisions and sentences, such a rustle of petitions and ring of protests to every authority which can be protested or petitioned. That a certain constituted court and judge have and ought to have no jurisdiction in this realm of England is asserted openly and constantly . . . It is a misconception to suppose that there is anything mediaeval or romanising in the claim that spiritual causes shall be tried in spiritual courts. . . . The question is—What is "a spiritual court?" "a spiritual judge?" Some reply a court of clerics; a judge who is a cleric. And they believe that they have with them the whole current of old Church Law. But not one single word in that old Church Law required anywhere that the spiritual judge should be a bishop or a priest or a deacon. Such a claim is perfectly unhistorical. . . . But the supreme counsel I have to give is this. However perfectly that Royal Commission may investigate and however wisely recommend — be the Courts spiritual based on their suggestion (if so be) never so spiritual or perfect or angelic — my one counsel shall be, "Eschew them. Keep thy foot from their threshold. There be ways of settling differences more apostolic and spiritual than the most spiritual of law courts."'

In 1882, while the Royal Commission was sitting, Tait, the Archbishop of Canterbury, died and the Bishop of Truro succeeded both to the Primacy and to the Chairmanship of the Royal Commission.

The Report was presented in 1883 and was satisfactory to High Churchmen; and the criticisms passed upon the Judicial Committee encouraged the Bishops to exercise their veto upon criminal proceedings for irregular ritual, and in this they were supported by the new Primate and by Frederick Temple, who succeeded to the Primacy in 1896.

Some months after the publication of the Report the Archbishop wrote to Sir Arthur Gordon:

> 'Most rational people now see that it is not unreasonable that the extreme right and the extreme left should each concede their bugbear to the other. Whether they will see it is another matter.'

No man had less sympathy with Ritualism than Temple, but none was more strongly determined to prevent ecclesiastical

litigation. He would not allow a hard-working clergyman to be disturbed merely because he broke, however deliberately and habitually, the law of the land. The other Bishops followed the example of the man whom Pusey had called 'a wolf in the fold.' His deep religious sincerity and sense of justice caused him to stand up for Puseyites and Ritualists, because he knew them to be as sincere as himself; and it is in great measure to Temple that the triumph of Ritualism in the Church of England is due. For triumph it has been since the indiscriminate use of the episcopal veto upon ecclesiastical prosecutions under the influence of Benson, the High Churchman, and Temple, the Broad Churchman, restored the peace of the Church. They were only treading in the footsteps of their predecessor, after he had learnt his lesson.

'Archbishop Tait, as you know,' said Temple in the House of Lords in 1899, 'carried the Public Worship Regulation Act, and he it was who nevertheless stopped the prosecution of Father Lowder at the East India Docks. I was talking with him not long afterwards, and he said: "I looked into the man's work, and I could not go on with any prosecution or allow it."'

In 1888 the Bishop of Lincoln (King) was charged with various infringements of ecclesiastical law. It was alleged that he had used the mixed chalice, allowed lighted candles on the Communion table, and in other ways infringed the law. The saintly character of the Bishop made it in the eyes of those who knew him a scandal that he should be treated as a culprit. He was cited to appear before the Archbishop of Canterbury at Lambeth Palace. Several Bishops, including Temple and Stubbs, sat as assessors. Stubbs, the great historian, said: 'It is not a Court; it is only an Archbishop sitting in his library.'

On most points the Archbishop acquitted the Bishop. The mixed chalice, if the wine and water were mixed before the service, was held to be legal. The lighted candles were also condoned. The only points found against the defendant were that he had not consecrated the elements 'before the people' and had made the sign of the Cross in benediction. The Bishop submitted to the Archbishop, whose judgment was confirmed by the Judicial Committee.

On February 9th, 1899, Creighton said in the House of Lords:

> 'Why was prosecution abandoned by the Bishops? Prosecutions were abandoned because it was found that they absolutely failed. It is a matter of fact that after each period in which prosecution for ecclesiastical offences has been inaugurated, instead of there being a going back of ritualism, there has been a distinct advance of it. . . . The reason why

the Bishops did not intervene more strongly in former times was because they felt that their coercive, compulsory intervention (by prosecution) would do more harm than the thing against which it was directed.'

The Church has had peace for fifty years.

Is it now proposed to revive those prosecutions which were pandoned because they failed? 'There be ways of settling ifferences more apostolic and spiritual than the most spiritual of iw courts.'

If the Bishop of Birmingham is deprived of his bishopric a rave injury will be inflicted on the Church; for it will lose its naracter for tolerance which it enjoyed under the wise leadership f Benson, Temple the father, Davidson, Lang and Temple the on. What dust and ashes those prosecutions are! But the great ork done by Hampden (to whom no blame would now be imputed y anyone if he had not wanted to prosecute Frederick Temple or infidelity), Maurice, Temple, Bishop King of Lincoln, Father owder, Green, Mackonochie and all those saintly Ritualists tands. There is not one of them whose name is not held in onour.

'Be the Courts spiritual never so spiritual or perfect or angelic, ny one counsel shall be, "Eschew them; keep thy foot from their nreshold."'

HUMPHREY PAUL

IN MEMORIAM

DR. STANLEY ARTHUR COOK

1873—1949

It would certainly have amused Stanley Cook, for as such he was always affectionately known among his friends, that one of the most insignificant of his former pupils should have the honour of recounting his mighty deeds; I can imagine him murmuring with a touch of sardonic humour, 'Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings,' and hoping that the English would be better than some of the Hebrew proses I served up for his delectation thirty-eight years ago.

The bare facts of his life and work may be briefly stated: born at King's Lynn in 1873, educated at Wyggeston School, Leicester, and at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, where he afterwards became a Fellow, gaining the Tyrwhitt Scholarship and Mason Prize, and in 1896 the Jeremie Septuagint Prize. In that year also his eminence in the world of Semitic scholarship led to his being invited to join the editorial staff of the *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, as later he was to become an editorial adviser, departmental editor and contributor on Biblical subjects to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, fourteenth edition. For thirty years he also edited the Palestine Exploration Fund's journal, and was joint editor of the *Cambridge Ancient History* and contributed to Vols. I-III and VI. The background of all his work was Cambridge with its devotion to accuracy in minute particulars, however large the background against which they were viewed. As another fine Old Testament scholar, and my own tutor, Dr. Owen C. Whitehouse, remarked to me as he once held in his hand an early effort of mine in Hebrew, in which I had misplaced a dot, 'Remember, Mr. Wigley, that Cambridge stands for verbal scholarship, verbal accuracy.' I have never forgotten. And Stanley Cook drove home the same truth as college lecturer in Hebrew and in the comparative study of religion, and as Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University of Cambridge. The recognition of his great gifts came thick and fast, the Litt.D. from Cambridge, an Hon. D.Litt. from Oxford, an Hon. D.D. from Aberdeen, and a Fellowship of the British Academy.

All this time stimulating and original works were flowing from the rich treasury of his mind: *The Religion of Ancient Palestine in the light of Archaeology*; *The Old Testament—a Re-interpretation*; *The 'Truth' of the Bible*; *The Rebirth of Christianity*;

n Introduction to the Bible; to say nothing of his introductions and additional notes to new editions of W. Robertson Smith's umous books on *Kinship and Marriage in Arabia* and *The Reli- ion of the Semites*. As the admirable survey of his work, given n over half a column of *The Times* in its issue of September 28th, 949, well says :

> 'His volume *The Study of Religions* (1914) marks a transition. He was now eager to evaluate his knowledge of Semitic antiquity in its relations to all matters of permanent human needs and achievements — psychological, sociological, philosophical and religious. He was deeply impressed by the fact that, decades earlier, A. B. Davidson and W. Robertson Smith had invaluably combined Biblical analysis with theological interpretation based on the profoundest constructive principles of thought; and memorably Cook resumed that fruitful task. More and more he stood convinced that through the Old and New Testaments, modernly understood, it is possible to perceive a historical continuity and spiritual development which is of permanent and paramount significance for right judgment of the ultimate meaning of human life, for the wise ordering of society, and for interpretation of essential Christian belief.'

It is, of course, impossible to sum up the rich contributions of uch a mind to the world of scholarship, or to estimate the impact e made on the discerning among ordinary readers in his more opular books. Always his stress was on what George Adam Smith alled 'real life,' 'the message of a true prophet to living men,' the essential problems of human society.' He was as tolerant as he really great scholar always is; in his own words,

> 'The "critical" inquirer must assume that people are intellectually as honest and sincere as himself. The "critical" method is to treat the beliefs and ideas of others as we would that they should treat ours, to allow that they may hold them for reasons not very different from those that actuate us, and to assume that the disharmony in thought is due to *bona fide* differences in experience and knowledge.'

Or again,

> 'Man's profoundest and most effective realities are primarily psychical realities, whether the individual be a mystic or a rationalist, a scientist or a religious devotee.'

Never did he forget, as so many are apt to forget even to-day, that

> 'The comparison of religions shows that religious expression moves along with the general progress of thought. There is an interconnection between religious and other aspects of thought, between Religion and all ordinary knowledge . . . we cannot properly understand things (men, events, beliefs, practices) unless we view them in their context, in the whole of which they are part, in the light of the preceding and following stages.
>
> 'The language that expresses our experience is as inadequate as the clumsy mark on the blackboard, which is supposed to represent a mathematical line devoid of breadth and absolutely straight. It is an error to

use our imperfect symbols as bases for investigation; rather must one go below the surface, recover the underlying meaning, and seek to improve the tools and instruments of thought. Our intellect both assists and impedes us, but only through it can progress come.

Those who were present at the Modern Churchmen's Conference at Oxford last year will never forget the paper he gave us on 'The Causes of Christian Modernism,' so ripe in its learning and so understandable even by the non-expert. After a review of the four main factors which had brought Modernism to the front, he dealt in some detail with the conclusions to be drawn from them, and ended with a survey of the task before the Modern Churchmen's Union, of which he was a life member.

'We need,' he said, 'a religious, or rather a spiritual, view of the entire universe. This is a view that would embrace much that, strictly speaking, lies outside religion; but it sees God in the universe. . . . Before we can synthesize our religious and other knowledge we have first to get a "whole" view of the individual and those varieties of his experience and thought which determine his whole world-view.'

As events have turned out, this was to be his last paper to the M.C.U. and it was fittingly a clarion call. We shall sorely miss him, especially in those informal after-dinner gatherings in which he gave himself as unstintingly as in his prepared papers.

He was fond of quoting Lacordaire's words, 'to possess oneself is the first act of the divine life; to give oneself is the second,' and right well he exemplified self-possession and self-giving. That is why there is something more to add to any tribute to the depth and range of his mind; it is the impression he made years ago, and which indelibly remains, on the small group of men who went to him week by week for Hebrew Unseens and Proses. I can see him now, a piece of chalk in each hand, for he could write with either with equal facility. . . . Often he wore no gown; 'I think I can do just as well without it, don't you?' he asked with a smile; always informal, amusing, in his company laughter rippled round a *dagesh*; he wore his learning 'lightly like a flower.' Walking round the quad he patiently listened to my plea that we should try to rid ourselves of layer upon layer of our historical skins, and then he would say with a twinkle, 'What you really want is that we should leave the dead to bury their own dead.'

On the last day of the Conference at Bristol, a few weeks ago, I joined him at lunch. We recalled old times in Cambridge; I asked him about X and Y, upon whom old age was making its inroads, and he said, 'It's sad when that happens.' It was not to happen to him, for at seventy-five, in spite of what one hoped was but a passing indisposition, he was as alert and as interested as

ver with his eager question, 'What have you got on the stocks?' At that moment, as in the years when he was a lecturer in Caius, e was still enthusiastic for the production of sound learning, and was glad to hear from him that we could expect another volume rom his pen to be published soon in the Pelican series. Himself modern prophet, he takes his rightful place among the prophets whom he loved, for in him there was mingled the forthrightness of Amos, the reach of Isaiah, and something which his friends well new, which reminded them of the tenderness of Hosea and of One who exalted the childlike heart. T. WIGLEY

CHARLES JENKINSON

1887—1949

By his death on August 3rd, the Modernist cause has lost a devoted and influential adherent in the person of the Rev. Alderman Charles Jenkinson, M.A., LL.B., Chairman of the Stevenage New Town Development Corporation.

Charles Jenkinson was sprung from rural stock in the Eastern Counties. In the First World War he served in the R.A.M.C., mainly in Mesopotamia. At the conclusion of the war he entered Cambridge University, becoming a member of Fitzwilliam House, and graduated in the Law Tripos. In 1921 he entered Ripon Hall to train for Holy Orders and was ordained in 1923 to the curacy of Barking, Essex, by the Bishop of Chelmsford, Dr. Watts-Ditchfield, by whose inspiring evangelical teaching and example he had been greatly influenced in his early manhood.

The influence of Watts-Ditchfield on the religious life of Jenkinson was next supplemented by association with Conrad Noel of Thaxted, the internationalist, communist and ecclesiastical aesthete, whose father, a peer, was the author of *The Red Flag*.

Next followed in the evolution of Jenkinson's religious life the Liberal churchmanship and critical theological teaching of Ripon Hall. This last influence led him to become a member of the Modern Churchmen's Union and the founder of the society of Old Riponians.

What is of significance in the religious evolution of Jenkinson is the way in which these three stages of religious education supplemented each other and made him an all-round English Churchman in a very remarkable degree. He was one of the hardest-working of men, rising early and going to bed late, to

whom holidays were unknown. Unflinchingly courageous, persistently resolute, he possessed an imperturbable temper with immense practical ability which regarded the smallest details as of importance. A vicar in a provincial city and hon. chaplain to his bishop were the highest of his Church honours. Although not destined to become an ecclesiastical dignitary, he became a great civic servant.

Whilst living in the East End of London he had experienced the sordid character of slum life and the urgent need for its abolition in our English civilization. His opportunity to take part in this crusade to which he felt himself called became his when, four years after his ordination, he was appointed vicar of the combined slum parishes of St. John and St. Barnabas, Holbeck, Leeds, in 1927. Three years later he was elected a Labour member of Leeds City Council and shortly after became the leader of the Labour party on the Council. And in 1933, when his party came into power, Jenkinson was enabled to institute a remarkable slum clearance policy costing the municipality £12,000,000. His scheme was many-sided. It obliterated the slums of his parish. It erected the great block of Corporation flats at Quarry Hill. It instituted a system of differential rents determined by the size of families and their available means. It insisted on new bedding and new well-designed furniture being substituted for the verminous and insanitary 'household gods' of the slums. All that he projected and much of which he accomplished will best be realized by the study of his essay, *Our Housing Objective*, published in 1944.

When his party was defeated at the Leeds municipal election in 1936 he withdrew from municipal politics to devote himself solely to parish life for seven years in the new suburb he had created. However, in 1943 he was again returned to the Leeds Council and became an alderman, and the Ministry of Health appointed him a member of the Central Advisory Housing Committee. In 1948 he resigned his living at Belle Isle in order to devote all his time and energy to the solution of the national housing problem, and whilst so engaged fell ill and died at the age of 62.

In concluding our obituary notice of this remarkable man there are two of his characterstics which ought especially to be recorded.

Although 'a man of the people' and a member of the I.L.P. from the age of twenty-one, he seemed to be entirely free from political malignancy and class prejudice. A specialist in the study of vermin, its various species, conditions of development, method

extirpation, he was never led to apply the term 'verminous' to s political critics and opponents. He regarded every patriotic id responsible and philanthropic citizen as deserving of respect id goodwill whatever his political party.

Another characteristic, too often conspicuous by its absence in olitical circles, was his absolute consistency. His convictions, s speeches, his conduct and character were in absolute agree-ent. Popular flattery, insincere sentimentality, misleading etoric were detestable to him. Perhaps the greatest tribute we ver heard paid to his character was by one who did not belong his political party. 'National Socialism would work, if all our itizens were like Charles Jenkinson.' H.D.A.M.

CORRESPONDENCE

REINCARNATION

IR,

It is not dislike of anything unorthodox but common sense which impels ost Christian people to reject reincarnation.

(1) As Christians, we believe that Jesus is the supreme unveiling of God in History; Reincarnation had no place in his own teaching.

(2) The doctrine involves a low concept of God's justice. To burden souls with a weight of guilt from an unremembered existence is sub-Christian and the idea of personality involved is very primitive. There is in this theory no continuity save that of guilt.

(3) It implies a very unimaginative God to suggest that he can devise no better way of offering salvation to those who had no chance of becoming Christians in this world than to put them back again into this world.

(4) It has a deadly effect on one of the noblest of human emotions — compassion.

A wealthy Malay recently explained to a British Chaplain that he could ot help a Coolie friend whose wife and family were starving as their starva-ion was the punishment inherited from their previous existence and if nitigated it would only be inflicted in some other way.

(5) Evolution and the fluctuations in world population seem to involve unfaced difficulties.

Did not the Protoplasm suffer from spiritual indigestion ? And when the un cools and the world freezes and the population declines, will not its last ew inhabitants be overstocked with souls?

Perhaps the emergency will spur even the reincarnationists' God to think f alternative accommodation.

Immanuel Vicarage, N. S. POWER
Birmingham

SIR,

The main reason which impelled me to believe in reincarnation was that I am a human being, and therefore a member of the human race. And I see no way in which I can remain a member of the human race, developing in association with other human beings and benefiting by the development and progressive attainments of the race, except through recurrent experiences of physical life on earth. And what I want for myself, I want for others. I am conscious of myself as a unit of humanity in its long evolution, its hard-won achievements, its struggles and its triumphs, and am hopeful of participating in its fulfilment destined by God. No connection of myself in a perpetual discarnate state after death, in another order of being, with humanity incarnate on earth could be equivalent to a repeatedly renewed experience as an incarnate member of humanity. The need for a further incarnate life is especially obvious in the case of infants dying a few hours after being born. And this also applies, if somewhat less compellingly, to the cave-man and the slum-dweller. But even the most ample and varied career in a highly civilized nation could not provide all the conditions for a fully satisfying personal development.

I do not appeal to Origen in this matter, seeing that, though he confidently affirmed pre-existence, he expressed hesitation about reincarnation (*vide* extracts quoted in my book on *The Future Life,* pp. 235-239). But I do measure my conviction of recurrent bodily life by the words of Christ Himself. Believers in reincarnation have commonly called attention to His identification of John the Baptist with Elijah — twice according to Matthew. On the second occasion He seems to have predicted a third masterful life of the same, saying, 'Elijah indeed cometh and shall restore all things.' Why should not God use His capable servants again and again, as opportunity offers? Our Lord's remark that no one greater than John had been born of women appears hardly warranted by the Baptist's career; but it does look more appropriate as applied to Elijah, the most forceful champion of the Israelite faith. But I also maintain that our Lord signified general reincarnation in His reply to the questioning Sadducees. For after predicting that those accounted worthy of the coming age and of the resurrection from the dead would thereafter neither marry nor die again, He then proceeded to speak of the resurrection of the dead, declaring that the dead are raised. He thus distinguished between 'the resurrection *from* the dead' (*Luke* xx, 35) and 'the resurrection *of* the dead' (*Matt.* xxii, 31). The former is of some in the future, who rise, leaving others in a condition of deadness behind them; the latter is of all in the present. And that by saying 'the dead are raised' He meant all the dead, is emphasized by His words reported by Luke, 'For all live unto Him' (God) — that is, all are maintained in life by God for the fulfilment of His gracious purposes.

Now what can this universal and present resurrection, evidently not to full immortality, really be? Resurrection, or rising, as applied to the so-called dead (or discarnate) regaining life appears always among the Jews to have signified re-embodiment and return to life among mankind in this world. In the Old Testament there is a prophetic vision of the dead arising out of the earth to inhabit the depopulated Jerusalem (*Isaiah* xxvi, 19); in the Synoptic Gospels we read of an idea entertained by some credulous folk that Jesus was 'John the Baptist risen from the dead'; in the Talmud a certain Rabbi Gamaliel convinced the *Minim* (heretics — probably the Sadducees) of the resurrection by reference to the promise of the Lord, recorded in the *Torah* (Law — the Pentateuch), to give the ancestors of the Israelites the land of Canaan (*Babylonian Talmud,* trans. by M. L. Rodkinson, Vol. III, p. 267). Christ Himself when risen is reported by Luke to have proved, or offered to

rove, to His disciples that He was no ghost (discarnate person) by showing hat He was not only visible and audible, but also solid to the touch. Therefore the raising of the dead in the present age, of which He spoke, must mean hat they are restored to this world visible and audible and tangible. Why, hen, are we not aware of them? The inevitable answer is that we do see and ear and touch them; they are the people about us. This general raising of he dead in the present is what we know as birth. Birth is really reincarnation f discarnate human beings who were previously incarnate.

That Christ's meaning eluded His hearers — even His most intimate disiples — is hardly surprising. He had many things to tell them which they were then unable to bear, as we read in the Johannine record. But the Spirit f Truth, that He promised would lead them into all the truth, is now revealng this essential fact of human nature and life and development, constituted nd controlled by God, to those who earnestly seek and patiently listen and re willing to learn.

FREDERICK A. M. SPENCER, D.D.

SHAKESPEARE AND REINCARNATION

SIR,

The Rev. A. Tindal-Hart has been strangely careless in writing (last line but one, p. 159 *Modern Churchman,* June, 1949) that belief in reincarnation was ignored by Shakespeare. On the contrary, he called it 'the opinion of Pythagoras' and jeered at it. See 'Twelfth Night,' Act IV, Sc. ii:

CLOWN: What is the opinion of Pythagoras concerning wild fowl?
MALVOLIO: That the soul of our granddam might haply inhabit a bird.
CLOWN: What thinkest thou of his opinion?
MALVOLIO: I think nobly of the soul, and noway approve his opinion.

See also 'Merchant of Venice,' Act IV, Sc. i — Gratiano.
And 'As You Like It,' Act III, Sc. ii — Rosalind.

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F. J. O. CODDINGTON

IS THE HOUSE OF LAITY REPRESENTATIVE?

SIR,

The *Election of the House of Laity.*

I have read Mr. Wood's article with much interest and general agreement, but it is clear that he is not aware of the practice in the Diocese of Chichester.

Here the P.C.C. elects direct to the Diocesan Council (Conference) and has from one to six representatives, according to the size of the parochial electoral roll.

The Diocesan Councilors elect to the House of Laity by Archdeaconries; two of the Archdeaconries elect four members each; the remaining Archdeaconry elects three members. The election is by proportional representation.

I serve on the Chichester Diocesan Council and the London Diocesan Conference, and think the Chichester system is much to be preferred in electing by Archdeaconries; it would not be easy in London for the P.C.C.s to elect direct to the Diocesan Conference, as the number of parishes would make the Conference even more bulky.

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REV. T. J. WOOD'S REPLY

SIR,

I am interested in Mr. Norris's explanation of the system of election of the members of the House of Laity which has been adopted in the Chichester Diocese, and thank him for his comments.

I note that each Parish sends representatives to the Diocesan Conference, and that these elect to the House of Laity by Archdeaconries, and by proportional representation. This system is certainly a great advance upon the 'pyramidal' system; but, as he says, where the number of Parishes is large it is impossible for each Parish to be represented directly on the Diocesan Conference. Where that is the case the Chichester method is impossible.

It would certainly be inconvenient even in a Diocese like Oxford, which, although its population is about the same as that of Chichester, has fifty per cent more Parishes. Here the number of members of the Diocesan Conference is only about half that of the number of Parishes, so that every Parish cannot possibly have a direct interest in, or effect upon, the election of the House of Laity.

I still think that Archdeaconries form too large units for direct representation, and that only direct election by a group of Parishes would ensure the interest of the ordinary Churchman, his direct effect upon the House, and the personal contact and sense of responsibility between the representative in the House of Laity and the ordinary members of the congregation.

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T. J. WOOD

HEBREW SCROLLS: FURTHER EVIDENCE FOR THEIR PRE-CHRISTIAN DATE

SIR,

In *The Times* of August 23rd Professor G. R. Driver called for further evidence establishing the pre-Christian date claimed for the Hebrew manuscripts found in a cave near 'Ain Feshka south of Jericho. He is quite right to say that the fragment of *Leviticus* in the old pre-Exilic (*i.e.* Phoenician) alphabet found by Mr. Harding in the cave where the newly discovered biblical manuscripts had been hidden proves nothing as to the age of the latter. This script is used by the Samaritans to this day, and the most probable explanation of the bit in question is that it is a part of one scroll of the Samaritan Pentateuch edited long ago by August von Gall. Dr. Wallenstein has already pointed out in the *Jewish Chronicle* of May 13th that 'a certain number of letters' in the document mentioning the 'Sons of Light'—reproduced in *The Times* of August 12th—'deviate in shape from those of the other scrolls and are reminiscent of the Samaritan script.'

It is actually this book which yields the hitherto overlooked clue to the historic background of this amazing discovery and a definite *annus post quem non* for the date of the new Biblical scrolls.

Caves in the desert as hiding-places of revolutionary groups are first mentioned in the books of the Maccabees (*I Macc.* i, 53; ii, 31, 36, 41; *II Macc.* vi, 11; x, 6). Since parts of the *Book of Daniel* written at the time of the Maccabean uprising were found in the cave, including bits of the Aramaic portions which were inserted to replace the missing parts of the mutilated original manuscript, and since Roman pottery was found in the cave, it is

unlikely that the Maccabee patriots are responsible for hiding a set of the Holy Scriptures in the cave. Josephus Flavius (*Jewish War*, I, §§ 310 ff.; *Jewish Antiquities*, XIV, §§ 421 ff.) reports that the rebels against Herod the Great, annihilated by the Idumaean tyrant in 38 B.C., hid and barricaded themselves in the caves near Arbela (*Irbid*) in Galilee. Again, the *Assumption of Moses* (chs. viii f.) — written at the time of the 'war of Varus' in 4 B.C. — speaks of a Levite who expects the immediate advent of the Kingdom of God and exhorts his seven sons to 'go into a cave in the desert and die rather than transgress the Law.'

At that time there were no less than three pretenders to the Messianic dignity in the field: in Galilee, Judas, son of Ezechias, the Gaulanite; in Peraea (Transjordan), Simon, a former slave of King Herod; and in Judaea, the shepherd Athrongas (Josephus, *Jewish War*, II, iv, 2 f.; *Antiquities*, XVII, x, 6 f.).

Having burnt down the royal palace of Jericho this Simon was intercepted by Gratus, the Roman commander of the royal infantry with the archers of Trachonitis (the Hauran) and the best troops of the Samaritans, and was killed 'while endeavouring to escape up a steep ravine,' evidently trying to reach some refuge. This 'steep ravine' in the neighbourhood of Jericho is the landscape the photograph of which Mr. Harding published in *The Times* of August 9th. This Simon is described by Josephus as 'a fine man, distinguished by the uncommon height and strength of his body,' 'proud of his tall and handsome figure.'

Now it so happens that in the book of the *Sons of Light*, of which a leaf was reproduced from Dr. Sukenik's book in *The Times* of August 12th, we read of 'the high-priest' addressing the leader of this army with the words, 'Arise, O giant (*gibbor*), lead thy captivity captive, thou man of glory, plunder thy plunder . . .,' and promising him that 'the kings of the nations (*goyîm*) shall be thy servants'; in other words, that he will be the Messianic world-ruler. By translating *gibbor* (giant) as 'mighty man,' Dr. Wallenstein (*l.c.* April 29th) has missed the significance of these words: the 'giant' and 'man of glory' is no other than the handsome and gigantic Simon of Peraea, standing head and shoulders (*méga periéchōn*) over his fellow-men, the false Messiah decapitated by the sword of Gratus. The high-priest who addressed him as the coming world-ruler cannot be Jo'azar son of Boethos, the Hellenized high-priest ruling at that time as Herod's puppet over the Temple of Jerusalem, but 'the more pious and pure one' whom the Zealots then claimed to be entitled to elect (Josephus, *War*, II, i, 2; *Antiq.*, XVII, ix, 1). The man chosen by those who rose against Herod can be no other than John the Baptist, who actually appears in the Hebrew and Arabic versions of Josephus as 'the great master and high-priest' slain by Herod Agrippa. In the Russian version of Josephus's *Capture of Jerusalem* (ed. Thackeray, *Loeb Class. Libr.*, III, pp. 644 f.) he comes forth 'from the bush' (that is, from the dense *maquis* in the lower valley of the Jordan), is brought before Archelaus, threatened but released, and returns again 'beyond the Jordan.' In *Matthew* ii, 22; iii, 1, too, his appearance is placed in the year of Herod's death and the accession of Archelaus, 4 B.C.

In *Luke* (iii, 14) the Baptist is shown addressing, not 'soldiers,' as the English versions render the word, but *strateuómenoi*, men 'engaged on warfare,' as can be proved by comparing *I Cor.* ix, 7: 'who goeth a warfare' (*tis strateúetai*) 'anytime at his own expenses?' and *papyrus Rylands* 189 of the time of Emperor Hadrian, concerning the provision of military requirements for 'those campaigning in Judaea' (*en Ioudaíāi strateuoménōn*). In view of what Josephus says (*Antiq.* XVIII, v, 2) about Herod Agrippa's fear

that the Baptist's influence 'might lead to some acts of revolt,' it is inconceivable that 'those on the warpath' he addressed at the time of Archelaus could have been the troops of the Herodian king under Gratus or Ptolemy or the Roman contingent under Varus. His audience must have been the rebels fighting against Archelaus and the Romans, who came to the Jordan valley from Galilee, Judaea and Peraea. These he admonished: 'Do violence to no man, extort from no man by intimidation, blackmail nobody, be content with your rations' (*Luke* iii, 14).

To this 'field sermon' and its chain of imperatives imposing military discipline there is a striking parallel at the beginning of the book of the *Sons of Light,* which 'begins with a string of infinitives which may be taken as imperatives' (thus Dr. Wallenstein, *l.c.*):

> 'To do that which is good and right before him as commanded by the hand of Moses and by all his servants, the prophets, and to love all he has chosen and to hate all he has despised; to go afar from all evil and to cling to every good deed and to perform truth and justice and judgement in the land and not to walk any more with the stubbornness of a guilty heart and lustful eyes.'

Could anything be more in accordance with the preaching of John, who 'came in the way of righteousness'? (*Matt.* xxi, 32).

From the Pseudo-Clementines (*Recogn.* i, 54; *Hom.* ii, 23) we happen to know that the successors in the leadership of the disciples of John the Baptist —who had denied the hereditary privilege of the sons of Abraham (*Matt.* iii, 9; *Luke* iii, 8)—were two Samaritans, Dositheus and after him Simon Magus. The presence of Samaritans among the followers of John the Baptist accounts for the Samaritan elements in the calligraphy of the scribe who wrote the book of the *Sons of Light* and the presence of the *Leviticus* fragment in the Phoenician, *i.e.* Samaritan, type of script.

The next analogy to the book of the *Sons of Light* is the much discussed Sadoqite document of the disciples of the said Dositheus who followed their master to the desert around Damascus. Of this, large fragments consisting of a medley of Old Testament quotations, just like those found in the new 'sectarian document,' were found by Dr. Schechter in the lumber-room (*geniza*) of the great Cairene synagogue and published in 1910. Also, this work shows the same unorthodox dualist conception as the book of the *Wars between the Children of Light and the Children of Darkness,* since it states (vii, 19) 'Moses and Aaron arose in the service of the Prince of Light while Belial raised (the Egyptian magicians) Iannes and Mambres against them.' The writer implies that he who appeared to Moses in the burning bush and sent him and Aaron to the king of Egypt was not God himself but only the archangel Uriel. But the essential fact is that the Mandaean *Treasure House* (*Ginza* right I, xxix, 12-25) says that 'John the Baptist converted the Jews to the worship of the King of Light,' of whom the same book (right side II, xxiv; v, 10ff.) says that 'He is the creator of the whole world and there is none to compare with him.'

This is not orthodox Judaism, as it is expressed in the proclamation (*Isaiah* xlv, 5ff.) to the Persian king Cyrus, the anointed of the Lord, protesting against the Iranian dualist belief in a god of light and wisdom opposed by a power of darkness: 'I am Jahveh and there is none else, no god beside me. . . . I form the light and create darkness.' But it could be reconciled with orthodox Judaism by interpreting 'King of Light' and 'Prince of Light' as meaning 'Ruler over Light' (and darkness) and the angel of light (*Uriel*) as a mere messenger of the ineffable God. It must have been interpreted in this

way by the Jewish adversaries of Herod the Great and partisans of the Hasmonaean Antigonos, siding with the Parthian invaders of Palestine in 40 B.C. under their three Magi leaders, Pacorus, Barzapharnes and Pacorus the Cupbearer (Josephus, *War*, I, xiii, 1-5; *Antiq.*, XIV, 3-6).

It is this worship and doctrine of the 'true Light' which is presented by the Fourth Gospel (i, 6-9) as the message of John the Baptist: 'There was a man sent from God whose name was John. The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light . . . he was not that Light but was to bear witness of that Light . . . the true Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world' . . . 'the Light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not.' Those who 'believe in the Light, may be the Children of Light' (*John* xii, 36).

It is to disciples of John baptized by him (*Acts* xix, 4), living in Ephesus, the place to which Apollos 'knowing only the baptism of John' (*Acts* xvii, 25) had come, that St. Paul writes (*Eph.* v, 8): 'Ye were sometimes darkness, but now are ye light in the Lord: walk as Children of Light.' The whole Messianic community of Thessalonica were apparently such former followers of the Baptist. St. Paul writes to them (*Thess.* I, v, 5): '*All* of you are Sons of Light . . . *we* are not of the darkness.' The Gospel of St. Luke, the physician to Paul, opposes (xvi, 8) the wisdom of 'the children of the world' to that of the 'Children of Light.'

In the *Egyptian* (Coptic) *Church Order* (I pref. i, 3, 12, 37), in the (Syrian) *Apostolic Constitutions* (i, 2; ii, 32, 46, 54), and in the parallel passages of the *Older Didascalia*, printed on opposite pages in F. X. Funk's *Didascalia et Constitutiones Apostolorum* (Paderborn, 1905) the Christians are altogether identified with the 'Children of Light,' part of whose sacred book has now been discovered in the cave below Jericho in the foothills of the Arabah near the Dead Sea.

As to the so-called *Commentary on the Prophet Habacuc* found in the cave, about which Prof. G. R. Driver says in *The Times* of August 23rd that it 'would be something extraordinarily surprising before the age when the scriptures required elaborate elucidation,' it is, according to Mr. Jacob Leveen of the British Museum in his reply of Sept. 5th, 'of a contemporizing character, in which events of the past are expounded in terms of the present.' It is actually a Messianic interpretation for the 'Sons of Light' of Old Testament prophecies supposed to refer to the alleged saviour king. The next parallel to it are the 'Oracles' (*Logia*) collected from the Old Testament, according to Papias, by Matthew the tax-gatherer and used in the First Gospel, which the late Dr. Rendel Harris has so ably discussed in his two volumes, *Testimonies* (Cambridge University Press, 1916 and 1920). Commentaries of this kind are necessary for any schismatic or heretical group interpreting the Scriptures in a way different from the accepted or traditional orthodox Jewish manner. There is, indeed, such a discussion of prophetic passages (*Zechariah* ix, 9; *Isaiah* lxi, 1; lix, 14; xxxv, 5 f.) and the conclusions to be drawn from them concerning the impending appearance of the Anointed one by some priests and Levites meeting under Herod the Great and killed by him for conspiracy just before the earthquake of 31 B.C., as recorded in Josephus' *Capture of Jerusalem* (Thackeray's ed., *Loeb Classical Library*, Vol. III, pp. 636 ff.).

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MODERN CHURCHMEN'S CONFERENCE, 1950

The thirty-third annual Conference of Modern Churchmen will be held a Girton College, Cambridge, in the week beginning August 14th. Apply fo particulars to Miss Irene Walker, Churchill Court, near Bristol. (Hon. Sec of the Conference).

CORRIGENDA

In June *M.C.* foot of p. 90 and top of p. 91 *delete* the statements that Fr. Ronald Knox is a Jesuit and that the publishing firm of St. Peter and St. Paul (now defunct) described itself as 'Publishers to the Church of England.' On p. 154 line 42 from the top *substitute* 'Mass' for 'Man.' [Ed. *M.C.*]